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ON THE USE AND ABUSE OF STANDARDS
FOR LAW: GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND
OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTERS*
RICHARD K. GORDON**
Current trends in international legal scholarship have shifted from a
paradigm of state actors working within recognized sources of
international law to one that includes networks of domestic
regulators that develop and implement best practices or standards
on a global basis. The new paradigm can be seen in operation in the
efforts by onshore jurisdictions (most of which are financial centers
themselves) to restrict the activities of offshore financial centers.
Onshore jurisdictions enlisted these regulatory networks, as well as
key international organizations, such as the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development and the International
Monetary Fund, to advance new standards for income taxation,
prudential regulation, and money laundering in offshore centers. By
2005, offshore centers’ compliance with financial, regulatory, and
money laundering standards was largely complete, while there was
less success with income tax standards. The current financial crisis,
however, has spurred renewed efforts, particularly with respect to
the latter. An analysis of this experience suggests that the new
paradigm should view regulatory networks in the context of a
complex system of states and international organizations that
possess the qualities of such regulatory networks. A system of
global governance that includes both regulatory networks and these
international organizations advances fairness and objectivity and, in
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particular, may protect weak states from the coercive power of the
stronger.
Let us rather turn to a much-praised strength of the modern
person, with the truly awkward question whether, on account of
his well-known historical “Objectivity,” he has a right to call
himself . . . just, and just to a higher degree than the people of
other times. Is it true that this objectivity originates from a
heightened need and demand for justice? Or does it . . . merely
create the appearance that justice might be its real cause? Does
this objectivity perhaps tempt one to a detrimental and too
flattering bias . . . ?1
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INTRODUCTION
Nouriel Roubini, Professor of Economics and International
Business at New York University, Kenneth Rogoff, Professor of
Economics and Public Policy at Harvard University and former Chief
Economist at the International Monetary Fund, and Nariman
Behravesh, Chief Economist and Executive Vice President for IHS
Global Insight, all agree that the current financial crisis is the worst
since the Great Depression.2 From the U.S. financial sector, collapse
has spread throughout the developed world,3 though curiously, it has
affected most of the developing world less.4 Governments5 and
international financial institutions, such as the International
Monetary Fund (“IMF” or “the Fund”),6 have called for a total
review of how national regulatory structures apparently failed so
spectacularly. Many have called for a significant overhaul of domestic
supervisory systems,7 while some have called for the creation of
transnational regulators.8 Yet, while it was the financial institutions
and supervisory systems of the largest financial centers, such as the
United States and the United Kingdom, that failed so spectacularly,
the governments of these countries have tried to pin at least some of

2. David Pendery, Three Top Economists Agree 2009 Worst Financial Crisis Since
Great Depression, REUTERS, Feb. 27, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/
idUS193520+27-Feb-2009+BW20090227.
3. Deutche Welle, Chronology: Financial Crisis Spreads from US to World Markets
(Apr. 10, 2008), http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,3689713,00.html.
4. INT’L MONETARY FUND [IMF], GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT:
NAVIGATING THE FINANCIAL CHALLENGES AHEAD, at xi (2009), http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2009/02/pdf/text.pdf.
5. Timothy Geithner & Lawrence Summers, Op-Ed., A New Financial Foundation,
WASH. POST, June 15, 2009, at A15; GROUP OF TWENTY, DECLARATION ON
STRENGTHENING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 1–5 (2009), http://www.g20.org/Documents/
Fin_Deps_Fin_Reg_Annex_020409_-_1615_final.pdf.
6. IMF, THE RECENT FINANCIAL TURMOIL—INITIAL ASSESSMENT, POLICY
LESSONS, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUND SURVEILLANCE 12–14 (2008),
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2008/040908.pdf.
7. Id.
8. Michael Knigge, Nationalized Banks Are “Only Answer,” Economist Stiglitz Says,
DEUTSCHE WELLE, June 2, 2009, http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,4005355,00.html;
Patrick Wintour, We Need International Regulation to Protect Global Economy, Brown
Tells World Leaders, GUARDIAN, Sept. 25, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2008/
sep/25/gordonbrown.marketturmoil.
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the blame on an old whipping horse: offshore financial centers
(“OFCs”).9
As absurd as this may sound—trying to shift blame to tiny
jurisdictions—it has always been so, or at least from the early 1990s.10
Government authorities from the United States and a number of
other developed countries focused on three financial areas where
they claimed OFCs were acting dangerously: income taxation,
prudential financial regulation, and anti-money laundering and
terrorism financing. By and large, there was no generally accepted
international law governing these issues. Rather, onshore jurisdictions
looked to something other than law: generally accepted standards or
best practices. It was an appeal to follow these standards, not law,
that dominated the calls for change in offshore behavior. And while
the implementation of coercive or “hard power”11 of states played an
essential role in changing the behavior of offshore jurisdictions, it was
the “soft power” of persuasion, that the standards were in fact best
practices, that may have played the most important role.
The struggle of these onshore jurisdictions to adhere to nonlegal standards was an excellent example of the operation of what
scholars have termed transnational regulatory networks (“TRNs”)—
informal groups of domestic regulators that, over time, create

9. GROUP OF TWENTY, supra note 5, at 4–5. There are a number of different ways of
defining what constitutes an offshore financial center. One is to use seven criteria: (1) a
primary orientation of business toward nonresidents, (2) a favorable regulatory
environment, (3) a low- or zero-taxation scheme, (4) a disproportion between the size of
the financial sector and the domestic financing needs, (5) a disproportionate dealing in
currencies that are not the currency of the jurisdiction where the center is located, (6)
banking activity that is primarily entrepôt business, and (7) a separation from major
regulatory states. Ahmed Zoromé, Concept of Offshore Financial Centers: In Search of an
Operational Definition 6 (IMF, Working Paper No. 07/87, 2007), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp0787.pdf. Because this Article is concerned
primarily with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s
(“OECD”) Harmful Tax Practices Project, the IMF’s Offshore Financial Center
assessment project, and the Financial Action Task Force’s Non-Cooperating Countries
and Territories Project, it will refer to the key traits and lists of jurisdictions used in those
programs. See infra Appendix.
10. See infra Parts II.B.1, C.1.
11. “As defined by Joseph Nye, hard power is ‘command power that can be used to
induce others to change their position.’ It works through both carrots and sticks, rewards
and threats. Soft power, by contrast, flows from the ability to convince others they want
what you want.” Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World
Order, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 283, 291 (2004) (quoting JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., THE PARADOX
OF A MERICAN POWER: WHY THE WORLD’S ONLY SUPERPOWER CAN’T GO IT ALONE 9
(2002)) [hereinafter Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power]. “Nye first elaborated the concept
of soft power in an earlier work.” Id. at 291 n.28 (citing JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., BOUND TO
LEAD: THE CHANGING NATURE OF AMERICAN POWER 188–201 (1990)).
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generally accepted regulatory standards.12 By the middle of the first
decade of the twenty-first century, onshore jurisdictions largely
succeeded in securing compliance with financial regulatory and
money laundering standards, but had less success with their initial
goals with respect to income taxation.13 How this system developed,
and the reasons for its successes and failures, may have much to teach
as to how the new engagement with offshore centers should proceed.
In Part I, this Article begins by discussing the current state of
legal theory concerning transnational regulatory networks. It then
examines some of the problems with that theory, and suggests that, in
addition to informal groups of domestic regulators, international
organizations with TRN characteristics could play an important role
in developing and applying standards or best practices. It contrasts
these with organizations lacking key TRN characteristics. Part I
proposes that these TRNs, along with states themselves, form a
system that creates and applies standards. It suggests that the success
or failure of these systems could depend on certain characteristics
found in the TRNs and international organizations, characteristics
that legitimize both the standard itself and the process by which
adherence is assessed. The better the characteristics of a particular
system’s participants, the better the resulting standards and
implementation of those standards.
Part II tests the hypotheses in Part I by analyzing how offshore
centers, TRNs, international organizations with TRN characteristics,
and onshore jurisdictions addressed the claims that offshore centers
failed to comply with certain income tax, financial regulatory, and
anti-money laundering standards. Part II.B analyzes how the failure
to involve a TRN or international organization with key TRN
characteristics hampered the efforts of onshore jurisdictions with
respect to income tax. Particularly, it discusses how the absence of a
broadly agreed upon income tax standard, and lack of an impartial
compliance assessment process, reduced both the legitimacy and
effectiveness of those efforts. It concludes by describing how a scaledback effort adopting some TRN and quasi-TRN components has
resulted in some success by onshore jurisdictions. Part II.C continues
the analysis by examining how the participation of both a TRN and
international organization with TRN characteristics advanced the
efforts of onshore jurisdictions with respect to prudential regulation.
It discusses how the presence of a broadly agreed upon standard and
12. See infra Part I.A.
13. See infra Parts II.B.2, C.2, and D.2.
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an impartial compliance assessment process created both legitimacy
and effectiveness, and how the process served to protect the interests
of the offshore jurisdictions. Part II.D continues the analysis by
looking at the role of another TRN and the same international
organization with respect to money laundering, reaching similar
conclusions based on analogous facts.
Part III.A reviews the conclusions of the previous Part and
argues that countries, TRNs, and organizations with key TRN
characteristics constitute a system that can be seen as an organic
whole. It further argues that it was the presence of certain key
characteristics within the system that largely determined how the
system operated, as well as its successes and failures. The Article
argues that the IMF, with its blend of key TRN and certain key nonTRN characteristics, played an important role in legitimating such
coordinated action among domestic regulators in the case of financial
and anti-money laundering standards. The Article also argues that the
IMF played an important role in restraining the application of local
power by onshore jurisdictions, thereby helping ensure that OFCs
were treated more fairly by the system than they otherwise would
have been.
In Part III.B, the Article proposes a modification to the
paradigm of the operation of TRNs. Lastly, the Article draws some
final conclusions concerning the benefits and drawbacks of standards
in guiding international behavior.
I. BACKGROUND
A. TRNs and Global Governance
Over the past decade and a half, scholarly inquiry into the source
and operation of international law has undergone significant
development. The earlier paradigm was one of unitary state actors,
working either by themselves or through formal international
organizations, within the context of recognized sources of
international law (i.e., international conventions, international
customary law, general principles of law recognized by “civilized”
nations, judicial decisions, and teachings of experts).14 The focus of
inquiry was primarily on the rights and obligations of states (including
14. Annex to U.N. Charter, Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, June
26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1179 (1945); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 102–03 (1986) (defining various sources of
international law and identifying evidence of international law).
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those found in the charters of international organizations), the
adjudication of breaches in the law, and the imposition of sanctions.15
The new focus looks beyond these basic parameters.16 Instead of
treating states as unitary actors, scholars have drawn attention to the
disaggregation of state sovereignty; states act in the international
system, not just through their executives, but through their various
domestic governmental institutions, including ministries, courts,
legislatures, and regulatory agencies.17 These various governmental
units may communicate with each other through global policy
networks and not just through the State (e.g., foreign ministries) or
formal international organizations.18 Throughout, two key factors in
the development of international law have been natural law (i.e.,
what is inherently right or wrong) and positivism (i.e., what is in the
self-interest of states).19
Key players in these developments have been domestic
regulatory agencies, including those that supervise the banking,
insurance, and securities sectors. These domestic regulators are
guided in large part by the application of technical expertise. They
share their expertise and other information through semi-formal
transnational regulatory networks. The Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (“Basel Committee”)20 and the International
Organization of Securities Commissioners (“IOSCO”) are cited as

15. See, e.g., MARK W. JANIS & JOHN E. NOYES, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND
COMMENTARY (3d ed. 2005).
16. David Kennedy, a principal contributor to the new scholarship, has recently
outlined the development of new approaches to international legal theory in The Mystery
of Global Governance, 34 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 827 (2008).
17. Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power, supra note 11, at 325. Like David Kennedy,
Anne-Marie Slaughter is a principal contributor to the new scholarship.
18. See, e.g., David Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence
of International Financial Regulatory Organizations, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 281, 284 (1998)
(noting how non-treaty international financial regulatory organizations cooperate to
develop transnational rules or standards).
19. David D. Jividen, Rediscovering International Law Through Dialogue Rather than
Diatribe: Reflections on an International Legal Conference in the Aftermath of Operation
Iraqi Freedom, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 691, 693–99 (2004).
20. The Basel Committee was established in 1974 by the central bank governors of the
G-10: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION,
BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, THE HISTORY OF THE BASEL COMMITTEE AND ITS
MEMBERSHIP 1 (2009), http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.pdf?noframes=1. According to the
Committee’s Web site, “[o]ne important objective of the Committee’s work has been to
close gaps in international supervisory coverage in pursuit of two basic principles: that no
foreign banking establishment should escape supervision; and that supervision should be
adequate.” Id. at 1–2.
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being among the more influential TRNs.21 These informal groups of
national regulators have no legal personality, have little or no staff,
and have little or no formal system of internal governance. Rather,
they consist of officials from national regulators who agree to meet on
an occasional basis and to reach agreement by consensus. Other
TRNs may coordinate among themselves through semiformal supraTRNs like the Financial Stability Forum (“FSF”), which includes
these TRNs themselves as members.22
These TRNs, through application of the collective expertise of
their members and through the building of consensus, develop best
practices or standards to address technical regulatory issues faced by
most or all domestic regulators. These standards are then
promulgated as technical guidance for all regulators.23 For example,
the Basel Committee is concerned with preserving the safety and
soundness of the banking system.24 Composed of a number of
domestic banking regulators from the most important banking
centers, the Basel Committee’s various standards are designed to
promote a public good—a sound banking system—that is of benefit to
all.25 And, in a world with an increasingly interconnected financial
system where one weak link may jeopardize the entire system, the
diffusion of best practices among all regulators benefits each
jurisdiction individually. If the Basel Committee’s standards truly
address the technical problem of how best to regulate and supervise
the banking system, then problems of conflicting principle or
ideology, or of national self-interest, should be minimized.26
Of great importance is the fact that acceptance of these best
practices or standards is primarily accomplished not through the hard
power of sanctions but through more subtle peer pressure or
21. Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power, supra note 11, at 315.
22. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Global Government Networks, Global Informational
Agencies, and Disaggregated Democracy, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1041, 1046–47 n.16 (2003)
[hereinafter Slaughter, Global Government Networks]. Membership in the Financial
Stability Forum includes the IMF, a treaty-based international organization. See id.;
Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power, supra note 11, at 289 n.26.
23. Rolf H. Weber & Douglas W. Arner, Toward a New Design for International
Financial Regulation, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 391, 411 (2007).
24. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, THE
NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD: AN EXPLANATORY NOTE 1 (2001) [hereinafter BASEL
COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION], http://www.bis.org/ publ/bcbsca01.pdf.
25. Id. at 7.
26. This is not to say that the resulting standards would then prove to be wise, in that
purely technical failures might still result. The recent crisis affecting the worldwide
banking sector suggests that, at a minimum, banking supervisory standards were poorly
conceived from a purely technical perspective.
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persuasion.27 In other words, “[the system] co-opts people rather than
coerces them.”28 TRNs help educate local regulators and convince
them that the standards agreed upon are truly best practices. In
addition, scholars have argued that the market, reacting to the
regulatory best practices, can also provide incentives for
performance.29 Many have referred to this shift from traditional
international law to less formal standard-building through TRNs as
part of a global movement from “government” to “governance.”30
Because transnational regulatory networks bring highly
developed expertise to address common problems, the solutions they
offer should be less ideologically or politically motivated than those
of states acting individually or in like-minded groups. Like turning to
organizations of doctors for medical advice or engineers for views on
building bridges, turning to banking regulators for views on how to
maintain a safe and sound banking system simply makes good sense.
Implementing their advice, therefore, should be in the best interests
of everyone. While states are motivated to develop policies that are
self-serving, TRNs are motivated primarily to develop policies that
are truly best practices. And, while states may rely on the hard or
coercive power of carrots and sticks to enforce their views, TRNs rely
more on soft power, meaning simple persuasion. The emergence of
TRNs, therefore, may be of great benefit to the world. TRNs create
those standards that succeed in promoting improved behavior without
having to create new law.
B.

The Limitations of TRNs

Scholars of the globalization of regulatory law have, however,
noted some problems when standard-setting is shifted from the
national to the global level, from local regulators to international

27. Slaughter, Global Government Networks, supra note 22, at 1061. Of course, even
breaches in accepted international law may result only in peer pressure and not formal
hard power sanctions.
28. Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power, supra note 11, at 291 (quoting JOSEPH S. NYE,
JR., THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER: WHY THE WORLD'S ONLY SUPERPOWER
CAN'T GO IT ALONE 9 (2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
29. Weber & Arner, supra note 23, at 411.
30. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 16, at 832 (describing the transition to a focus on
global governance); Sol Picciotto, Regulatory Networks and Global Governance 7 (June
27–29, 2006), available at http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/232/1/Reg_Networks_&_Glob_Gov.pdf
(manuscript of speech given at The Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, University of
London, workshop) (detailing the regulation of international financial markets through
global governance).
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standard-setting bodies.31 Chief among these is a potential lack of
legitimacy. For instance, accountability of TRNs may be limited, in
that bureaucrats operating at the TRN level may not be accountable
to individual state governments or to people as a whole.32 Further, it
is typically true that not every domestic regulatory authority is
represented within a typical TRN. The Basel Committee, for
example, includes only the regulatory authorities of twenty-seven
countries, most of which are developed or very large.33 This can cause
at least three major problems. First, a lack of representation may
result in the interests of member regulatory bodies being promoted
over those of non-members. To the extent that national regulators
favor the interests of their own states over a hypothetical best practice
for the world as a whole, the resulting standards may be tainted by
state self-interest.34 This may adversely affect both the perception of
the standards as legitimate and the actual quality of the standards
themselves. Second, TRNs, like the Basel Committee, do not
normally have a mechanism for reviewing any particular standard,
outside of the TRN itself (meaning the TRN reviews its own work),
which also may affect both the perception of legitimacy and the
quality of the standards proposed. Third, TRNs do not normally have
neutral or objective ways of monitoring compliance.35 These problems
result in flaws in the standards that TRNs create and advance.
These problems may be overcome with a combination of
adequate procedural standards and substantive standards.36 Naturally,
these procedural and substantive standards may be very difficult to
implement in fact. A key problem is that the inherent conflicts among
31. Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global
Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 16 (2005). Professors Kingsbury,
Krisch, and Stewart have developed a project on global administrative law at New York
University that is part of the Regulatory Institutions Network, or “RegNet.”
32. Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Transnational Regulatory Networks and Their Limits, 34
YALE J. INT’L L. 113, 115 (2009).
33. The Committee’s members come from Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil,
Canada, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea,
Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. About
the Basel Committee, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2009).
34. Verdier, supra note 32, at 115.
35. Id. at 116.
36. Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, supra note 31, at 17, 37–42. Procedural standards
could include sufficient transparency in the adoption of rules, adequate participation by
different state regulatory authorities, reasoned decision making, and effective review of
final rules and decisions, while substantive standards could provide that any rules adopted
are proportional and rational, employ the least restrictive means to accomplish the desired
result, and satisfy legitimate expectations.
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different national regulators must be resolved if the TRN is to agree
upon one or more best practices. This will lead to concessions and
tradeoffs, breaching some or all of the procedural or substantive
standards.37
C.

Quasi-TRNs, Organizations with TRN Characteristics, and States
Themselves

This Article has so far addressed the paradigmatic TRN, like the
Basel Committee. But, there may be other groups that have some,
though not all, TRN characteristics. This Article proposes a
taxonomy based on the characteristics of TRNs (and other networks
of sub-state units) that distinguish them from states acting alone.
Quasi-TRNs. The first category of groups possessing TRN
characteristics includes quasi-TRNs, or those organizations like the
Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”) on Money Laundering and
Terrorism Financing, that have most, but not all, TRN attributes.38 As
with TRNs like the Basel Committee, the FATF has worked to create
various standards and best practices. Also like the Basel Committee,
the FATF has no legal personality and no formal system of internal
governance. While it has a few staff, it relies primarily on the
expertise of its members to conduct its work and it reaches agreement
by consensus. Unlike the Basel Committee, the members of the
FATF are states. However, as a practical matter, states’ members are
represented at the FATF by sub-state units, including regulatory
authorities (most particularly banking supervisors), as well as law
enforcement. While the Basel Committee is less susceptible to state
control than the FATF, it retains at least some of the beneficial
qualities of serving as a repository of local expertise.
Two types of international treaty organizations with TRN
characteristics. The second category includes international treaty
organizations, which this Article divides into two types: those with
broad membership and those with more restricted membership. The
former includes international financial institutions like the IMF,

37. See Verdier, supra note 32, at 115–16.
38. Anti-money laundering principles involve both regulatory and non-regulatory
(mostly related to criminal justice) matters. See DAVID FOLKERTS-LANDAU ET AL.,
TOWARD A FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY 35 (1998), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wefs/toward/index.htm (follow link for Part VI,
Prudential Regulation of Banking). For purposes of simplicity, this Article will refer to
TRNs as including matters that are primarily regulatory in nature but that may involve
some non-regulatory issues. It will also refer to regulatory issues as matters that may
require some legislative response.
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World Bank, or regional development banks. While these are
accepted as parts of the traditional international legal system, they do
share some characteristics of TRNs. Like the Basel Committee, the
IMF has created some technical standards, although none in the
traditional regulatory areas such as banking, securities, or insurance.39
Unlike the Basel Committee or the Financial Action Task Force,
however, the IMF is a treaty organization with state membership,
with a large paid professional staff, and with a formal governance
structure.40 However, states are represented at the IMF through their
central banks or finance ministries, and the organization’s staff is
selected largely because of its technical expertise, including in
financial regulatory areas.41 While the organization itself is controlled
by states, staff may still exercise its expertise with some significant
freedom from the control of those states.
Organizations like the IMF have non-TRN characteristics that
address some of the problems that scholars have identified with
TRNs. For example, unlike the Basel Committee, which has a
membership limited to only a few national banking regulators, the
IMF’s membership includes nearly every state,42 and its staff includes
individuals from nearly every country in the world.43 Such broad
membership may allay some legitimacy concerns. In addition, IMF
staff might be able to review the standards proposed by TRNs or play
a role in monitoring compliance. As will be discussed in Part III.A,
these are key roles the IMF has played.
The second type of international treaty organization is
dominated by member states more than the first type of treaty
organization with TRN characteristics, such as the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”).44 This type
39. See, e.g., IMF Dissemination Standards Bulletin Board, http://dsbb.imf.org/
Applications/web/dsbbhome/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2009) (noting that the special data
dissemination standards provide guidance as to how countries should disseminate key
economic and financial data).
40. Richard Gordon, The International Monetary Fund: A Mandate to Fight Money
Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism, in MICHAEL P. SCHARF, THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 1093, 1093–95 (2d ed. 2007).
41. Id.
42. IMF, Membership, http://www.imf.org/external/about/members.htm (last visited
Oct. 26, 2009).
43. IMF, THE ROLE OF DIVERSITY IN THE FUND’S HUMAN RESOURCE STRATEGY
5–10 (2003), http://www.imf.org/external/np/div/2003/052803.pdf.
44. Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], Ratification of the Convention of
the
OECD
[hereinafter
OECD,
Ratification
of
the
Convention],
http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,3343,en_2649_201185_1889402_1_1_1_1,00.html (last
visited Oct. 26, 2009).
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will obviously suffer from a number of problems in independence and
legitimacy due to its domination by member states. However, even
the OECD may exhibit some positive TRN characteristics; for
example, the OECD and its members may also tap into significant
domestic expertise in the fiscal area.
States themselves. While TRNs may use soft power to convince
national regulators as to what constitutes a standard or best practice,
those regulators are the ones who may exercise hard power. The
acceptance of the standard may be an exercise of soft power, but
regulatory sanctions based on that standard are backed by the police
power of the state itself. Regulatory power typically applies only to
the resident of the state in which the regulator has jurisdiction, but
applying such power to its resident can force the resident to stop
doing business with states that have not applied the standard. This
brings market pressure to bear on the non-complying state to comply.
If states whose residents have significant market power are prevented
from doing business with the non-complying state, market pressure
on the non-complying state will be significant. Thus, the application
of hard power is more effective if it is coordinated among states
whose residents have a dominating market presence.45 Obviously,
states acting as themselves embody many of the negative
characteristics that TRNs are supposed to replace. Although they are
far less associated with the creation and application of technicalbased and generally accepted standards, they can nevertheless play
their roles in relatively more benign ways that do not conflict with the
various goals of creating and implementing generally accepted
standards as described above.46
45. Another reason that onshore jurisdictions sought a coordinated response may
have been to prevent anyone from receiving a competitive advantage by using OFCs to
escape domestic tax or regulatory costs. Once the OFC’s allegedly noxious activities were
shut down, no one’s residents could benefit by using them.
46. Another category might include states acting together in informal clubs, such as
the G-8 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the
United States), University of Toronto Munk Center for International Studies G-8
Research Group, What is the G-8?, http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/what_is_g8.html (last
visited Nov. 19, 2009), or the increasingly important G-20 (Argentina, Australia, Brazil,
Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi
Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States).
Steve Brusk & Ed Henry, Officials: G-20 to Supplant G-8 as International Economic
Council, CNN.COM, Sept. 24, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/09/24/us.g.twenty
.summit/index.html. When acting in such groups, they often focus on particular technical
issues rather than simply on natural law (i.e., principle) or positivism (i.e., state interests).
Another possible category would be supra-national, quasi-federalist, multi-state polities
like the European Union. Each of these additional categories lie somewhere between
states themselves and organizations like the OECD.
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D. The Resulting Standard
TRNs, quasi-TRNs, international organizations with TRN
characteristics, and states themselves operate in an interrelated
fashion. They may not all come into play in every standard system or
come into play in the same way with respect to every issue of global
governance. Those that do, with respect to a particular regulatory
issue, will bring along their different characteristics (along with their
different pluses and minuses) to the process. Each will influence each
other and, of course, the final result. However, the success or failure
of these systems is likely to depend on the presence of beneficial or
detrimental characteristics found in the TRNs, quasi-TRNs,
international organizations with TRN characteristics, and states
themselves. The more positive attributes there are and the fewer
detrimental attributes there are, the more likely it will be that the
resulting system will work, and work beneficially.
II. THE SYSTEM IN ACTION: OFCS AND INCOME TAXATION,
PRUDENTIAL REGULATION, AND MONEY LAUNDERING
A. Overview
At its heart, the complaint that onshore jurisdictions had with
offshore centers was that the latter provided a willing sanctuary for
tax evasion, poor financial regulation, and money laundering by
onshore residents.47 There was, however, no generally accepted
international legal framework to address the causes of the alleged
damages.
Onshore centers, while conceding the costliness of the taxes and
financial regulations they imposed on resident investors, nevertheless
justified them as necessary to protect their citizens from the risks
inherent in OFCs.48 OFCs, on the other hand, realized that by
providing onshore residents with a means of avoiding these same
taxes and regulations, they could obtain the financial benefits of
handling the onshore residents’ business. Tax evasion, however, was
not the only consequence suffered by onshore centers as a result of
OFCs. By allowing onshore residents to circumvent prudential
regulations, offshore financial centers threatened the safety and
soundness of all financial systems. And, by allowing onshore residents
to circumvent anti-money laundering (and later terrorism financing

47. See infra Parts II.B.1, C.1, and D.1.
48. See infra Parts II.B.1, C.1, and D.1.
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policies), OFCs were also enablers of both serious and often violent
crime and terrorism both at home and abroad.49
While the complaint against these three OFC behaviors
developed over a more or less similar time period (from the late 1970s
to the present), each did not develop exactly at the same time—and
over the period in question they often had a different relative
importance.
B.

Income Tax
1. The Basic Indictment50

There is little question that, at least early on, most offshore
centers (as well as some onshore centers)51 offered onshore residents
49. See infra Part II.D.1.
50. This short section is a summary and, in some cases, a reorganization of arguments
on tax havens and harmful tax practices. The arguments began very early. The G-7 stated
their concern over “[t]ax schemes aimed at attracting financial and other geographically
mobile activities [that] can create harmful tax competition between States, carrying risks
of distorting trade and investment and [leading] to the erosion of national tax bases.”
Lyon Summit Communiqué: Making a Success of Globalization for the Benefit of All, U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE DISPATCH SUPPLEMENT para. 16 (June 1996), available at
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1584/is_nSUPP-2_v7/ai_18777690. They were later
developed by the OECD in Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue. OECD,
HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE 19–25 (1998) [hereinafter
OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION], available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/0/
1904176.pdf. See generally Craig Boise, Regulating Tax Competition in Offshore Centers
(Case Research Paper Series in Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 08-26, 2008), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1266329 (providing an excellent indepth discussion of other arguments for and against tax havens).
51. There was an early recognition by the OECD that it was difficult to come up with
an objective definition of a “tax haven.” OECD, INTERNATIONAL TAX AVOIDANCE AND
EVASION: FOUR RELATED STUDIES 20 (1987). However, the jurisdictions eventually
identified by the OECD looked very much like the list of offshore jurisdictions compiled
by the IMF, of problem jurisdictions compiled with respect to prudential regulation, and,
to a lesser degree, anti-money laundering. Compare OECD, TOWARDS GLOBAL TAX COOPERATION: PROGRESS IN IDENTIFYING AND ELIMINATING HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES
17 (2000) [hereinafter OECD, TOWARDS GLOBAL TAX CO-OPERATION],
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/61/2090192.pdf (citing thirty-five jurisdictions that meet
the OECD tax haven criteria), with Luca Errico & Alberto Musalem, Offshore Banking:
An Analysis of Micro- and Macro-Prudential Issues 10–11 (IMF, Working Paper No. 99/5,
1999), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=880532 (compiling a list of sixty-nine countries
and territories that have offshore financial centers capable of being exploited for tax
evasion and money laundering purposes), Press Release, Bank for International
Settlements, Financial Stability Forum Releases Grouping of Offshore Financial Centers
(OFCs) to Assist in Setting Priorities for Assessment (May 26, 2000) [hereinafter Press
Release, Bank for International Settlements], available at http://www.bis.org/press/
p000526.htm (categorizing OFCs into three priority groups based on the quality of legal
infrastructures and financial supervision provided by each jurisdiction), and FINANCIAL
ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING [FATF], FATF REVIEW TO IDENTIFY

GORDON.PTD5

516

2/9/2010 1:23 PM

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

an opportunity to evade taxes on income from capital by neither
levying tax on income from non-resident capital investments nor
reporting such income to resident countries. In effect, these offshore
tax havens invited onshore taxpayers to shift their capital investments
from onshore financial intermediaries to tax haven-based
intermediaries.
The vast majority of capital that flowed to tax havens was not
invested locally in either fixed assets like buildings or equipment or in
human assets like managers or workers. Tax havens and their
economies were quite small and needed only a tiny fraction of the
capital that flowed to them for local investment. Instead, the capital
was routed to other locations where it could be invested in actual
productive assets. The role of the tax haven was to act as a conduit or
entrepôt on the way to another destination.52
The tax haven provided a place where, as a technical legal
matter, income accumulated or where payments were made, while the
actual management could be undertaken somewhere else and the
actual capital was invested in real productive assets somewhere else.
The tax haven mainly provided services like a tax-free environment
and secrecy,53 although freedom from non-tax regulation and
dependable legal systems were also beneficial to such investors.54
In one very simple example, a person subject to residence
taxation would open a bank account in the tax haven. Third party
payments to the taxpayer would then be diverted to the tax haven
bank account. The tax haven would not tax interest income; nor
would the taxpayer voluntarily pay tax to the resident jurisdiction on
that interest.55 The ability of the taxpayer to evade taxes would be
greatly reduced if the bank were required to report interest income to
NON-COOPERATIVE COUNTRIES OR TERRITORIES: INCREASING THE WORLDWIDE
EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING MEASURES 2–10 (June 22, 2000),
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/56/43/33921824.pdf (providing a list of jurisdictions the
FATF deems to be “non-cooperative” with detrimental financial practices).
52. See RICHARD A. GORDON, TAX HAVENS AND THEIR USE BY UNITED STATES
TAXPAYERS—AN OVERVIEW 32–41 (1981) [hereinafter GORDON, TAX HAVENS AND
THEIR USE], available at http://www.archive.org/details/taxhavenstheirus01gord.
53. Id. at 15, 17.
54. Id. at 22–23.
55. Richard A. Gordon did not discuss this issue in his report, TAX HAVENS AND
THEIR USE, supra note 52, but the point had long been made elsewhere and was therefore
already widely known. Also, the amount of evasion involved was considered trivial
compared to the use of companies and other offshore vehicles for tax evasion. Telephone
Interview with David Brockway, Esq., former Chief of Staff, Joint Comm. on Taxation,
U.S. Congress 1983–86 (October 15, 2009). Gordon does discuss a related issue in the
context of earnings by companies and other vehicles. See discussion infra.
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the tax authority.56 Such reporting requirements are a key feature of
most income tax administrations.57
In the event that the payments diverted to the account in the tax
haven constituted income, the taxpayer could also fail to declare
those as income.58 The ability of the taxpayer to evade taxes in this
case would be greatly reduced if third party payers were required to
report payments and banks were required to report the beneficial
ownership of the bank account to the tax authorities.59
A taxpayer could also set up a company or a trust in the tax
haven and direct payments to that company’s bank account rather
than to his own. Profits accruing to the company or other legal form
could then escape tax in both the tax haven and country of the
taxpayer. As a general rule, the U.S. tax regime only taxed dividends
paid by a foreign company to a U.S. resident and not the earnings of
that company. However, to prevent tax avoidance, rules were
adopted to tax, in certain circumstances, the U.S. resident’s share of
the earnings of such a company when the earnings constituted passive
investment income, meaning essentially that the income from the
asset could have been paid directly to the U.S. resident without going
first through the foreign company.60 But without adequate
information provided by the tax haven, the Internal Revenue Service
would have no way of knowing such income was taxable.61 Of course,
the U.S. resident could also interpose companies between herself and
her tax haven bank account to engage in other forms of tax evasion,

56. For example, in the United States, interest paid by a U.S. resident must be
reported by the payor to the Internal Revenue Service. I.R.C. § 6049 (2006).
57. Richard K. Gordon, Jnr., Income Tax Compliance and Sanctions in Developing
Countries, in TAXATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 455, 460–61 (Richard M. Bird &
Oliver Oldman eds., 4th ed. 1990) [hereinafter Gordon, Income Tax Compliance]; Richard
K. Gordon, Law of Tax Administration and Procedure, in TAX LAW DESIGN AND
DRAFTING 95, 103 (Victor Thuronyi ed., Kluwer Law Int’l 2000) [hereinafter Gordon,
Law of Tax Administration and Procedure].
58. Again, Richard A. Gordon did not discuss this issue in his report TAX HAVENS
AND THEIR USE, supra note 52. He does discuss a related issue in the context of payments
to companies and other vehicles. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
59. For example, in the United States, many payments representing income must be
reported by the resident payor to the Internal Revenue Service, including dividends (I.R.C
§ 6042 (2006)), returns of brokers (§ 6045), interest (§ 6049), unemployment compensation
(§ 6050B), royalties (§ 6050N), and wages (§ 6051(d)).
60. See GORDON, TAX HAVENS AND THEIR USE, supra note 52, at 24–25, 50–58.
61. See id. at 8–9, 180–82.
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such as directing payments constituting would-be taxpayer income to
the company instead, as well as other techniques.62
In the absence of adequate information to determine whether a
domestic payment to a tax haven-based recipient had in fact come
from a domestic taxpayer, the domestic jurisdiction could instead levy
a gross fee on that payment approximating the amount that would be
due. Levying gross withholding taxes on payments in lieu of taxing
recipients is an important tax administration tool.63 In fact, primarily
for ease of tax administration, the generally accepted international
tax regime has long assumed that certain payments to foreigners that
usually represent income to the recipient would be taxed at a gross
rate by the jurisdiction of the payer. These would include interest,
dividends, royalties, and wages.64 Possible double taxation of the same
income was eliminated by the receiving jurisdiction by not taxing the
foreign income (which is what tax havens did) or by taxing it but
giving a credit for the taxes remitted (the general rule and the one
adopted by the United States),65 or by reducing or eliminating the
gross tax through a tax treaty (and/or combining this with the
exemption or credit system).66 Of course, going the third route means
re-opening the tax evasion problem—which is why the system would
need enough flow of information to ensure that the paying
jurisdiction could tax its residents who were receiving income through
the bank account or company or other legal form in the receiving
country. This is why the standard-form tax treaties have had articles
on exchange of information, which allows one treaty partner to
request and receive key information from the other.67
As it turned out, by the 1970s, the United States had a large
network of tax treaties reducing or eliminating these gross taxes on
62. See id. at 26–28, 59–127. Gordon directs the lion’s share of attention in his report
to these issues, presumably because they constituted the lion’s share of revenue losses. See
id.
63. See Gordon, Income Tax Compliance, supra note 57, at 460–61; Gordon, Law of
Tax Administration and Procedure, supra note 57, at 103, 115.
64. Richard J. Vann, International Aspects of Income Tax, in TAX LAW DESIGN AND
DRAFTING, supra note 57, at 718, 721–22, 762–68.
65. MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INCOME TAXATION
157 (2003).
66. Vann, supra note 64, at 718, 758–59. In 1981, the United States Model Income Tax
Treaty posited that the rate of tax on dividends should be reduced from 30 percent to 5
percent in the case of direct investment (ownership of 10 percent or more of the stock of
the payor corporation) and to 15 percent in the case of portfolio investment. Interest and
royalties should be exempt from gross tax. GORDON, TAX HAVENS AND THEIR USE,
supra note 52, at 148.
67. Vann, supra note 64, at 804–07.
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payments from U.S. persons to bank accounts in tax havens, but these
treaties lacked effective exchange-of-information provisions.68 Some
of the reasons for having such treaties were historical, based on
earlier treaties with the United Kingdom that extended benefits to
former U.K. colonies that were now tax havens.69 The treaty with the
Netherland Antilles, oddly, was tolerated so that overseas investors
could invest in the U.S. corporate debt market without having to pay
gross tax to the United States,70 thereby helping them to evade tax in
their home jurisdiction.71
2. The System in Action
Serious concern over the use of tax havens by U.S. citizens began
in 1979 when the Oversight Subcommittee of the U.S. House Ways
and Means Committee held hearings focused primarily on Caribbean
OFCs.72 Two years later, Richard A. Gordon completed a report for
the U.S. Treasury entitled Tax Havens and Their Use by United States
Taxpayers.73 In the three years following the publication of the
Gordon Report, the U.S. Congress held a series of additional
hearings on tax haven “abuse” (which also included a short discussion
of tax havens’ role in money laundering).74 The U.S. Treasury focused
on preventing tax haven abuse thorough the exchange of taxpayer
information. In 1983, President Ronald Reagan signed into law the
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, which provided economic
benefits to jurisdictions (many of which were offshore centers) that
68. GORDON, TAX HAVENS AND THEIR USE, supra note 52, at 147–49, 207–09.
69. Id. at 149.
70. Id. at 149–50.
71. Personal communication from a Senate confirmation-level U.S. Treasury official,
to author (Oct. 18, 1994).
72. The Use of Offshore Tax Havens for the Purpose of Evading Income Taxes:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th
Cong. 284–99 (1979). These hearings and subsequent developments are discussed in Bruce
Zagaris, The Procedural Aspects of U.S. Tax Policy Towards Developing Countries: Too
Many Sticks and No Carrots?, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 331, 333–35 (2003).
73. GORDON, TAX HAVENS AND THEIR USE, supra note 52.
74. See generally Improper Use of Foreign Addresses to Evade U.S. Taxes: Hearing
Before the Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on
Gov’t Operations, 97th Cong. (1982) (discussing measures to stop the illegal use of foreign
addresses to evade U.S. taxes); Tax Evasion Through the Netherlands Antilles and Other
Tax Haven Countries: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Operations,
98th Cong. 3 (1983) (focusing on money laundering through the Netherlands Antilles and
other Caribbean tax haven territories); Crime and Secrecy: The Use of Offshore Banks and
Companies: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm.
on Governmental Affairs, 98th Cong. 16, 21 (1983) (studying the use of offshore tax
shelters to evade U.S. taxes). See Zagaris, supra note 72, at 332–35, for a discussion of the
chronology of the three hearings.
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agreed to an information-exchange agreement with the United
States.75 More importantly, in 1984, the Tax Reform Act authorized
the government to deny a general exemption of withholding tax on
portfolio interest paid to any person within a jurisdiction that did not
provide the United States sufficient information to prevent evasion of
U.S. income tax by U.S. persons.76 In addition, the United States
refused to enter into new tax treaties with jurisdictions that did not
include exchange-of-information agreements.77
While some progress was made in information-exchange
agreements over the next ten years, most of the key offshore centers
did not sign on.78 In addition, some offshore centers that did agree to
enter into information-exchange agreements were less than
forthcoming in implementing those agreements.79 Also, there was a
fundamental problem with relying solely on requests for information
on particular U.S. taxpayers to prevent U.S. persons in general from
using a tax haven to avoid U.S. taxes: the U.S. tax authorities would
not, ab initio, know what information to request. Presumably, it
would be far better from the U.S. point of view if tax havens charged
a positive rate of tax and/or if they made it more difficult for U.S.
taxpayers using the tax haven as a “residence” to hide the fact that
they were in fact U.S. persons.
There were good reasons why offshore centers neither levied
income taxes on U.S. residents nor frequently on their own residents.
First, because offshore centers were essentially transit points for
capital flowing from one onshore jurisdiction to another, little or no
income on that capital had an economic source in the offshore center
itself.80 This meant that there were good theoretical reasons not to tax

75. See Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 98-67, 97 Stat. 384,
395–97 (1983). The Act created I.R.C. § 274(h)(6) to allow tax deductions for conventions
in Caribbean countries if those countries entered into exchange-of-information
agreements with the United States; see also Zagaris, supra note 72, at 332–35 (providing a
summary of the Act). See generally Gregory P. Crinion, Information Gathering on Tax
Evasion in Tax Haven Countries, 20 INT’L L. 1209 (1986) (discussing how the U.S.
Treasury uses information gathering through both treaty and non-treaty means to combat
tax avoidance and evasion in tax haven countries).
76. See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494, 648–50 (1984).
The new I.R.C. § 871(h)(1) repealed the withholding tax on certain portfolio debt
investments of non-residents, while § 871(h)(5) allowed the Secretary of the Treasury to
provide that the repeal does not apply in cases of inadequate information exchange.
77. A review of all U.S. tax treaties concluded since 1984 shows that all have
exchange-of-information agreements.
78. See Zagaris, supra note 72, at 332–37.
79. See id. at 335–36.
80. See discussion supra at Part II.B.1.
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flows of income from capital in the offshore center.81 Next, because
the vast majority of offshore centers were quite small and produced
few goods domestically (many were islands with little or no domestic
industry), most goods were imported.82 Many of these jurisdictions
may simply have concluded that it was administratively easier to raise
needed government revenue through taxes levied on imports than
taxes levied on income.83 There were also reasons based in economic
theory to conclude that indirect taxes were preferable to income
taxes. In fact, there was already a general consensus among many
economists that taxes on income from capital were undesirable due to
the disincentive effects on savings.84 There were also good reasons
why offshore centers may not have wished to act as reporting agents
for the U.S. tax authorities. Such reporting would be expensive,
particularly given that most offshore centers had no income tax
themselves and, therefore, had no pre-existing infrastructure for
reporting.85 Finally, implementing an income tax and/or reporting
income earned by non-residents to their tax authority would have the
effect of benefiting foreign jurisdictions without creating a domestic
benefit; in fact, the costs born locally, including the loss of business,
might be considerable.86
Throughout the 1980s, the United States raised the problem of
tax haven abuse with other major onshore jurisdictions, a number of
which also expressed considerable concern, especially France and, to

81. Officials from a number of offshore centers argued to IMF staff members that
because they were neither source nor resident jurisdictions, they had no reason to tax cash
flows “passing through us.” For an overview of international tax theory, see generally
GRAETZ, supra note 65 (describing the economic and administrative foundations for
taxation of income in source and residence jurisdictions).
82. Id. at 378, 390; see Boise, supra note 50, at 24.
83. Boise, supra note 50, at 25 (discussing how the relatively small size and geographic
isolation of OFCs combine to make an income tax a highly inefficient means of obtaining
revenue in comparison to duties on imports).
84. See, e.g., Andrew Atkeson et al., Capital Income Taxes; A Bad Idea, 23 FED. RES.
BANK MINN. Q. REV. 1, 11 (1999), available at http://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/
QR/QR2331.pdf (concluding that recent research suggests that capital income should not
be taxed, despite conventional wisdom to the contrary). There are many other reasons for
favoring an income tax, including the ability to tax wealthy persons, who have less
marginal utility in each additional currency unit earned, at higher effective rates than less
wealthy persons. See Carl S. Shoup, Taxes and Economic Development, 25
FINANZARCHIV 385, 388 (1966).
85. Boise, supra note 50, at 25.
86. Personal communication from Robert Mathavious, Managing Dir., Fin. Services
Comm’n of the British Virgin Islands, in Roadtown, British Virgin Islands, to author
(Aug. 16, 2004).
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a lesser extent, Germany and the United Kingdom.87 During this
period, representatives of these countries also raised the issue at
meetings of the G-7 (and later G-8, following the addition of the
Russian Federation).88
The larger onshore jurisdictions then turned to the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development. The OECD is an
international organization created by treaty that limits membership
(largely) to developed countries.89 While membership has been
increasing, at the time it included the European Union members plus
Iceland, Norway, Sweden, the United States, Canada, Japan, and
Turkey.90 The purposes of the OECD, as expressed in its founding
convention, included the promotion of policies designed to achieve
economic growth and fiscal stability;91 the OECD’s primary role was
to carry out relevant studies and act as a forum where members could
“co-operate closely and where appropriate take co-ordinated
action.”92 Much of the OECD’s prior work involving taxation focused
on developing model double-taxation conventions, including a draft
convention on exchange of taxpayer information.93 Once formed, the
United States called on the OECD to study the effect of tax havens.94
As discussed above in Part I.C, the OECD displayed some TRNlike characteristics; for example, it could call on a great deal of
expertise in the tax area from among its members. But, it failed as a
TRN on many fronts. The OECD consisted of states themselves,
meaning governments and not the regulatory agencies of states
comprised its membership.95 In other words, it was under the political
control of states. At the same time, it suffered from many of the

87. Personal communication from David H. Brockway, Esq., Chief of Staff, Joint
Comm. on Taxation, U.S. Congress 1983–86, in Washington, D.C., to author (June 12,
1989). U.K. loyalties were somewhat divided, in that a significant number of the tax
havens were also overseas territories of the United Kingdom.
88. Id.
89. See OECD, Ratification of the Convention, supra note 44.
90. See id.
91. Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,
arts. 1, 2, Dec. 14, 1960, 12 U.S.T. 1728, 888 U.N.T.S. 179, available at http://www.oecd.org/
document/7/0,3343,en_2649_201185_1915847_1_1_1_1,00.html.
92. Id. art. 3(c).
93. OECD COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON
INCOME AND ON CAPITAL 9–15 (2008) [hereinafter OECD, COMMITTEE ON FISCAL
AFFAIRS], available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/14/32/41147804.pdf.
94. Personal communication from Jeffrey Owen, Former Dir. of the Dep’t of Fiscal
Affairs, OECD, in Paris, Fr., to author (May 23, 2003).
95. See OECD, Ratification of the Convention, supra note 44.
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drawbacks of such TRNs as the Basel Committee; it was dominated
by a relatively small number of wealthy jurisdictions.96
In 1987, the OECD published a key study on tax havens that, in
many ways, mirrored the conclusions of the Gordon Report.97 The
OECD study, prepared by staff from member treasury departments
and finance ministries (and with participation of outside consultants),
also focused on the importance of exchange of information, especially
with respect to bank records, and the problems of shell companies
whose beneficial owner and controller could not be easily identified.98
The study proposed that tax treaty benefits not be extended to
jurisdictions that did not provide adequate information exchange, as
well as other countermeasures reminiscent of those proposed in the
United States in 1984.99
Beginning in the mid-1980s (but continuing through the 1990s),
the larger onshore jurisdictions attempted to involve the IMF in
analyzing and criticizing offshore center income tax policies. Also, as
discussed in Part I.C, the IMF had some of the advantages, and
avoided some of the disadvantages, of TRNs.100 While its membership
consisted of states, it had a skilled and independent professional civil
service as a member which could, at least in theory, bring relatively
unbiased technical skills to bear on problems. And unlike TRNs like
the Basel Committee or the OECD, its membership was nearly
universal.101
There were good reasons for the onshore jurisdictions to wish for
IMF involvement. It appeared to have jurisdiction; under the IMF’s
Articles of Agreement,102 members are obligated to direct their
“economic and financial policies toward the objective of fostering

96. The author attended many meetings of various committees of the OECD as well
as conferences sponsored by the OECD from 1990 to 2002. This is his personal conclusion
based on hundreds of hours of conversations with OECD staff and ambassadors to the
OECD.
97. OECD, INTERNATIONAL TAX AVOIDANCE AND EVASION: FOUR RELATED
STUDIES, supra note 51.
98. Id. at 45–46 (noting, incidentally, that this “lack of transparency” also created
opportunities for money laundering).
99. Id.
100. See the discussion in Part I.C supra concerning the IMF’s TRN-like
characteristics.
101. See IMF, Membership, supra note 42.
102. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat.
1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39 (as amended by the Second Amendment to the Articles of Agreement
of the International Monetary Fund, Apr. 30, 1976, 29 U.S.T. 2203, 15 I.L.M. 546)
[hereinafter IMF Articles]. The current text of the treaty is available from the IMF Web
site at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/index.htm.
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orderly economic growth” and underlying economic and financial
conditions, which would certainly include tax matters.103 The Articles
also give the IMF influence and even power. The IMF has the
jurisdiction to exercise surveillance over these policies,104 which they
do by writing and discussing (mostly) annual reports on each
member’s economy, meaning they could criticize a member’s tax
policies.105 The Articles also allow the Fund to provide financial
assistance to member countries in certain circumstances, including
that the borrowers follow conditions laid down by the Fund.106 Those
conditions might include changing tax policy. Finally, the Articles
allow the Fund to provide technical assistance to members (and
others), provided that the assistance is consistent with the purposes of
the Fund; in other words, they could help draft tax laws.107
The Fund, in fact, has a long tradition of attending to tax matters
when conducting surveillance, designing conditions for the use of
Fund financial resources, and providing technical assistance.108 Not
surprisingly, onshore jurisdictions intimated that they would like the
Fund to support anti-tax haven activities through its surveillance,
conditionality, and technical assistance.109
However, with respect to surveillance and conditionality, the
IMF (meaning the Executive Board, management, and staff)
concluded that its jurisdiction lay uniquely in how a particular
member’s110 tax policies affected its own economic and fiscal wellbeing. The issue of the effects of a member’s tax policies on the

103. Id. art. IV, § 1(i).
104. Id. art. IV, § 3. See generally Gordon, supra note 40, at 1096–98 (providing an
overview of the IMF’s mandate, organization, and activities).
105. See IMF Surveillance, A Factsheet (June 2009), http://www.imf.org/external/np/
exr/facts/surv.htm.
106. See IMF Articles, supra note 102, art. V, § 3; see also IMF, IMF Conditionality, A
Factsheet (Sept. 15, 2009), http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/conditio.htm
(describing the conditions of the IMF’s lending program).
107. See IMF Articles, supra note 102, art. V, § 2; see also IMF, IMF Technical
Assistance, A Factsheet (Sept. 1, 2009), http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/tech.htm
(detailing the technical assistance provided by the IMF).
108. There is an enormous amount of material on the Fund’s activities with respect to
each of these three areas of activity. Surveillance reports, country reports on the use of
Fund resources (including reviews of country performance resulting in disbursement of
funds to the borrowing member), and reports on Fund technical assistance are now
available on the Fund’s Web site, http://www.imf.org/external/pubind.htm.
109. This information comes from the author’s personal participation in the activities
of the IMF as a senior staff member during the relevant time period.
110. All but five offshore centers (Andorra, Monaco, Liechtenstein, Tuvalu, and
Nauru) are either members of the IMF directly or as an overseas territory, dependency,
special administrative area, etc. of a member.
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economic or fiscal well-being of other members should not be within
its jurisdiction, argued François Gianviti, General Counsel and
Director of the Legal Department from January 1986 to December
2004.111 With respect to tax technical assistance, which at the time was
strictly voluntary, the question of external implications of domestic
tax policy was generally not raised by IMF staff. Had it been, the
effects of such voluntary Fund-to-jurisdiction advice on curbing
OFCs’ so-called harmful tax practices would still have been, at best,
trivial.112
There are a number of reasons why the Fund as an institution
concluded that it had no jurisdiction to become involved in the
Harmful Tax Practices Project. Although the actual evidence is
sketchy and largely anecdotal, it appears that the political concerns of
a number of key Executive Board members were important—though
probably not determinative. The IMF Board consists of twenty-four
members. The five IMF members with the greatest voting power, the
United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, and France,113
select an Executive Board member directly, while other IMF
members elect Board members from self-organized constituencies.114
The United Kingdom was one of the onshore jurisdictions expressing
concern over the harmful tax practices of offshore centers, albeit with
less energy and conviction than the United States or France.115 As
such, the United Kingdom was primarily representing the concerns of
the U.K. Treasury. However, at the IMF, the United Kingdom also
represents the interests of the British Overseas Territories and Crown
Dependencies because they are, for Fund purposes, part of the
United Kingdom.116 Of these, Anguilla, Bermuda, the British Virgin
111. The author drafted a legal opinion which reached this conclusion. While it was
endorsed by the General Counsel, it was not publically released.
112. During the early 1990s, Vito Tanzi, the then head of the Fiscal Affairs
Department, began to criticize the adverse effects that tax havens had on tax systems of
other countries and speculated that those countries could force a change in the tax policies
of tax havens by a concerted levying of significant withholding tax on all payments to such
havens and levying significant tax on all payments from them. However, such a critique
was not integrated into the Fund’s surveillance or conditionality. See Vito Tanzi,
Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Future of Tax Systems (IMF, Working Paper No.
96/141, 1996), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=883038.
113. IMF Articles, supra note 102, art. XII, § 3; IMF, IMF Executive Directors and
Voting Power [hereinafter IMF, Executive Directors], http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/
memdir/eds.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2009).
114. See IMF, Executive Directors, supra note 113.
115. This information comes from the author’s personal participation in the activities
of the IMF as a senior staff member during the relevant time period.
116. Membership is restricted to countries. See IMF Articles, supra note 102, art. II;
IMF, Membership, supra note 42. The IMF’s and United Kingdom’s recognition of British
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Islands, Cayman Islands, Gibraltar, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Jersey,
Montserrat, and the Turks and Caicos Islands were offshore centers
that were allegedly engaging in harmful tax practices.117 These U.K.
territories and dependencies had jurisdiction over their own domestic
tax policies—they were not under the control of the U.K. Treasury.118
This appeared to at least some IMF staff to create a tension between
the United Kingdom’s more limited domestic interests, as expressed
through their concern over harmful tax practices, and the United
Kingdom’s broader “imperial” interests, as expressed through their
need to represent the interests of overseas territories and crown
dependencies at the IMF.
Another member of the IMF Board with divided loyalties was
Canada. Canada, a G-7 member country since 1976, led an elective
IMF Executive Board constituency that included the independent
Commonwealth countries of Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas,
Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St.
Vincent and the Grenadines,119 each of which was also an offshore
financial center with “suspect” tax practices.120 The Canadian
Executive Director (who also represented Ireland and Jamaica) was
well known to many IMF staff for actively representing the interests
of the members of its constituency. In other words, the fact that the
IMF’s membership was broadly inclusive (unlike the OECD) was
probably one reason it did not get involved in curbing tax practices of
offshore centers.
Also important was the view of the IMF management and staff,
as articulated by the Legal Department in a number of unpublished
memoranda, that there was nothing in the IMF Articles of
Agreement that created any membership obligation that a member
take action to benefit another member at their own expense.121 This
would mean that jurisdictions engaging in allegedly harmful tax
practices would only be counseled to adjust those practices if they
Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies as part of the United Kingdom for
purposes of IMF membership is long standing. These facts were made clear to the author
while he served as Senior Council in the Legal Department from 1996–2002. For a list of
British Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies, see Foreign and Commonwealth
Office (U.K.), Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories, http://collections
.europarchive.org/tna/20080205132101/www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front%3Fpagename=Ope
nMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1044360168291 (last visited Oct. 27, 2009).
117. See OECD, TOWARDS GLOBAL TAX CO-OPERATION, supra note 51, at 17, 29.
118. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Briefing to IMF Staff in Washington, D.C.
(Summer 2000).
119. IMF, Executive Directors, supra note 113.
120. OECD, TOWARDS GLOBAL TAX CO-OPERATION, supra note 51, at 17.
121. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
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were harmful to the jurisdiction itself rather than to other members.
As this was not the problem, the Fund could not be expected to
conclude that the choice of offshore jurisdictions to adopt domestic
tax policies that caused harm to other members (by undermining the
income tax base of other jurisdictions) breached some kind of Fund
obligation. This principle of “no obligation to sacrifice for another
member” applied particularly well for tax matters, in that there was
no other international law that recognized any principle of
international tax comity, i.e., that the courts (and administrative
agencies) of one country should enforce the revenue laws of another
country except on the basis of reciprocity. In other words, it was
probably restraints on the organization’s ability to act on behalf of its
wealthiest members (both its organizing principles and its
independent staff) that helped keep the IMF from acting against the
interests of the OFCs.
Following the election of President Bill Clinton and the
reappointment of Donald Lubick to the position of Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy,122 the United States began to
advance a more aggressive policy to moderate so-called harmful tax
practices.123 Concluding that a coordinated approach would be more
effective, the United States and France in particular worked with the
remaining five members of the G-7 to mobilize the OECD to
“develop measures to counter the distorting effects of harmful tax
competition on investment and financing decisions and the
consequences for national tax bases” and report back to the G-7 in
1998.124
A problem with such a coordinated approach was that a number
of OECD jurisdictions were themselves offshore centers guilty of the
same behavior. For example, most IMF staff appeared to consider
Luxembourg and Switzerland, who had low or no tax on income from
capital and relatively strict bank secrecy, offshore centers.125
Nevertheless, the OECD as an organization duly issued a report

122. Assistant Secretary Lubick held the same position under President Jimmy Carter.
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Donald C. Lubick Confirmed as Treasury
Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy (Feb. 13, 1998), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/
press/releases/rr2225.htm.
123. Personal communication from Donald Lubick, Assistant Sec’y of the Treasury for
Tax Policy, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, in Washington, D.C., to author (Summer 1994).
124. OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 50, at 7 (quoting the
Ministerial Communiqué of May 1996).
125. This information comes from the author’s personal participation in the activities
of the IMF during the relevant time period.
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entitled Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue.126
Among other things, the report called for the OECD to develop a list
of uncooperative tax havens and “a number of Recommendations for
action at the level of national legislation and in tax treaties.”127 The
report also noted that “[c]ountries should remain free to design their
own tax systems as long as they abide by internationally accepted
standards in doing so,”128 later noting that while there was nothing
inherently wrong with countries “that are able to finance their public
services with no or nominal income taxes,”129 those that “offer
themselves as places to be used by non-residents to escape [income]
tax in their country of residence” were in breach of accepted
standards of behavior.130 Nevertheless, in identifying “harmful
preferential tax regimes,” meaning breaches of accepted standards,
the report listed a number of “key factors”: (1) the regime imposes
low or no taxes on the relevant income (from geographically mobile
financial and other service activities); (2) the regime is “ring-fenced”
from the domestic economy (meaning that there is a domestic income
tax, but that non-resident taxpayers are exempt from paying income
tax); (3) the regime lacks transparency (e.g., the details of the regime
or its application are not apparent or there is inadequate regulatory
supervision or financial disclosure); and finally (4) there is no
effective exchange of information with respect to the regime.131
The report discussed how many OECD members had some
aspects of harmful preferential regimes and produced a proposal for

126. OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 50, at 1. At their 1997
meetings, the G-8 reaffirmed the importance of combating harmful tax competition.
FINANCE MINISTERS’ REPORT, DENVER ECONOMIC SUMMIT (June 1997), available at
http://www.state.gov/www/issues/economic/summit/finance97.html. Soon after, the OECD
Committee on Fiscal Affairs created the “Special Sessions on Tax Competition” in
response to the ministerial communiqué. The Special Sessions prepared the report under
the joint chairmanship of France and Japan. The Committee adopted the report at its
session on the 20th of January, 1998. See OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra
note 50, at 7.
127. OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 50, at 50.
128. Id. at 15.
129. Id. at 20. At the time of the drafting of the report there was much discussion about
how the success of the modern welfare state depended on effective taxation of income
from capital, and that tax havens, by permitting avoidance or evasion of that tax, were
therefore endangering the welfare state. See generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah,
Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L.
REV. 1573 (2000) (arguing that tax havens allow large amounts of income from capital to
go untaxed, depriving countries of revenue and forcing them to rely on forms of taxation
less progressive than the income tax, threatening the welfare state).
130. OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 50, at 20.
131. Id. at 21.
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dealing with these members.132 It also recommended creating a
separate list of possible “tax havens.”133 When the list came out in the
2000 OECD report Toward Global Tax Co-operation, no OECD
members were on the list.134 Not surprisingly, due to the fact that
OECD members would not be subject to the harmful tax practices,
the project became a major criticism by project opponents.135 Simply
put, the standards were not designed to be universal. The OECD was
acting even less like a traditional TRN.136
But a key problem for the OECD was identifying internationally
accepted standards of income tax behavior. As the report correctly
noted, there was no generally accepted standard that countries
impose an income tax, or more specifically, a tax on income from
capital.137 As argued earlier by at least some officials from OFCs, it
was problematic to argue that jurisdictions should be compelled to
enforce a tax on the income from capital of their non-residents,
especially given no international standard and no international rule of
tax comity.138 This was the main purpose of TRNs in the first place.
The OECD’s 2000 report appeared to accept some of the
arguments raised against the Harmful Tax Practices Project; while the
report restated the four “key factors,” it noted at the beginning that
the project was “not primarily about collecting taxes” or “promot[ing]
the harmonisation of income taxes” or “dictating to any country what
should be the appropriate level of tax rates.”139 Instead, “the project is
about ensuring that the burden of taxation is fairly shared and that
tax should not be the dominant factor in making capital allocation
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 70–71.
Id. at 71.
OECD, TOWARDS GLOBAL TAX CO-OPERATION, supra note 51, at 17.
See J.C. SHARMAN, HAVENS IN A STORM: THE STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL TAX
REGULATION 44–45 (2006).
136. During the 1990s, the European Union also began the process of addressing the
more specific problem of tax evasion on savings income when an individual resident of one
E.U. member country held an account in a financial institution in another E.U. member
country whose tax authority did not withhold tax on interest paid to the non-resident or
report the payment of that interest to the resident jurisdiction’s tax authority. See generally
Thomas Perrot, Legislative Development: EC Draft Directive on the Taxation of Savings:
Still a Long (and Bumpy) Road Ahead, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 475 (2003) (setting the
Directive’s objective to deter tax avoidance); Suzanne Walsh, Taxation of Cross-Border
Interest Flows: The Promises and Failures of the European Union Approach, 37 GEO.
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 251 (2005) (discussing the steps developed nations are taking to
combat the threat of tax evasion created by “the increased mobility of capital”).
137. OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 50, at 16.
138. This information comes from the author’s personal participation in the activities
of the IMF during the relevant time period.
139. OECD, TOWARDS GLOBAL TAX CO-OPERATION, supra note 51, at 5.
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decisions . . . . The project will, by promoting a co-operative
framework, support the effective fiscal sovereignty of countries over
the design of their tax systems.”140
There are many obvious problems and contradictions in this
short statement. The project apparently is about collecting taxes in
cases where there is no harmonization of tax rates; tax havens, by
making it possible to reduce or eliminate tax on income from capital
regardless of where the investment is actually located, actually ensure
that tax is no factor in making capital allocation decisions; and
effective implementation of the project will (they hope) result in
offshore centers and other tax havens changing the design of their tax
systems. One can almost pity the OECD. They outline the ideological
reason why there is no generally accepted standard, then pretend that
they have one that works. This is hardly the way a successful TRN is
supposed to work.
Finally, the report also compiled a preliminary list of tax havens
from which a list of “uncooperative” tax havens was to be distilled
over the next twelve months.141 The report concluded that in order to
avoid inclusion on the list of “Uncooperative Tax Havens,” the
jurisdiction would have to make a public political commitment to
adopt a schedule of progressive changes to eliminate its harmful tax
practices (i.e., the four key factors) by the end of 2005.142 The OECD
also laid out a plan for dialogue with so-called “cooperative”
jurisdictions.143
While the 2000 Report retained the same extensive definition of
harmful tax practices,144 that same year, the OECD released another
report focusing in particular on the importance of the exchange of
information, especially with respect to gathering information on bank
accounts.145 As discussed above in Part II.B.1, with effective
exchanges of information in cases of suspected tax evasion, onshore
tax authorities could request and receive information from offshore
jurisdictions about bank accounts and other information held by
those specific taxpayers.146 However, those authorities would first
have to identify particular taxpayers as possible evaders and fulfill

140. Id.
141. Id. at 17–18.
142. Id. at 17–19.
143. Id. at 20–21.
144. OECD, TOWARDS GLOBAL TAX CO-OPERATION, supra note 51, at 9.
145. See OECD, IMPROVING ACCESS TO BANK INFORMATION FOR TAX PURPOSES
(2000), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/7/2497487.pdf.
146. See supra notes 57–58, 60, 62, and 68, and accompanying text.
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domestic legal requirements for requesting such information.147 Even
if they did, they often would not know what information to request.148
While far better than nothing, just agreeing to exchanges of
information would not solve the problems raised by onshore
jurisdictions. Indeed, that was why the attributes of uncooperative
jurisdictions went beyond exchange-of-information agreements.
It was also around this time that the Financial Stability Forum
(another quasi-TRN, to be discussed at greater length below in Part
II.C.2) released its Group III list of jurisdictions that had the most
problematic financial supervisory systems.149 The list included twentyfive offshore centers, including nearly all those on the OECD tax
haven list.150
Not long after the release of the Report, then U.S. Secretary of
the Treasury, Lawrence Summers, tried once again to get the IMF
involved. He issued a statement to the International Monetary and
Finance Committee of the IMF calling “abuse of the global financial
system” a “global public bad” and calling on the IMF and the World
Bank to prepare a joint report on their roles in protecting the
integrity of the financial system against abuse.151 He issued the
statement as the IMF was implementing its Financial Sector
Assessment Program and Offshore Financial Center Assessment
Program.152 Some IMF senior staff involved assumed that the
statement might have been directed, at least in part, toward the
possibility of including harmful tax practices as a subject for
assessment under those two programs.153
While Secretary Summers specifically mentioned money
laundering in his statement, staff prepared a background paper
examining financial system abuse as broadly defined, including tax
147. OECD, IMPROVING A CCESS TO BANK INFORMATION FOR TAX PURPOSES, supra
note 145, at 8–9, 19.
148. “As noted, the OECD’s proposed solution has been bilateral tax information
exchange agreements requiring exchange of information on request, . . . which is not
effective exchange of information.” David Spencer, Liechtenstein and the Subprime Crisis:
Systemic Issues, J. INT’L TAX’N, Sept. 2008, at 14, 21. For a discussion of the different types
of tax evasion opportunities that remain, see generally David Spencer and J.C. Sharman,
International Tax Cooperation, J. INT’L TAX’N, Dec. 2007, at 34, 35–49.
149. See Press Release, Bank for International Settlements, supra note 51.
150. Id.
151. Lawrence H. Summers, U.S. Treasury Sec’y, Statement to the International
Monetary and Finance Committee (Sept. 24, 2000), available at http://www.imf.org/
external/am/2000/imfc/eng/usa.htm.
152. These issues will be discussed at greater length infra in Parts II.C and D.
153. The author was a party to these discussions. Due to sensitivities involved, names
and titles of discussants in this section are withheld.
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evasion.154 The paper also discussed the OECD’s Harmful Tax
Practices Project and its progress.155 A number of IMF Executive
Directors spoke with IMF Management and the staff involved in
drafting the background paper and made it clear that they opposed
any IMF involvement in the Harmful Tax Practices Project, in part
because the Fund should not be involved in any program that was not
“voluntary” or that was “coercive,”156 which, incidentally, are
concepts largely contrary to the way in which TRNs are supposed to
operate.157 The next staff paper (co-authored with World Bank staff)
deleted any discussion of harmful tax practices and focused
exclusively on money laundering.158
The next OECD report, released in early 2001, included a list of
uncooperative jurisdictions (to be updated by the OECD) for the
purpose of coordinating the application of the so-called “defensive
measures.”159 They were actually quite straightforward. They would
disallow normally available deductions, exemptions, allowances, and
credits, as well as apply withholding taxes and increase audits, relating
to transactions with residents or entities in the uncooperative
jurisdictions.160
While roundly described as the exercise of hard power sanctions
and criticized as an improper application of financial force by the
powerful against the weak,161 what the OECD termed
“countermeasures” turned out to be primarily an exercise of purely
domestic sovereignty by OECD members; in fact, the kinds of
activities that members of TRNs, meaning domestic regulatory
authorities, frequently undertake. This is because the
countermeasures would have affected only the tax liabilities of
physical or legal persons resident in the onshore domestic jurisdiction
154. IMF, FINANCIAL SYSTEM ABUSE, FINANCIAL CRIME AND MONEY
LAUNDERING—BACKGROUND PAPER 3 (2001) [hereinafter IMF, FINANCIAL SYSTEM
ABUSE], available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/ml/2001/eng/021201.pdf.
155. Id. at 19.
156. This information comes from the author’s personal participation in the activities
of the IMF during the relevant time period.
157. See the discussion about lack of coerciveness in TRN participation supra in Part
I.A.
158. See IMF AND WORLD BANK, ENHANCING CONTRIBUTIONS TO COMBATING
MONEY LAUNDERING: POLICY PAPER 2–9 (2001), available at http://www.imf.org/
external/np/ml/2001/eng/042601.PDF.
159. OECD, OECD’s PROJECT ON HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES: THE 2001 PROGRESS
REPORT 8–9 (2001) [hereinafter OECD, PROJECT ON HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES],
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/28/2664438.pdf.
160. Id. at 13.
161. See infra notes 168–71 and accompanying text.
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(or the flow of income passing through them to non-residents). None
of the measures proposed would have required an OFC to collect
taxes and remit them to an onshore jurisdiction; nor did the onshore
jurisdictions threaten to withhold financial or other assistance.162 In
effect, local tax authorities would withhold tax benefits from their
own residents when they engaged in activities with tax havens.
Nevertheless, the OECD was not simply discussing proposed
standards that should be accepted by domestic authorities based on
persuasion, but was advocating that local authorities enforce those
standards by using state (i.e., hard) power.
Nor did the countermeasures breach any generally accepted
international obligation. While such an obligation could arise from a
double-taxation convention (or possibly a bilateral investment
treaty), no such treaties were affected; and even if they were, such
treaties permit parties unilaterally to withdraw after a notice
period.163 One possible problem was that the deductions, exemptions,
and credits to be disallowed (or the reduction or elimination of
withholding taxes to be foregone) were included in international
income tax principles generally accepted by countries with income
taxes, and accepted by the major onshore jurisdictions.164 Assuming a
tax on income from capital, there are good reasons for the acceptance
of these principles, which have been enshrined in the laws of most
OECD countries and in the OECD Model Double Taxation
Convention.165 In effect, the anti-tax haven OECD members were
saying, “help us enforce our income taxes on our own people or we
will adopt very different tax rules when our taxpayers engage in
transactions with your taxpayers.” The threatened countermeasures
may have been significant, but they were not illegal under
international law or custom. If applied, the countermeasures would
increase the tax owed to the onshore jurisdiction.166 Increasing that
162. OECD, PROJECT ON HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES, supra note 159, at 11–13.
163. See OECD, COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, supra note 93, art. 20; U.S. Model
Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 16 (2004), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
117601.pdf. But see George Rawlings, Taxes and Transnational Treaties: Responsive
Regulation and the Reassertion of Offshore Sovereignty, 29 LAW & POL’Y 51, 51–56 (2007)
(describing the shift from a “command-and-control regulatory approach” in dealing with
tax havens to a more “responsive regulatory dialogue”).
164. For further discussion, see Benjamin R. Hartman, Coercing Cooperation from
Offshore Centers: Identity and Coincidence of International Obligations Against Money
Laundering and Harmful Tax Competition, 24 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 253, 279–81
(2001).
165. See Vann, supra note 64, at 718, 719–22, and 725–29.
166. Increasing the withholding tax on dividends or interest paid to a non-resident
located in an OFC could, at least in theory, be suffered by the offshore resident. However,
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person’s taxes would reduce after-tax income, which would reduce
the ultimate profitability of that person. That would act as a serious
disincentive for that person to conduct business with a person located
in a blacklisted jurisdiction, which would, in turn, create competitive
pressure on the offshore jurisdiction to change its rules so that it was
no longer blacklisted.167 This would be the exercise of hard power, but
one that was applied to the OFC only indirectly, through the onshore
resident party and through the operation of the market.
These countermeasures, however, were offered as part of a
concerted effort by OECD members to change how OFCs operated.
As described above, they came in the form of a standard accepted
only by certain members of the OECD (rather than generally
accepted), via OECD-initiated assessments (rather than those of
neutral parties), and of blacklisting by the OECD (again, rather than
by a neutral party), followed by a concerted application of
countermeasures by each local state (rather than through persuasion).
In many ways this was a textbook example of how TRNs do not
operate. This greatly exacerbated the negative reactions that
followed.
The OECD program opponents presented the program as a form
of bullying which resulted in immediate protests by officials in those
offshore jurisdictions. One major complaint was procedural, that the
OECD was not a truly representative forum, but one dominated by
wealthy onshore jurisdictions that essentially ignored all principles of
due process. The Secretary General of the Commonwealth, which
includes nearly all of the listed English-speaking tax havens, referred
to the OECD as “prosecutor, judge, jury and jailer.”168 Another major
complaint was more substantive, that the OECD, by imposing
domestic tax policies on small offshore jurisdictions was practicing
“economic imperialism” and discriminating against “small states.”169
Predictably, the most vocal and effective complaint was that the
the offshore resident would not be the actual taxpayer, in that tax is withheld at source,
i.e., by the onshore resident. In other words, the effect on the offshore resident would only
be indirect.
167. See J.C. Sharman & Gregory Rawlings, National Tax Blacklists: A Comparative
Analysis, J. INT’L TAX’N, Sept. 2006, at 38, 47, 64 (describing the OECD Harmful Tax
Competition initiative and discussing criticism of the initiative).
168. Anthony B. van Fossen, Money Laundering, Global Financial Instability, and Tax
Havens in the Pacific Islands, 15 CONTEMP. PAC. 237, 260 (2003) (quoting Eugene
Bingham & John Andrews, Islands Face Dirty-Money Backlash, N.Z. HERALD, Mar. 3,
2001, available at http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=174807
&pnum=0).
169. Id. at 259 (quoting PALAU HORIZON, Aug. 24, 2001), 260 (quoting MONEY
LAUNDERING MONITOR, Jan. 2001).
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OECD’s “defensive countermeasures” were actually coercive
sanctions, in effect the illegitimate application of hard power by the
rich and powerful against the small and weak.170
There was some agreement with this view in the popular press,
among economists and think-tanks, and in academia.171 In effect, the
offshore centers adopted what turned out to be a powerful rhetorical
argument that the larger onshore centers were trying to impose
“standards” that were neither internationally accepted nor even
applicable to some of their own members.172
Finally, the OECD Harmful Tax Practices Project was being
carried out almost simultaneously with the Financial Action Task
Force’s non-cooperating countries and territories initiative, and there
was significant overlap between the two blacklists.173 One major
complaint was that the two issues, tax evasion and the laundering of
illegal proceeds, were being conflated and confused by the press and
the public so that tax havens were confused with countries that
allowed drug kingpins or corrupt dictators to hide their ill-gotten
gains.174
The OECD appeared to be caught somewhat unaware by the
fierce nature of the reaction against the Harmful Tax Practices
Project and began to change its tactics. While it could not find a TRN
or an international organization with TRN characteristics like the
IMF to support its initiative, the OECD took steps to make the
process more inclusive and less confrontational. Starting in the spring
of 2001, the OECD held regional face-to-face meetings with officials
from the listed countries in an attempt to negotiate agreements.175
170. See SHARMAN, supra note 135, at 101–48. For further examples, see Vaughn E.
James, Twenty-First Century Pirates of the Caribbean: How the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development Robbed Fourteen CARICOM Countries of Their Tax and
Economic Policy Sovereignty, 34 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 28–39 (2002)
(describing “the CARICOM reaction to OECD lists” and the “economic impact of the
OECD listing on CARICOM nations”); Akiko Hishikawa, Note, The Death of Tax
Havens?, 25 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 389, 401–12 (2002) (describing responses to the
OECD’s designation as tax havens by the designated countries).
171. See, e.g., Hartman, supra note 164, at 279–81 (arguing that countermeasures are in
fact sanctions to remedy a breach of international obligations, but that because there are
no such obligations with respect to tax the sanctions are illegitimate); James, supra note
170, at 5 (“[T]he OECD, like pirates who plied the waters of the Caribbean during the
sixteenth through nineteenth centuries, has, through its ill-advised anti-harmful tax
competition initiative, effectively robbed fourteen CARICOM nations of their sovereign
right to determine their tax and economic policies.”).
172. SHARMAN, supra note 135, at 71, 101–48.
173. See infra Appendix.
174. See van Fossen, supra note 168, at 260.
175. See id. at 259–60.
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Also, it was at this time that the replacement of the Clinton
administration with the Bush administration resulted in a serious
shifting of gears.
Even during the Clinton administration, many conservative
Republicans had opposed income taxes in general for ideological
reasons while others opposed the OECD’s actions as a breach of
international sovereignty.176 There had been little support among
Republicans in the House and Senate for the OECD initiative;
Richard Armey, the House majority leader, even called the OECD “a
global network of tax police.”177 According to some press reports (and
private discussions with administration officials), Lawrence Lindsey,
then Director of the National Economic Council, and R. Glenn
Hubbard, Chairman, President’s Council of Economic Advisers (and
incidentally Chairman, Economic Policy Committee, Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development), both adopted views that
the availability of tax havens not only helped keep tax rates in the
United States down, but they actually helped U.S. companies
compete by reducing tax rates.178 In June 2001, Treasury Secretary
Paul O’Neill stated in a meeting at the OECD that the United States
could no longer support the initiative, at least the way in which it was
now being pressed.179 Also, as news of this development found its way
back to the IMF, Huw Evans, IMF Executive Director for the United
Kingdom, concluded that the efforts to involve the Fund in anti-tax
haven activities would now be over.
In response, the OECD took several actions. First, the shift in
focus hinted at in a 2000 paper on bank secrecy became concrete.
Moving beyond the existing OECD model on exchange of
information, in 2002, the OECD published a new model covering
both civil and criminal taxation matters, known as Tax Information
Exchange Agreements (“TIEAs”).180 The OECD also created the
Global Forum on Taxation (later retroactively renamed Global
Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information), with a
principle goal of advancing the adoption of transparency in the
176. Id. at 261–62.
177. Id. at 262 (internal quotation marks omitted).
178. See Adam Cohen, Banking on Secrecy: Terrorists Oppose Scrutiny of Offshore
Accounts. And So Do Many U.S. Bankers and Lawmakers, CNN.COM, Oct. 15, 2001,
http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/time/2001/10/22/secrecy.html.
179. Id. This was also reported to the author by a senior civil servant at the OECD.
180. OECD, AGREEMENT ON EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON TAX MATTERS
(2002), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/43/2082215.pdf; Press Release, OECD, OECD
Releases Model Agreement on Exchange of Information in Tax Matters (Apr. 18, 2002),
http://www.oecd.org/document/4/0,3343,en_2649_33745_2082244_1_1_1_1,00.html.
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ownership and control of companies and trusts and exchange of that
information and other information on bank accounts, of which TIEAs
were an essential part. From here on, the Global Forum and the
Harmful Tax Practices programs moved forward in tandem.
In 2003, Canada hosted a Global Forum meeting bringing
together representatives of forty OECD and non-OECD
governments.181 Many OFCs participated. They agreed to continue
their work on advancing principles of transparency and exchange of
information.182
The following year, another Global Forum was convened in
Berlin.183 The meeting sought to create an assessment process to
determine how all jurisdictions, including OECD members,184 were
complying with the goal of transparency and information exchange
based on the TIEA process,185 particularly the “financial centers,”
which included Andorra, Barbados, Brunei, Liechtenstein, MacaoChina, Malaysia (Labuan), and the Marshall Islands, among others.186
Interestingly, the Forum called for a process with “fairness and
integrity” and a “methodology and consistent framework” using an
“agreed template.”187 The Forum also agreed that “the identification
and review of significant financial centres should be a dynamic
process and that these countries should be invited to participate in the
Global Forum.”188 Finally, it agreed that “the information compiled
about all the countries under review would be made available to the
full Global Forum for comments and questions prior to finalisation,”
and that “[w]here factual disagreements arise, a small group of . . .
Participating Partners would be designated following an agreed
process to try to resolve the factual disagreement.”189
It seemed that the OECD learned from its Harmful Tax
Practices experience. The new Global Forum adopted a less
ambitious goal than the original Harmful Tax Practices set of four
181. Closing Statement by the Co-Chairs, OECD Global Forum on Taxation, Ottawa,
(Oct. 16, 2003) http://www.oecd.org/document/0/0,3343,en_2649_33745_16643264_1_1
_1_1,00.html.
182. Id.
183. Press Release, OECD, Outcome, Conclusion of the Meeting of the OECD Global
Forum on Taxation in Berlin (June 3–4, 2004), http://www.oecd.org/document/5/0,3343,en
_2649_33745_31967429_1_1_1_1,00.html.
184. OECD, A PROCESS FOR ACHIEVING A GLOBAL LEVEL PLAYING FIELD 2 (June
4, 2004), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/13/0/31967501.pdf.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 6 n.7.
187. Id. at 6.
188. Id.
189. Id.

GORDON.PTD5

538

2/9/2010 1:23 PM

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

“key factors” in identifying “harmful preferential tax regimes.”190 The
focus now was on information exchange, a principle that even OFCs
might well accept as an acceptable standard. After all, many had
signed exchange-of-information agreements with countries like the
United States.191 Also, such a standard would still leave offshore
centers considerable leeway in how to organize their domestic tax
structures.
Of particular interest is that the OECD made specific efforts to
increase the number of jurisdictions involved in the process, including
non-OECD countries and even assessed jurisdictions themselves.
Increasing the number of members would help reduce the problem
the OECD had in its Harmful Tax Practices—a small and relatively
cohesive membership, identified above in Part I.B as a significant
limitation in the legitimacy of TRNs. Next, the new program called
for an agreed methodology and template for assessment, ensuring
more consistency and uniformity among those assessed—another
matter addressed in Part I.B. It also called for a review process
involving the concerned parties, a third issue addressed above. And
finally, there was no specific call for countermeasures. By moving
toward a new Global Forum, the OECD was adopting many of the
characteristics of successful TRNs. Meanwhile, by 2004 only five
offshore centers remained on the OECD list, three of which,
Andorra, Liechtenstein, and Monaco, are located in Europe.192
The next meeting of the Global Forum was in Melbourne in
2005.193 The meeting attracted a significant number of offshore
centers, although a number of invited OFCs did not attend.194 The
report of the meeting noted progress in reviewing countries’
adherence to principles of transparency and effective exchange of
information.195 The report also noted that the Global Forum effort
was not the same as the Harmful Tax Practices effort, but that “the
Report, once completed and as updated periodically, will provide
more up-to-date information [than the OECD 2000 Harmful Tax
190. See OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 50, at 21.
191. See supra notes 67, 75–77 and accompanying text.
192. See OECD, THE OECD’S PROJECT ON HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES: THE 2004
PROGRESS REPORT 14 (2004), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/33/30901115.pdf (listing
Andorra, the Principality of Liechtenstein, Liberia, the Principality of Monaco, and the
Republic of the Marshall Islands).
193. See OECD, PROGRESS TOWARDS A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD: OUTCOMES OF THE
OECD GLOBAL FORUM ON TAXATION, MELBOURNE (Nov. 2005), http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/28/55/35670025.pdf.
194. See id. at 9.
195. See id. at 3.
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Practice list]. This does not reflect any judgment by the Global Forum
on the tax or other policies underlying country lists.”196 In other
words, the two efforts were different, and the Forum did not replace
Harmful Tax Practices, but those who had been adversely affected by
the latter could count on the former to help out.
OFCs rapidly began to enter into TIEA agreements with
onshore jurisdictions.197 By the end of 2002, only six offshore centers
and one onshore jurisdiction had not committed to effective
exchanges of information.198 Meanwhile, by 2004 only five offshore
centers remained on the OECD list, three of which, Andorra,
Liechtenstein, and Monaco, are located in Europe.199
Nevertheless, the onshore centers did not get what they most
wanted in the beginning of the process: the end of no (or low) income
taxation or, barring that, the full reporting to onshore centers of all
non-resident activities. Because of this, an onshore resident could still
easily evade income taxes by setting up a company and bank account
in an offshore jurisdiction rather than in a jurisdiction that levied tax.
While in cases of suspected tax evasion onshore tax authorities could
request, and now receive, information from offshore jurisdictions
about those specific taxpayers, those authorities would first have to
suspect the evasion. Even if they did, they often would not know what
information to request.200 On the other hand, OFCs were not fully
satisfied. Complaints of undue pressure to force OFCs to accept
burdens they should not have to—spending money to implement tax
systems they do not believe in for the benefit of far richer countries—
continue.201
196. Id. at 8.
197. See Press Release, OECD, OECD Reports Progress in Fighting Offshore Tax
Evasion, but Says More Efforts Are Needed (Oct. 12, 2007), http://www.oecd.org/
document/48/0,3343,en_2649_201185_39482288_1_1_1_1,00.html.
198. See Press Release, OECD, The OECD Issues the List of Unco-operative Tax
Havens (Apr. 18, 2002), http://www.oecd.org/document/19/0,3343,en_2649_33745_2082323
_1_1_1_1,00.html (listing Andorra, the Principality of Liechtenstein, Liberia, the
Principality of Monaco, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Republic of Nauru, and
the Republic of Vanuatu as the remaining “unco-operative tax havens”).
199. See OECD, THE OECD’S PROJECT ON HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES, supra note
192, at 14 (listing Andorra, the Principality of Liechtenstein, Liberia, the Principality of
Monaco, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands).
200. “As noted, the OECD’s proposed solution has been bilateral tax information
exchange agreements requiring exchange of information on request . . . which is not
effective exchange of information.” Spencer, supra note 148, at 21 (emphasis added). For a
discussion of the different types of tax evasion opportunities that remain, see generally
Spencer & Sharman, supra note 148, at 35–49.
201. Interviews with various IMF staff, IMF Offshore Financial Center Assessment
Program (Summer 2007–present).

GORDON.PTD5

540

2/9/2010 1:23 PM

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

The income tax standards system began with many detrimental
attributes—no real TRN, no real international organization with
TRN attributes—and depended largely on the actions of powerful
states. It had difficulty producing generally accepted standards and
implementing them successfully. It had less than perfect success in
protecting the interests of weak states over the strong.
The OECD shifted gears after the outcry raised against the
Harmful Tax Practices Project. It created a far more inclusive suborganization—the Global Forum. The OECD turned away from a
standard not widely accepted and adopted a less stringent but more
widely acceptable standard. It adopted a system of assessment that
was less arbitrary and that included a review process for the countries
affected. And finally, it had no blacklist. By adding these components
of successful TRNs, the Global Forum process was far more widely
accepted.
C.

Prudential Regulation
1. The Basic Indictment202

Onshore jurisdictions claimed that OFCs destabilized the
international financial system by failing to implement prudential
regulations, which allowed both offshore institutions and onshore
institutions that use offshore facilities to avoid onshore regulations,
putting them at greater risk of failure. While all prudentially
supervised institutions (banks, insurance companies, and securities
firms) were of concern to the onshore jurisdictions, banks were the
primary focus of onshore attention. According to onshore
jurisdictions, because OFCs either did not promulgate adequate
prudential regulations or implement them effectively through a
program of compliance, an OFC-chartered bank could act in ways
that would threaten its own soundness. These could include lending in
excess of a prescribed capital minimum and failing to control for
default and concentration risk. Another allegation was that, in
granting banking licenses, OFC regulators did not vet owners and
controllers to see if they were “fit and proper,” which would have
made poor management and poor compliance with prudential
principles less likely. Together, these poor prudential practices would
202. This short section is a summary and reorganization of arguments presented during
the early years of the debate (mid- to late- 1990s) on offshore financial centers and poor
financial sector supervision. See Errico & Musalem, supra note 51, at 1–7; FINANCIAL
STABILITY FORUM, REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON OFFSHORE CENTRES 1–2
(2000), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0004b.pdf.
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lead to a greater likelihood of the bank failing, resulting in losses by
creditors, especially depositors. The failure of any bank may lead to
the failure of other banks, and even a loss of confidence in the entire
banking system.203 If other onshore banks were creditors, this could
adversely affect those banks, resulting in a chain reaction of defaults
that could endanger the entire international financial system.
There were a few money laundering issues raised in the financial
supervisory context as well. The anti-money laundering measures
were not prudential in nature in that they did not have as a goal
keeping the bank solvent, but because their implementation in
onshore jurisdictions was usually through the financial supervisor or
regulator, they had the potential of becoming part of the “poor
prudential regulation” indictment.204 The most important of these
measures had to do with a requirement to identify the physical person
who owned and controlled a particular customer account.205 Of
course, such information was also critical for providing tax-related
information to the major onshore centers. The regulatory arbitrage
provided by offshore centers allowed their financial institutions, or at
least financial institutions with an offshore presence, to operate more
profitably by reducing the costs of regulation, rendering entirely
onshore institutions less profitable and subject to unfair
competition.206
2. The System in Action
Domestic bank supervisors had problems supervising domestic
banks with branches and subsidiaries located in foreign jurisdictions
whenever those foreign establishments were domiciled in jurisdictions
with strict bank secrecy.207 Supervisors also had trouble supervising

203. Vincent P. Polizatto, Prudential Regulation and Banking Supervision: Building an
Institutional Framework for Banks 1 (World Bank, Working Paper Series No. 340, 1990),
available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/
1990/01/01/000009265_3960928161430/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf.
204. An informal review in January 2000, of a subset of IMF member countries and
offshore jurisdictions by IMF staff confirmed that in the vast majority of cases anti-money
laundering rules were implemented through prudential regulatory bodies. The author
participated in this review.
205. See OECD, IMPROVING ACCESS TO BANK INFORMATION FOR TAX PURPOSES,
supra note 145, at 25.
206. Hermann Krull, Assistant General Counsel, South African Reserve Bank (1990–
1998, 2002), Statement During a Panel Discussion at the IMF Legal Department (Jan. 14,
2000).
207. This was the reason that the Basel Committee created a working group on
supervision of banks’ foreign establishments, resulting in the report. See BASEL COMM.,

GORDON.PTD5

542

2/9/2010 1:23 PM

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks.208 Briefly, bank
supervisors need the entire bank’s financial information (parent and
branches or subsidiaries) to determine if the bank is heeding
prudential regulations. In 1975, the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, a classic TRN, issued a report on the importance of the
supervision of banks’ foreign establishments in ensuring the safety
and soundness of domestic banks,209 which made arguments that were
extended in a paper in 1979 favoring consolidated supervision of
banks’ international activities.210 In 1981, the Basel Committee
published a report noting that banking secrecy can impede the flow of
information needed by supervisors.211 While the report did not single
out offshore centers, it did note that non-members of the Committee,
“particularly offshore centers,” were in broad agreement.212 The
report was followed by another exploring ways in which supervisors
should share information about the activities of banks and their
foreign branches and subsidiaries.213 Of great importance, the
Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors (“OGBS”),214 a TRN
consisting of regulators in offshore centers, generally agreed to the
various proposals to ensure the flow of information among
supervisors.215 Some problems involving the limited membership of
the Basel Committee were hence resolved.
The bankruptcy of the Bank of Credit and Commerce
International (“BCCI”) in 1991 drew attention to the serious
problems that could arise when there was no effective consolidated
supervision of banks with foreign operations,216 especially when an
REPORT TO THE GOVERNORS ON THE SUPERVISION OF BANKS’ FOREIGN
ESTABLISHMENTS 1 (1975), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs00a.pdf?noframes=1.
208. Id. at 5.
209. Id. at 1.
210. See BASEL COMM., CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISION OF BANKS’ INTERNATIONAL
ACTIVITIES 1 (Mar. 1979), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc112.pdf.
211. See BASEL COMM., BANKING SECRECY AND INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION
IN BANKING SUPERVISION 1 (1981), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs00f.pdf.
212. Id.
213. BASEL COMM., PRINCIPLES FOR THE SUPERVISION OF BANKS’ FOREIGN
ESTABLISHMENTS § I (1983), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc312.pdf.
214. The Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors (“OGBS”) includes fourteen
offshore centers. See OGBS, Members and Observers, http://www.ogbs.net/members.htm
(last visited Nov. 21, 2009). Since 1983, a condition of OGBS membership is to support the
1983 Concordat. See OGBS, Conditions of Membership, http://www.ogbs.net/conditions
.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2009).
215. See BASEL COMM., INFORMATION FLOWS BETWEEN BANKING SUPERVISORY
AUTHORITIES (1990), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc313.pdf.
216. At the time it was closed by regulators in the summer of 1991, the Bank of Credit
and Commerce (“BCCI”) was operating in sixty-nine countries. Duncan E. Alford, Basle
Committee Minimum Standards: International Regulatory Response to the Failure of BCCI,
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offshore center with allegedly lax supervision and “excessive” secrecy
like the Cayman Islands was involved.217 The following year, the Basel
Committee issued a report on minimum standards for the supervision
of international banking groups.218 The minimum standards include
that all international banks be supervised by a home-country
authority that performs consolidated supervision, that banks and their
foreign branches or subsidiaries receive the prior consent of both
home country supervisor and host country supervisor, and that home
country supervisors have the authority to receive information
necessary to conduct consolidated supervision.219 Finally, if these
minimum standards are not met, the report suggested that the host
country supervisor either prohibit the establishment of foreign
branches/subsidiaries or impose restrictive measures on them.220 In
other words, hard power could be exercised against resident banks by
local regulators. As with the OECD’s tax “countermeasures,”
however, the market would ensure that the foreign jurisdiction would
also suffer as a result.
While the report put in place a process of improved cooperation
among supervisors from both onshore and offshore jurisdictions,
problems remained. In 1995, the Meridien Bank International, which
was really two banks with one registered in Luxembourg221 and
another, its seventy-four percent owner, licensed in the Bahamas, and
with operational control of much of its activities located in London,
collapsed and was placed into liquidation by the Bahamian Supreme

26 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 241, 258 (1992). The dispersal of subsidiaries and
branches in so many countries made it easier for BCCI to avoid consolidated regulatory
oversight. Id. at 263–64. See generally JOHN KERRY & HANK BROWN, 102D CONG., THE
BCCI AFFAIR: A REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (DRAFT)
(1992), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/ (describing the structure
of the BCCI that eventually led to its collapse).
217. According to Senators Kerry and Brown, “the Grand Caymans, did not regulate
any bank licensed there. The Caymans lack of regulation was precisely the inducement for
banks to charter themselves there.” KERRY & BROWN, supra note 216, pt. 12. This
allegation was incorrect in that the Caymans did regulate banks and bank branches
located there. This information comes from the author’s personal participation in the
activities of the IMF as a senior staff member during the relevant time period.
218. See BASEL COMM., MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR THE SUPERVISION OF
INTERNATIONAL BANKING GROUPS AND THEIR CROSS-BORDER ESTABLISHMENTS
(1992), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc314.pdf.
219. Id. § II.1–3.
220. Id. § II.4.
221. It did no banking business in Luxembourg. This information comes from the
author’s personal participation in the activities of the IMF as a senior staff member during
the relevant time period.
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Court.222 As with BCCI, regulators and commentators concluded that
the use of complicated cross-border corporate structures allowed the
bank to escape effective prudential supervision.223
There was little doubt that both BCCI and Meridien showed no
effective supervision and that supervisors needed to pay better
attention to cross-border issues, but it was not clear in either case that
offshore centers were to blame for the failure. In both instances
supervisory authorities in the United States and the United Kingdom
appeared to be at least partially at fault by not taking effective action
even after noting clear warning signs that the banks were not
complying with existing rules. For example, in the BCCI case, much
was made of the role played by politicians and lobbyists in fending off
appropriate supervisory action.224
At the same time, other banking problems unrelated to these
specific cross-border supervisory issues were gaining attention.
Because the international community’s eventual response to these
issues played such a crucial role in shaping the treatment of OFCs,
this discussion now turns to the series of crises and near-crises in a
number of emerging markets. The most prominent crises were in
Asia, which had particularly adverse effects on domestic banking
systems. These macroeconomic crises were largely caused by large
external borrowings and significant balance of payments deficits.
Many banks had excessive external exposures and foreign exchange
risk that resulted in insolvency; had local supervision been better,
some argued, these banks would not have been so vulnerable to
economic shocks and would have made recovery after the crises faster
and less disruptive.225
The first of these shocks was the 1994–95 Mexican Peso Crisis.
The first significant emerging-market, sovereign debt crisis since the
late 1980s,226 the Peso Crisis resulted in significant financial support to
222. Interview with Herman Krull, former Assistant General Counsel, South African
Reserve Bank, in Cleveland, Ohio (Sept. 21, 2008). The bank had an exceptional liquidity
crisis, which it was allegedly able to hide from regulators by shifting cash among its many
constituent parts.
223. See IMF, TOWARD A FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY 47 (1998).
224. KERRY & BROWN, supra note 216, pt. 13.
225. See generally Liliana Rojas-Suarez & Steven Reiss Weisbord, Financial Market
Fragilities in Latin America: From Banking Crisis Resolution to Current Policy Challenges
(IMF, Working Paper No. 94/117, 1994) (examining the impact of the strength of the Latin
American domestic banking system and domestic supervision in restoring confidence in
the financial system after a financial crisis).
226. See JAMES M. BOUGHTON, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND 1979–1989, at 477–534 (2001) (detailing the sovereign debt crises for
various countries during the 1980s).
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Mexico from the IMF and the United States.227 A key analysis by the
IMF of the Peso Crisis suggested that macroeconomic variables
largely determined the timing of bank failures while it was bankspecific prudential indicators that explained the likelihood of bank
failure.228
By 1995, the two different issues—the lack of effective
consolidated supervision of cross-border banking and the ineffective
domestic supervision in many countries suffering macroeconomic
shocks—became conflated.229 In 1995, the G-7 announced that much
more work was needed in creating and implementing appropriate
prudential supervisory standards in all countries.230 Specifically, they
stated that closer international cooperation in the regulation and
supervision of financial institutions was “essential to safeguard the
financial system and prevent an erosion of prudential standards” and
called on finance ministers to “commission studies and analysis from
the international organizations responsible for banking and securities
regulation and to report on the adequacy of current arrangements
. . . .”231 In particular, they urged that the IMF and World Bank be
involved, but that they “concentrate on their respective core concerns
(broadly, macroeconomic policy for the IMF and structural and
sectoral policies for the World Bank).”232 In partial response, a
Working Group on Stability in Emerging Market Economies
convened under the sponsorship of the Group of 10.233
227. Press Release, IMF, IMF Approves US$17.8 Billion Stand-By Credit for Mexico
(Feb. 1, 1995), http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/1995/PR9510.HTM (describing the
IMF’s credit line to Mexico for purposes of alleviating the Mexican financial crisis and
adding confidence to the international financial system).
228. See generally Brenda González-Hermosillo et al., Banking System Fragility:
Likelihood Versus Timing of Failure—An Application to the Mexican Financial Crisis
(IMF, Working Paper No. 96/142, 1996) (examining the proposition that bank soundness is
determined by bank-specific factors and macroeconomic conditions with regard to the
Mexican Financial Crisis).
229. These issues became of significant interest to the IMF, which had generally been
more concerned with macro rather than micro policy. See, e.g., Morris Goldstein & Philip
Turner, Banking Crises in Emerging Economies: Origins and Policy Options 9–13, 21–24
(BIS, BIS Economic Paper No. 46, 1996), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/
econ46.pdf?noframes=1; CARL-JOHAN LINDGREN ET AL., BANK SOUNDNESS AND
MACROECONOMIC POLICY 39–46, 123–35 (1996).
230. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF JAPAN, HALIFAX SUMMIT COMMUNIQUÉ,
para. 22 (1995), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit/2000/past_summit/21/
e21_a.html.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. In addition to Argentina, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Japan, Mexico, the
Netherlands, Poland, Singapore, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the
working group also included Thailand, Korea, and Indonesia. THE WORKING GROUP ON
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The IMF and World Bank also set up staff working groups to
consider these issues while the Basel Committee continued its efforts
to refine standards. In 1996, the Basel Committee, again with full
cooperation and participation from the Offshore Group of Banking
Supervisors, released another report that addressed a number of
practical considerations in implementing the 1992 Report, especially
regarding confidentiality of exchanged information.234 The Basel
Committee also accelerated its work on creating a set of generally
accepted principles for effective banking supervision; these “Core
Principles,” which focused on acceptable standards for prudential
regulation of domestic banking, were released late in 1997.235 In
particular, the Core Principles require that supervisors practice
consolidated supervision and that they “apply[] appropriate
prudential norms to all aspects of the business conducted by their
banking organizations worldwide” and that they “require the local
operations of foreign banks to be conducted to the same high
standards as are required of domestic institutions and must have
powers to share information needed by the home country supervisors
of those banks for the purpose of carrying out consolidated
supervision.”236 In releasing the Core Principles, the Basel Committee
“suggested that the IMF, the World Bank, and other interested
organizations use the Core Principles in assisting individual countries
to strengthen their supervisory arrangements in connection with work
aimed at promoting overall macroeconomic and financial stability.”237
There was no mention of offshore centers. Similar activities with
respect to the creation of best practices or standards were underway
for the two other key elements of the regulated financial system,
securities markets (including broker-dealers) and insurance, to be

FINANCIAL STABILITY IN EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES, FINANCIAL STABILITY IN
EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES 1 (1997), http://www.bis.org/publ/gten02.pdf.
234. BASEL COMM., THE SUPERVISION OF CROSS-BORDER BANKING 10, 12 (1996),
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs27.htm. Key issues addressed were preserving confidentiality
of information obtained by bank supervisors from foreign supervisors and creating
standard procedures for the conduct of cross-border inspections by home-country
supervisors. Id.
235. BASEL COMM., CORE PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE BANKING SUPERVISION 2
(1997), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs30a.htm. The Core Principles cover seven principal
areas: preconditions for effective banking supervision, licensing and structure, prudential
regulations and requirements, methods of banking supervision, information and recordkeeping requirements, formal powers of supervisors, and cross-border banking. Id. The
work on developing the Core Principles was conducted in close cooperation with both the
IMF and World Bank, but particularly with the former.
236. Id. at 7.
237. Id. at 2.
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carried out by the International Organization of Securities
Commissions (“IOSCO”) and the International Association of
Insurance Supervisors (“IAIS”).238
In April of 1997, the Working Group on Financial Stability239
issued its report, which urged the creation of “an international
consensus on the key elements of a sound financial and regulatory
system” by representatives of both developed and developing
countries, including the “formulation of norms, principles and
practices by international groupings of national authorities with
relevant expertise and experience,” such as the Basel Committee,
IAIS, and the International Organization of Securities
Commissions.240 It also called for the “[p]romotion by multilateral
institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank and the regional
development banks of the adoption and implementation of sound
principles and practices.”241 More specifically, the report suggested
that, as part of its Article IV surveillance activities, the IMF should
“take stock of the progress that countries with clear vulnerabilities
have made in the adoption of sound principles and practices
developed by the international groupings.”242 The report went on to
state that “the IMF and World Bank should develop modalities for
sharing their assessments of financial sector strength and the
regulatory and supervisory regimes in individual economies,” that
IMF conditionality could “include steps to correct shortcomings in
the financial sector,” and that the two organizations should provide

238. The history and background on these two organizations are on their Web sites.
International Association of Insurance Supervisors [IAIS], http://www.iaisweb.org/
index.cfm?pageID=28 (last visited Sept. 10, 2009); International Organization of Securities
Commissions [IOSCO], http://www.iosco.org/about/index.cfm?section=history (last visited
Sept. 10, 2009). While both the IAIS (IAIS Members, http://www.iaisweb.org/index.cfm
?pageID=31) and IOSCO (IOSCO Members, http://www.iosco.org/lists/display_members
.cfm?memID=1&orderBy=none) have large memberships, as a practical matter, the
organizations and their key committees have been dominated by the larger, developed
country members. The author personally observed this dynamic while working with
members of the organizations as a staff member at the IMF.
239. The Working Group was an ad hoc group consisting of Argentina, France,
Germany, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, Poland,
Singapore, Sweden, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Representatives of the Basel Committee, the International Accounting Standards
Committee, and IOSCO also attended most meetings, as did staff members of the Bank
for International Settlements (“BIS”), the European Commission, IMF, the OECD, and
the World Bank. THE WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL STABILITY IN EMERGING
MARKET ECONOMIES, supra note 233, at 1.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 2.
242. Id. at 7.
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technical assistance as well.243 In other words, the IMF (and where
appropriate, the World Bank) should advance the adoption of
banking and other financial-sector principles or best practices in its
three main areas of work: surveillance, loan conditionality, and
technical assistance. The Basel Committee, a TRN with limited
membership, was asking the IMF, an international organization with
TRN characteristics but with near universal membership, to
participate.
Almost immediately after the report was issued (and just before
the Basel Committee issued its Core Principles), the Asian financial
crisis struck,244 followed by crises in Russia, Ukraine, and Ecuador.245
A considerable amount has been written on the history, development,
causes, and global responses to the series of economic meltdowns that
began in Thailand in July 1997.246 There were a number of different
views as to what caused Thailand, then South Korea and Indonesia,
to move toward a massive default on external (and then internal)
obligations. One thing on which virtually all commentators agreed is
that the banking systems in each country were not well run; they were
under-capitalized and had taken on far too much risk, including
exchange rate risk and credit risk.247 They agreed that the key
problem causing excess credit risk was excessive connected lending,
where banks lent money to connected parties on non-arms-length
terms.248 In some instances, these were banks lending money to
members of an affiliated corporate group; in others it was banks
lending money to relatives or business associates of bank officers or
board members.249 In many instances, the banks were controlled by
the government, which exerted influence on banks to direct lending
to favored borrowers; thus, when the financial crisis hit and investors
243. Id.
244. IMF, A Factsheet—The IMF’s Response to the Asian Financial Crisis (1999),
http://www.imf.org/External/np/exr/facts/asia.htm.
245. During this time the author was involved in the crafting of IMF loans and loan
programs for each country.
246. According to one analyst, by 1999 more than 16,000 articles, journals, and reviews
had already been published on the topic. Michael H. Moskow, The Asian Financial Crisis,
in THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS: ORIGINS, IMPLICATIONS, AND SOLUTIONS 11, 11
(William C. Hunter et al. eds., 1999).
247. See Roberto Chang, Origins of the Asian Crisis: Discussion, in THE ASIAN
FINANCIAL CRISIS: ORIGINS, I MPLICATIONS, AND SOLUTIONS, supra note 246, at 65, 65–
68; Michael P. Dooley, Origins of the Crisis in Asia, in THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS:
ORIGINS, I MPLICATIONS, AND SOLUTIONS, supra note 246, at 27, 27–29; William C.
Hunter, The Korean Banking Crisis: Picking up the Pieces, in THE ASIAN FINANCIAL
CRISIS: ORIGINS, IMPLICATIONS, AND SOLUTIONS, supra note 246, at 127, 127–28.
248. Hunter, supra note 247, at 127–28.
249. Id.
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fled from local currencies, banks were unable to pay their creditors,
which were often foreign banks, resulting in illiquidity and
insolvency.250 Clearly, the banking systems in these countries had not
been adequately supervised.
Another issue related to the causes of the Asian financial crisis
was what was termed “contagion,” where a serious loss of investor
confidence in one country could spread to other countries as investors
lost confidence in similar countries.251 Perhaps more importantly,
there was significant evidence that bank illiquidity or insolvency in
one country could spread to creditor banks in another country,
resulting in illiquidity or insolvency in that country.252
While the problems in these banking systems were not new, they
had not been the subject of IMF attention during the annual Article
IV consultations, where IMF staff review the economies of member
countries. Yet, when the IMF stepped in to provide financing, the
problem of poor banking supervision was brought immediately to the
fore; bank restructuring, plus new and improved banking regulation,
was seen as a key to the reform program.253 Bill Murden, then a senior
official at the U.S. Treasury Department, explained:
[The Working Group on Financial Stability] issued a report in
April 1997, in time for the 1997 Denver Summit. The report
looked at some of the problems in the financial sectors in
emerging markets . . . and recommended a concerted strategy
for improving the financial sectors and financial supervision in
these economies, including a more in depth role by the IMF and
the World Bank . . . . Out of that process came some very
significant developments, including the Basle Committee’s
Core Principles . . . which were released later that fall . . . . A
year later, [The International Organization of Securities
Commissions] issued a similar set of principles. Unfortunately,
we did not have time to implement the strategy before the Asia

250. Id.
251. Taimur Baig & Ilan Goldfajn, Financial Market Contagion in the Asian Crisis 6–7
(IMF, Working Paper No. 98/155, 1998) (showing evidence for contagion by examining the
behavior of financial markets).
252. Haizhou Huang & Chenggang Xu, Financial Institutions, Financial Contagion, and
Financial Crises 14 (IMF, Working Paper No. 00/92, 2000).
253. See Stijn Claessens et al., Korea’s Financial Sector Reforms, in THE ASIAN
FINANCIAL CRISIS: ORIGINS, IMPLICATIONS, AND SOLUTIONS, supra note 246, at 167,
173–76. For a brief discussion of the IMF’s bank reform conditionality for Korea, see
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The International Monetary System and the Erosion of Sovereignty:
Essay in Honor of Cynthia Lichtenstein, 25 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 257, 268–69
(2002).

GORDON.PTD5

550

2/9/2010 1:23 PM

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

crisis erupted in the summer of 1997 in Thailand and quickly
spread to Indonesia and Korea by that fall.254
What Murden did not mention explicitly was that the three
countries hit hardest by the Asian financial crisis, Thailand,
Indonesia, and Korea, were part of the working group that issued the
Report.
Unlike with the OECD’s Harmful Tax Practices initiative, the
promulgation of prudential banking standards did not require the
IMF to conclude that a country should make a sacrifice for the benefit
of another; unsound domestic banking systems, management and staff
concluded, adversely affected the well being of the country itself, and
had potential contagion effects on other countries. With respect to
this second issue, there was an additional distinction from the
Harmful Tax Practices Project: Article I(i) of the Fund’s Articles of
Agreement included as one of its purposes “[t]o promote
international monetary cooperation through a permanent institution
which provides the machinery for consultation and collaboration on
international monetary problems.”255 This had been interpreted
broadly to include oversight of the “international financial system,”
which arguably would include contagion effects from a problem in
banks honoring cross-border obligations.256
What happened next was a multi-pronged attempt to find ways
to prevent future crises, an effort known broadly as “strengthening
the international financial architecture.”257 Unlike with the OECD’s
work on harmful tax competition, this work involved, at least in
theory, not only the IMF and World Bank but representatives of
developing countries themselves. Among the various prongs was the
ongoing work on financial standards—the promulgation of the Basel
Core Principles258 (and to a lesser extent the analogous standards of
the IAIS259 and the IOSCO260) through the work of the IMF and the

254. William Murden, Banking Supervision and Government Policy: The Role of
Regulators in International Financial Crises, 4 FORDHAM FIN. SEC. & TAX L. F. 35, 36–37
(1999).
255. IMF ARTICLES, supra note 102, art. I(i).
256. See infra notes 297–301and accompanying text.
257. IMF, A Factsheet—The IMF’s Response to the Asian Financial Crisis, supra note
244.
258. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 24, at 2.
259. IAIS, PRINCIPLES FOR THE CONDUCT OF INSURANCE BUSINESS 2 (1999),
http://www.iaisweb.org/__temp/Principles_for_conduct_of_insurance_business.pdf.
260. IOSCO, OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES REGULATION 6 (1998),
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD82.pdf.
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World Bank.261 Also, in 1998, the G-22, a group of developed and
developing countries (including Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia),262
set up three working groups to examine issues related to
strengthening the international financial architecture, one of which
focused on strengthening financial systems.263 In theory at least, the
heads of the IMF, the World Bank, the OECD, and the Bank for
International Settlements (another treaty organization) attended
meetings as observers, but, in practice, the IMF (and, to a lesser
extent, the World Bank) staff were most closely involved in the
working group’s activities.
In the spring of 1999, a new international group, the Financial
Stability Forum (“FSF”), was created.264 It included central banks,
finance ministries, and financial system supervisory authorities from
twelve developed countries, plus the IMF, the World Bank, the Bank
for International Settlements (“BIS”),265 the OECD, the Basel
Committee, IOSCO, and IAIS, as well as some others.266 Again, IMF
and World Bank staff were closely involved in promoting the FSF’s
research and conclusions.

261. In order to better coordinate the work of the IMF and the World Bank on
financial sector issues, the two organizations set up the Financial Sector Liaison
Committee, which consisted of senior staff members from the IMF and the World Bank
who met periodically to coordinate the financial sector work of the two institutions. It was
set up in 1998. IMF, PROGRESS REPORT ON THE WORLD BANK-IMF FINANCIAL SECTOR
LIAISON COMMITTEE (FSLC) 1 n.1 (1999), http://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/fslc/
121599.htm.
262. The G-22 consisted of finance ministers and central bank governors from a broad
range of developed and developing countries, including the three most adversely affected
by the Asian financial crisis (Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia), and those affected by the
1995 Peso crisis and sovereign insolvencies in former Communist countries, Mexico, and
Russia. The others were Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany,
Hong Kong SAR, India, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Poland, Singapore, South Africa, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. GROUP OF 22, REPORT OF THE WORKING
GROUP ON INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CRISES, at i n.1 (1998), http://www.imf.org/
external/np/g22/ifcrep.pdf.
263. See IMF, Reports on the International Financial Architecture, http://www.imf.org/
external/np/g22/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2009).
264. Financial Stability Board, History, http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/
history.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2009).
265. “The BIS is an international organization that fosters international monetary and
financial cooperation and serves as a bank for central banks.” BIS, About BIS,
http://www.bis.org/about/index.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2009).
266. The Financial Stability Forum included Australia, Canada, France, Germany,
Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Singapore, Switzerland, the United States, and
the United Kingdom, plus the European Central Bank and three other standard setting
organizations related to accounting and payment systems. IMF, A Guide to Committees,
Groups, and Clubs, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/groups.htm (last visited Nov.
9, 2009).
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It was clear that the IMF was going to play a key role in adopting
and promulgating any new rules of the road for avoiding future
financial crises.267 In the late spring of 1998, Michel Camdessus, at
that time the Managing Director of the IMF, outlined a key aspect of
the approach: a set of standards and codes, including banking
supervision, that would be “progressively disseminated by the IMF
through its surveillance.”268 Soon after, the Fund published Toward a
Framework for Financial Stability, which proposed:
The IMF, with its near-universal membership, has an important
role to play in . . . the broad dissemination of the work of
various organizations, particularly that of the Basle Committee
[and] . . . with its broad responsibility to engage in surveillance
of member countries’ economic policies . . . can assist in
identifying potential vulnerabilities . . . and it can help the
authorities in formulating corrective policies.269
The benefits of universal membership were obviously not shared
by the Basel Committee,270 and although IOSCO and IAIS had larger
membership bases, they too were dominated by their larger
members.271
The Group of 22’s Report of the Working Group on
Strengthening Financial Systems, released in the fall of 1998, had few
surprises. It announced an “international consensus” on banking and
securities supervision, specifically endorsing the Basel Core
Principles, including principles on information exchange for
supervising internationally active financial groups.272 It also called on
the IMF and World Bank to enhance their work in the area, anchored
in IMF surveillance.273 The IMF and World Bank, in coordination
267. This conclusion was obvious, even at the time. See Lawrence L. C. Lee, The Basle
Accords as Soft Law: Strengthening International Banking Supervision, 39 VA. J. INT’L L.
1, 36–39 (1998) (suggesting that the IMF will play a great role in implementing Basel Core
Principles and other Basel accords as a type of “soft” international law).
268. Michel Camdessus, Managing Dir. of the IMF, at the Royal Institute of
International Affairs: Toward a New Financial Architecture for a Globalized World (May
8, 1998) (transcript available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/1998/050898
.htm).
269. IMF, WORLD ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL SURVEYS, TOWARD A FRAMEWORK
FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY 1 (1998), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wefs/
toward/pdf/file01.pdf.
270. See supra note 20.
271. See supra note 238.
272. GROUP OF 22, REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON STRENGTHENING
FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 3–4, 47 (1998), http://www.imf.org/external/np/g22/sfsrep.pdf.
273. Id. at 46–50. The Report was later endorsed by the G-7, although this was a
foregone conclusion. University of Toronto Munk Centre for International Studies, G7
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with the G-22 and the new Financial Stability Forum, worked to
develop a new international effort to encourage the adoption and
implementation of financial standards.
This work led to the Financial Sector Assessment Program
(“FSAP”), a new program piloted in 1998 and adopted the next
year.274 The purpose of the FSAP was to identify strengths and
vulnerabilities of a country’s financial sector, in part by assessing its
compliance with key international financial standards, such as the
Basel Core Principles and related standards on insurance and
securities regulations.275 The IMF and World Bank agreed that they
should divide assessment work between them based on their areas of
competence, with some being exclusively IMF, others exclusively
World Bank, and others being of joint responsibility.276 Basel Core
Principle assessments were to be the responsibility of the IMF.277 The
assessments would be summarized in Reports on the Observance of
Standards and Codes (“ROSCs”).278 The purpose of ROSCs was to
summarize the extent to which jurisdictions observe certain
internationally recognized standards and codes.279
There were a number of key features of the FSAP, most
importantly the ROSC program that developed over the first few
years. The program’s notable features included that the adoption and
assessment of internationally recognized standards remain
voluntary280 (meaning persuasion and perhaps market forces but no
coercion) and that assessments be independently conducted and
consistently applied across countries (meaning there should be

Leaders Statement on the World Economy, http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/finance/g7_103098
.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2009).
274. Much of the thinking for the Financial Sector Assessment Program (“FSAP”) had
gone on earlier; the pilot program was actually carefully thought out. See generally IMF,
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND FUND SURVEILLANCE—PROGRESS AND ISSUES
(Aug. 16, 1999), http://imf.org/external/np/rosc/stand.htm (describing various case studies
and research related to strengthening the international financial system).
275. See IMF, FINANCIAL SECTOR ASSESSMENT PROGRAM (May 19, 2009)
http://www.imf.org/external/np/fsap/fsap.asp (explaining in general the use of a FSAP).
276. IMF, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND FUND SURVEILLANCE—PROGRESS
AND ISSUES, supra note 274, at tbl.1 & para. 70.
277. Id. paras. 69–70 (follow link to section IV).
278. Id. paras. 5–6 (follow link to section I).
279. Id. paras. 5–7. Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (“ROSCs”)
were initially known as “Reports on the Implementation of Standards and Codes.” Id.
para. 6. However, the acronym RISC bore unfortunate connotations, resulting in a change
of name.
280. Id. para. 18.
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impartiality).281 As Part I.D notes above, these two criteria are among
those proposed for a truly successful TRN standard.
Also, there was some debate in the beginning as to whether
countries could be required to publish ROSCs, but, as a practical
matter, countries that chose to participate in the pilot program did
not object to publication.282 Finally, additional technical assistance
could then be offered to countries to help address weaknesses
identified in the assessment process: a carrot but not a stick.283 In
order for assessments to be as objective as possible, detailed
methodologies for assessment were required, and these
methodologies for the Basel Core Principles were drafted with the
close cooperation of IMF staff.284 In other words, the FASP and
ROSC procedures were designed to ensure a uniformly objective
compliance assessment process with key features posited as being
part of successful standards for TRNs.
While the FSAP and ROSC programs were being devised and
piloted, the IMF and the G-7-dominated FSF turned once again to
the issue of offshore centers.285 During the Asian crisis and those
crises that followed in Russia, Ukraine, and Ecuador, not a single
offshore center experienced a significant problem in its regulated
financial sector. Nevertheless, both the IMF and FSF managed to find
problems with the operations of offshore banking and, at least in part,
made valiant efforts to tie these problems to banking problems in the
crisis countries.
In early 1999, the Fund issued a staff working paper entitled
Offshore Banking: An Analysis of Micro- and Macro-Prudential
Issues.286 IMF staff interest in offshore banking issues had been
prompted in part by the continuing expression of interest from the
United States and French Executive Directors (among others),
although many staff members involved expressed serious doubts
about whether offshore centers posed any real threat to the

281. While IMF management, staff, and Executive Directors often referred to the
FSAP and ROSC assessment programs as part of IMF surveillance, from a legal
perspective they were actually technical assistance, which under Article V, section 2 is
strictly voluntary. See IMF ARTICLES, supra note 102, art. V, § 2.
282. See IMF, FINANCIAL SECTOR ASSESSMENT PROGRAM, supra note 275.
283. IMF ARTICLES, supra note 102, art. V, § 2.
284. IMF, DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS: PROGRESS REPORT 3 (1999)
http://www.imf.org/external/np/rocs/progrev.pdf.
285. The concern resulted in another report. See FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM,
REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON OFFSHORE CENTRES 16 (2000), available at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0004b.pdf.
286. See Errico & Musalem, supra note 51.
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international financial system.287 Almost bizarrely, the paper
concluded that “[o]ffshore banking has most certainly been a factor in
the Asian financial crisis [and has] . . . also played a significant, but
not catalytic, role in the recent Latin America crises,” even though
the body of the paper identifies virtually no role at all.288 The paper
went on, however, to discuss in general terms the issues raised by
offshore banking. The paper claimed that there are “legitimate” and
“dubious” reasons for banks to use OFC facilities; oddly, the paper
listed among the former “convenient” fiscal and regulatory regimes
that lowering explicit and “implicit” taxation increases net profit
margins.289 The paper also noted the ease of incorporation, legal
frameworks for protecting the privacy of the principal-agent
relationship, and the freedom from exchange controls offered by
OFCs.290 Among the illegitimate are bank secrecy (“almost
invariably” a selling point), tax avoidance and evasion, and money
laundering.291
The paper suggested that the “greater leeway for balance sheet
management, granted by favorable regulatory frameworks in OFCs,
make offshore banks potentially more vulnerable . . . to solvency and
foreign exchange risks.”292 And yet, the paper also concluded that
“offshore banks are less likely to be unprofitable and more likely to be
profitable than onshore banks.”293 It also noted that, typically, a much
larger percentage of offshore bank investments tend to be in other
onshore banks, and that offshore banks are often simply intermediate
deposits between offshore and onshore banks.294 In what at least
appears to be a desperate effort to find a way to condemn offshore
banking from a prudential perspective, the paper concluded that
while offshore banks are far more likely to be liquid (since their
regulators do not enforce capital standards with the verve of their
onshore counterparts) the offshore banks may be more highly
leveraged and therefore less solvent, although no risk-weighted data

287. The author was involved in these ongoing discussions throughout the relevant
time period.
288. Errico & Musalem, supra note 51, at 4. The paper also notes that offshore facilities
may have contributed to problems in Thailand and Malaysia, but in those cases the
offshore “centers” were within Thailand and Malaysia themselves. Id. at 33–34.
289. Id. at 6–7, 10.
290. Id. at 6.
291. Id. at 10.
292. Id. at 4.
293. Id. at 27 (emphasis added).
294. Id. at 14–16.
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was available.295 In short, the working paper found little factual
material to support the charge that offshore center banks were
somehow dangerous, although it nevertheless concluded that they
were.
The paper was followed the next year by a report of the FSF’s
working group on offshore centers. Not surprisingly—given the
content of the paper—the FSF report concluded that “OFCs, to date,
do not appear to have been a major causal factor in the creation of
systemic financial problems.”296 The report did, however, also
conclude that OFCs could cause contagion problems in the future due
to the growth in assets and liabilities of OFC financial institutions
(and the inter-bank nature of the market) and the suspected growth
in off-balance-sheet activities.297 The report distinguished between
OFCs with weak supervision and those with strong supervision and
went on to distinguish between prudential concerns and, what they
termed, “market integrity concerns,” the latter having a meaning
similar to the IMF paper’s “dubious purposes.”298 The Executive
Summary report listed the old OFC tax issue of information exchange
as a key prudential problem, but it added a far more general concern
over a lack of prudential supervision.299 Again, similar to the IMF
paper, the FSF report also noted that jurisdictions that followed
international standards were at risk of losing business to the lax
jurisdictions.300
With respect to market integrity, the report noted that while
offshore centers did not pose immediate risks to international
financial stability, by hampering international surveillance and law
enforcement, they eroded the integrity of international financial
markets and, therefore, represented a potential threat to global
financial systems.301 The report highlighted “the lack of . . .
information on beneficial ownership of corporate vehicles . . . [that]
can thwart efforts directed against illegal business activities.”302
Noting the work of the IMF in the FSAP program and in
preparing ROSCs, the report called for a similar assessment program
295. Id. at 29 & n.41.
296. FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM, REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON
OFFSHORE CENTERS 16 (2000), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/
r_0004b.pdf.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 2.
299. Id. at 1–6.
300. Id. at 18.
301. Id. at 1.
302. Id. at 2.
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for all OFCs, based on a priority list of those with the greatest
problems.303 The report recommended focusing on three areas: (1)
cross-border cooperation, information sharing, and confidentiality;
(2) supervisory powers and practices; and (3) customer identification
and record-keeping.304 Specifically, it suggested that the assessment
program include subsets of the Basel Core Principles, IAIS principles,
and IOSCO principles (as well as of the Financial Action Task Force
anti-money laundering recommendations) all linked to these three
areas.305 The report also listed a menu of possible incentives to
enhance OFCs’ adherence to “international standards,” from limiting
market access to OFC-based institutions to increasing due diligence
for onshore financial institutions when doing business with offshorebased ones to restricting or prohibiting financial transactions with
those institutions.306
At the time, many IMF staff reacted with dismay to the report.
Many staff agreed with the general conclusion that offshore centers
had not been a weak link in the world financial system. And, while
they agreed that many offshore jurisdictions applied a light
supervisory hand, they did not believe that the result was a weak
banking system; agreeing instead with the IMF paper, they felt that
offshore banks were healthy—largely because they did not make
risky investments.307 Instead, it appeared that the proposed offshore
center assessment program addressed other issues referenced in the
report, including the fear that onshore jurisdictions could be losing
out to offshore ones in the global competition for banking services.
But, of greatest concern was that by focusing on information sharing,
customer identification, and transparency of ownership, the Working
Group was really concerned about tax, and to a lesser extent, money
laundering.308 And, as discussed above, many staff believed that it was
illegitimate for the IMF to suggest that one jurisdiction should
commit sacrifices to benefit another.309 A number of staff most closely

303. Id. at 20–28.
304. Id. at 28.
305. Id. at 58–68.
306. Id. at 32 fig.7.
307. Unless, of course, investing in onshore banks was risky, which—during the current
international financial crisis—turned out to be the case. The information contained in this
paragraph comes from the author’s personal participation in the activities of the IMF as a
senior staff member during the relevant time period.
308. Because the papers noted that the offshore banks were often more profitable, and
because they could point to no actual instances in which offshore banks contributed to the
crisis, these arguments were rather weak.
309. See supra notes 111, 121 and accompanying text.
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involved in putting together the new offshore center program
expressed their belief that the program had little or nothing to do
with prudential regulation, which they believed actually was a
legitimate subject for IMF involvement. Instead, they wondered if it
was all a subterfuge to help the OECD and its member states in the
Harmful Tax Practices Project. Given the strong support voiced by
the Financial Stability Forum for an offshore center assessment
program to complement the FSAP and ROSC programs already in
progress, it was no surprise that IMF management moved promptly to
propose a pilot assessment program.
The IMF papers on the subject echoed some of the contentions
that OFCs may have played some kind of role in recent banking
failures and the need to improve cross-border information exchange,
customer identification, and transparency of ownership of legal
persons.310 Interestingly, they also discussed at some length other
OFC initiatives, including the OECD tax competition program and
the recent anti-money laundering initiative of the FATF involving socalled non-cooperating countries and territories initiative
(“NCCT”).311 Like the tax competition program, the NCCT
program312 assessed a select group of jurisdictions, most of which were
OFCs, and threatened them with “countermeasures” if they did not
comply with a set of anti-money laundering standards created by the
FATF. One of the staff involved in drafting the IMF background
papers noted that discussing the work of the OECD and FATF,
including their aggressive threats to levy “countermeasures,” would
make it less likely that the Executive Board would endorse any IMF
involvement in either tax or anti-money laundering initiatives.313
However, the proposed assessment program differed from the
FSF recommendations by suggesting that all jurisdictions should be
assessed on the entire set of Basel Core Principles (and relevant Basel
Committee reports), in addition to insurance and securities standards
where appropriate.314 The report also noted that those onshore
centers where offshore bank branches/subsidiaries were subjected to
310. IMF, OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTERS—THE ROLE OF THE IMF, paras. 5–7
(2000) [hereinafter IMF, ROLE OF THE IMF], http://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/
oshore/2000/eng/role.htm; IMF, OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTERS IMF BACKGROUND
PAPER (2000) [hereinafter IMF, BACKGROUND PAPER], http://www.imf.org/external/np/
mae/oshore/2000/eng/back.htm.
311. IMF, BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 310, § III & tbl.3.
312. See discussion infra at notes 401–05, 437 and accompanying text.
313. Conversation with un-named senior staff member, IMF, in Washington, D.C. (Jan.
2000).
314. As proposed in IMF, ROLE OF THE IMF, supra note 310, paras. 38, 43–45.
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consolidated supervision would also have to be assessed, even noting
that there were serious gaps because onshore supervisors often do a
poor job.315 The proposal accommodated anti-money laundering
issues, noting that Basel Core Principle Fifteen included ensuring an
effective anti-money laundering program.316
Of key importance, the report made no mention of the exercise
of hard power—no carrots or sticks. While the report accepted the
FSF proposal of three modules, with the first being an assisted selfassessment, the second and third assessments resembled assessments
in the FSAP program, that is, strictly voluntary, resulting in ROSCs to
be published only with the agreement of the jurisdiction involved.317
As with the FSAP program, additional technical assistance could then
be offered to help OFCs address weaknesses identified in the
assessment process.318 The IMF Executive Board agreed, emphasizing
the strictly voluntary and cooperative nature of the exercise.319
As a result, the FSF’s proposal—a selective assessment of Basel
Core Principles and anti-money laundering principles with a threat of
possible “countermeasures” if the OFC did not measure up—was
replaced with a voluntary extension of the Basel Core Principles
assessment part of the FSAP and ROSC program to offshore centers.
In effect, the FSF (and its sponsors in the major onshore jurisdictions)
was hoisted on its own petard. Arguably, the FSF wanted the IMF’s
OFC program to address what was outside the mandate of the Fund:
the competitive advantage of offshore banks. Legitimate, institutional
causes, such as fewer regulations, along with unfair issues like tax
competition and money laundering, all contributed to a competitive
advantage that the OFCs had over their onshore counterparts. In
order to make the argument for IMF involvement, the FSF had to
claim that the issue stemmed from bad prudential regulation.320 In
effect, the IMF accepted this argument and proposed that it fold

315. IMF, BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 310, § III.
316. Basel Core Principle Fifteen states, “Banking supervisors must determine that
banks have adequate policies, practices and procedures in place, including strict ‘knowyour-customer’ rules that promote high ethical and professional standards in the financial
sector and prevent the bank being used, intentionally or unintentionally, by criminal
elements.” BASEL COMM., CORE PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE BANKING SUPERVISION 6
(1997), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs30a.pdf?noframes=1. Basel Core Principle assessment
of this principle tended to be cursory.
317. IMF, ROLE OF THE IMF, supra note 310, para. 37.
318. Id. paras. 61–64.
319. News Brief, IMF, IMF Board Reviews Issues Surrounding Work on Offshore
Financial Centers (July 26, 2000), http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/nb/2000/nb0062.htm.
320. See discussion supra notes 111, 121 and accompanying text.
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OFCs into its onshore assessment program, all without adopting the
proposals that would have targeted the FSF’s real concerns.
By 2006, all offshore centers except one eventually consented to
being assessed and to publishing their assessments.321 The reasons for
this were varied and no doubt included a significant amount of
lobbying, but there were a number of practical reasons as well. IMF
staff heard a number of different comments voiced by officials in
offshore jurisdictions as to why.322 Certainly, in some instances, there
was a fear that if a particular jurisdiction did not participate it would
be assumed to be in serious non-compliance with the Basel Core
Principles, which could then be cited by onshore regulators as a
reason for restricting banking activities with offshore institutions. In
other words, onshore regulators could exercise hard power with
domestic banks that would have negative effects on offshore banks.
Next, many offshore centers believed that their banks were safe and
sound and that a truly impartial assessment by the international civil
servants of the IMF would likely give them at least passing marks.
They may not have trusted the onshore jurisdictions to be fair, but,
unlike with the OECD, they placed faith in the skills and impartiality
of IMF staff (or at least they decided that the IMF staff was more
impartial than the sub-state regulatory members of the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision). Offshore centers were already
the subject of essentially involuntary assessments under the OECD’s
Harmful Tax Practices Project (and the FATF’s NCCT program);
they might in some instances have hoped that the cooperative and
less biased IMF assessment could be used as a tool to counter the
work of the G-7 civil servants who dominated the OECD and the
FATF.
As it turned out, overall, offshore centers did quite well in their
assessments. By the time of the first OFC progress report to the
Executive Board, there had been twelve self-assessments and ten
IMF-staff assessments leading to ROSCs for compliance with the
Basel Core Principles (and a smaller number of ROSCs for insurance,

321. IMF, OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTERS: THE ASSESSMENT PROGRAM—A
PROGRESS REPORT 11 tbl.2 (2006), http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2006/
020806.pdf.
322. The author interacted extensively with officials of offshore centers, both on-site
and in Washington. In particular, the IMF held regular outreach meetings with offshore
officials during this time where those officials were invited to discuss their views. The
statements in this paragraph are the author’s conclusions based on the statements of those
officials.
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IAIS, and securities, IOSCO, supervisory principles).323 While some
of the newer (and poorer) offshore centers fared less well, the older
established offshore centers performed better than many onshore
centers.324 The most significant problems lay in the set-up and
operations of the supervisors themselves, including the examination
process,325 and, in particular, supervision over credit risk and market
risk.326 However, while the report notes that a lack of effective
supervisory implementation may result in problems, the report does
not suggest that any of the banking systems assessed were in any way
actually weak. Frequent discussions among assessors suggested that
none were actually concerned over potential bank failures.327
Although local bank examination of credit and market risk was a
problem, banks themselves did not appear to be behaving too riskily,
in part because so much of their business was actually intermediation
between depositors and other onshore banks, and in part because
many of the banks were also the subject of consolidated supervision
by onshore jurisdictions.328 In that regard, staff assessments generally
found good cooperation with respect to sharing information with
onshore regulators.329 Of particular interest, staff noted that OFCs so
far had a better record of compliance with the Basel Core Principles
than did onshore jurisdictions.330
These first impressions were largely confirmed as the Offshore
Financial Center Program continued forward, eventually covering all
offshore centers by 2004.331 One significant effect of the assessments
was that OFCs did work to improve their prudential supervisory
programs, including passing new laws and regulations to bring them
into fuller compliance with the Basel Core Principles (especially with
323. IMF, OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTER PROGRAM: A PROGRESS REPORT 3, 6 fig.1
(2002) [hereinafter IMF, 2002 PROGRESS REPORT], http://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/
oshore/2002/eng/032802.pdf.
324. Id. at 10.
325. Id. at 10–12.
326. Id. at 12 tbl.3.
327. The author participated in the drafting of the paper and discussed this issue with
the assessors. The unanimous view of those assessors was that none of the banking systems
assessed to date were actually weak.
328. As the current financial crisis has shown, this may not have been terribly
reassuring, but at least onshore regulators—and their state governments—had no reason
to complain that the offshore centers were riskier.
329. IMF, 2002 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 323, 17–18.
330. Id. at 13 tbl.4. In the table, “Initial Countries” are all onshore jurisdictions. As can
be seen, offshore centers have a higher rate of compliance with Basel Core Principles. Id.
331. IMF, OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTERS: THE ASSESSMENT PROGRAM—AN
UPDATE 5 (2004) [hereinafter IMF, 2004 ASSESSMENT PROGRAM UPDATE],
http://www.imf.org/external/np/mfd/2004/eng/031204.pdf.
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respect to the independence of the supervisor, on-site examinations,
and a focus on credit and market risk),332 but it was not at all clear
that these improvements materially improved the actual safety and
soundness of the various banking systems. In a 2003 review of the
program, staff found that OFCs had supervisory deficiencies similar
to onshore countries.333 The review also found that larger, wealthier
OFCs generally meet very high supervisory standards.334
The review the following year actually found that compliance
levels for OFCs were, on average, more favorable than those for
other jurisdictions assessed by the IMF in its financial sector work.335
By early 2005, forty-one of the forty-four OFC jurisdictions had been
assessed under the first phase of the OFC program.336 A review by
IMF staff that year found that “[c]ompliance with standards in OFCs
is, on average, better than in other jurisdictions assessed under the
FSAP, reflecting in part the higher average income levels of the
OFCs. Results on cooperation and information sharing principles,
which play a key role in cross-border supervision, show a similar
pattern.”337 The second phase was to focus on monitoring compliance
through assessment updates every four to five years, with a focus on
providing technical assistance to less wealthy jurisdictions to help
improve their compliance.338 Finally, in 2008, the Offshore Center
Program merged with the FSAP, treating offshore centers, in essence,
like their onshore counterparts.339

332. IMF, 2002 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 323, at 22–24. “Overall compliance
with the Basel Core Principles was generally appropriate to the nature of the business
conducted, especially in important jurisdictions where compliance was found to be broadly
in line with that in advanced economies.” IMF, OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTER
PROGRAM: A PROGRESS REPORT 2 (2003) [hereinafter IMF, 2003 PROGRESS REPORT],
http://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/oshore/2003/eng/031403.pdf.
333. IMF, OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTERS, THE ASSESSMENT PROGRAM: A
PROGRESS REPORT AND THE FUTURE OF THE PROGRAM 12 (2003), http://www.imf.org/
external/np/mae/oshore/2003/eng/073103.pdf.
334. Id.
335. See IMF, 2004 ASSESSMENT PROGRAM UPDATE, supra note 331, at 7, app. II
(showing that Basel Core Principles assessed in all jurisdictions had, on average, a lower
rate of compliance than in just offshore jurisdictions).
336. IMF, OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTERS: THE ASSESSMENT PROGRAM: A
PROGRESS REPORT 6–8 (2005), http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2005/022505.pdf.
337. Id. at 3. The review also found deficiencies, including “inadequate onsite
inspections, inability to address cooperation on terrorist financing, need to expand mutual
legal assistance treaties, and lack of formal agreements to share information.” Id.
338. See id. at 6–8.
339. See Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 08/82, IMF, IMF Executive Board
Integrates the Offshore Financial Center Assessment Program with the FSAP (July 9,
2008), http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2008/pn0882.htm.
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As a result of the IMF’s insistence that offshore centers be
assessed in a fair, consistent, and uniform manner, it was shown that
those centers largely conformed to the universal banking supervision
standards. There was no longer any reason to treat them separately.
Offshore centers had scored a significant victory. The prudential
standards system included many beneficial TRN attributes (and, with
the IMF participating, even more legitimacy than just the Basel
Committee alone possessed), was far superior to the Harmful Tax
Practices Project, and was more legitimate than the Global Forum
program. It not only produced generally accepted standards to be
applied and implemented impartially, but it protected the interests of
weak states over the strong.
D. Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing
1. The Basic Indictment340
Onshore jurisdictions also claimed that OFCs assisted criminals
by failing to implement anti-money laundering principles, which
allowed criminals more easily to retain the proceeds of their crimes.
Among the most important anti-money laundering principles was a
requirement that financial institutions “know your customer,”
including knowing who controlled the account and whether the
source of the funds was likely to be criminal. These principles also
required financial institutions to monitor accounts to see if they might
indicate criminal proceeds and report to a government agency when
they did. Finally, the principles stated that this information should be
made available to other jurisdictions.341
By not enforcing such rules, onshore centers claimed that
criminals were allowed to hide the fact that they owned or controlled
an account, either because the accounts were actually anonymous
(such as numbered accounts) or because the account holder was a
company or other legal arrangement in which the owner and
controller was not revealed. Next, the criminal could make deposits of
his ill-gotten gains to these accounts, often through a transfer from
another bank, without any questions being asked as to the origin of
the funds. When the criminal wanted use of the funds, he would
340. This short section is a summary and reorganization of arguments presented during
the initial debate (late 1990s) on jurisdictions that were deemed to be “non-cooperative”
with respect to anti-money laundering efforts. See FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE [FATF],
REPORT ON NON-COOPERATIVE COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES 1–2 (2000),
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/57/22/33921735.pdf.
341. Id.
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implement a transfer to an account in his or her own name, typically
in a large onshore jurisdiction. By running criminal proceeds through
these effectively anonymous accounts, onshore banks would not be
able to discover the origins of the funds, or whether the account was
controlled by a criminal laundering the proceeds. Any request for
information by another jurisdiction would either be rebuffed because
the information was not available or because of laws protecting
financial secrecy.342
Other principles also included having jurisdictions extend
cooperation to each other in investigating and prosecuting alleged
criminals involved in laundering. Offshore centers, it was alleged,
either rebuffed such requests directly or provided such poor
cooperation that little assistance was actually given.343 Following the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, onshore jurisdictions
extended their criticism to include inadequate cooperation in the
“global war on terror.” One requirement of this “war,” adopted as
international law by the U.N. Security Council, was to seize accounts
owned or controlled by known terrorists and terrorist organizations.
The larger onshore jurisdictions also agreed that a failure to
implement “know your customer” rules made it impossible to seize
the funds of known terrorists.344
2. The System in Action
Sustained global interest in anti-money laundering policies began
in the 1980s, primarily in the context of concern over international
drug trafficking.345 Because the drug trade (and other illegal activities)
generated huge profits, criminals found it necessary to find a way to
introduce the cash into the formal financial system so that it could be
342. Id.
343. See id. at 5.
344. This was a key issue of discussion at the FATF Emergency Session meeting in
Washington, D.C., October 29–30, 2001. The author was present during this meeting. The
Eight Special Recommendations on Terrorism Financing, adopted by the FATF soon after
September 11, 2001, required the freezing of terrorist assets and the implementation of
U.N. Security Council resolutions that included specific names of terrorists and terrorist
organizations. However, the FATF’s so-called Un-cooperative Countries and Territories
process, started nearly two years earlier, was not changed to include terrorism financing in
the initiative beyond the request that countries complete a separate terrorism financing
questionnaire. FATF, FATF ACTS AGAINST TERRORIST FINANCING, MONEY
LAUNDERING AND NON-COOPERATIVE JURISDICTIONS 1–3 (Feb. 1, 2002),
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/50/36/33935095.pdf.
345. Richard K. Gordon, Anti-Money-Laundering Policies: Selected Legal, Political,
and Economic Issues, in 1 CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN MONETARY AND FINANCIAL
LAW 405, 407 (1999).
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moved, spent, or invested without drawing the attention of law
enforcement. However, simple deposits or transfers of huge amounts
of cash could draw the attention of law enforcement. Criminals,
therefore, needed to disguise the illegal origins of the proceeds of
crime and/or their ownership of the proceeds. Early anti-money
laundering legislation made it a crime for financial institutions
knowingly to participate in such activities.346 However, to be truly
effective, an anti-money laundering regime needed to be
implemented in every jurisdiction where drug money might be
laundered and introduced into the international financial system. As a
result, a number of the major onshore centers, most notably the
United States and France, took the lead in pressing for an
international anti-money laundering effort.347
The first major international agreement to enact uniform antimoney laundering laws was the U.N. Convention Against the Illicit
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (also called
the Vienna Convention).348 The Convention required all parties to
enact legislation providing for the identification and confiscation of
laundered drug money and set out procedures for mutual legal
assistance in countering money laundering.349 In 1990, the Council of
Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation
of the Proceeds from Crime (Strasbourg Convention) was adopted,350
and the following year, the first European Directive on the
prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of
money laundering was adopted.351
The next major international step to enhance global anti-money
laundering efforts came with the creation of the Financial Action
Task Force in 1989, following the G-7 Summit in Paris.352 The original
Task Force consisted of sixteen OECD countries.353 The Task Force
was inter-governmental in nature, with members represented by substate entities like financial supervisors (in this aspect at least it was
346. See id. at 405, 407–10.
347. Interview with un-named senior staff member, Fin. Action Task Force, in
Washington, D.C. (Sept. 21, 1998).
348. U.N. Convention Against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 493, 26 U.N.T.S. 3 (1992). The original treaty was
adopted in 1988. Id.
349. Id. arts. 5, 7–11.
350. Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation
of the Proceeds from Crime, Nov. 8, 1990, E.T.S. 141.
351. Council Directive 91/308, 1991 O.J. (L 166) 1 (EC).
352. See FATF, About the FATF, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/0,3417,en_32250379
_32236836_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2009).
353. Id.
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like a TRN), as well as criminal investigators and prosecutors.354
While the latter two were not like classic TRN members, at least they
were not states. While the FATF had a small secretariat, the work of
the FATF was carried on almost entirely by its members. Less than a
year later, the FATF published355 its first set of Forty
Recommendations (“FATF 40” or “the Recommendations”),356
which were designed to provide a comprehensive plan of action for
fighting money laundering and which looked somewhat like an antimoney laundering standard. Drafted primarily by representatives
from U.S. sub-state participants, the Recommendations covered the
criminalization of money laundering and the freezing and seizing of
criminal proceeds, preventive measures for banks such as customer
identification and record keeping, transaction monitoring and the
filing of suspicious activity reports when a financial institution
suspected money laundering, and cross-border cooperation in
investigating and prosecuting money laundering.357 In this, the FATF
also looked much like a classic TRN, using the expertise of members,
but suffering from the detrimental effects of a membership limited
primarily to large industrialized countries.358
In 1991, the FATF began its program of yearly self-evaluations
of compliance by completing questionnaires, and its mutual
evaluation program.359 The mutual evaluations involved on-site
assessments of compliance with the Recommendations, undertaken
by experts drawn solely from other members.360 The following year,
FATF helped set up the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force
(“CFATF”), the first FATF-style regional body designed to advance
adoption of the FATF 40.361 This was followed by the formation of
the Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laundering, and the FATF found

354. The author served as an IMF representative at FATF meetings starting in 1998
and continuing through 2004 and observed the operations of the FATF in detail, including
engaging in discussion with the FATF secretariat and delegates from sub-state entities.
355. See FATF, About the FATF, supra note 352.
356. FATF, FORTY RECOMMENDATIONS (June 20, 2003), http://www.fatfgafi.org/dataoecd/7/40/34849567.PDF.
357. Id. at 2, 5–6, 9–11.
358. See discussion of the nature of TRNs supra at Part I.C.
359. See FATF, FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE MONEY LAUNDERING REPORT
1991/1992 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (1992), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/63/39/35752730.pdf.
360. The author served as an IMF representative at FATF meetings starting in 1998
and continuing through 2004 and observed the operations of the FATF in detail, including
engaging in discussion with the FATF secretariat and delegates from sub-state entities.
361. See FATF, FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE MONEY LAUNDERING REPORT
1992/1993 ANNUAL REPORT 5, 21 (1992), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/13/61/
34325384.pdf.
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the mutual evaluation procedures of the CFATF and the Offshore
Group of Banking Supervisors to be in conformity with the FATF’s
principles.362 While membership in regional bodies required a political
commitment to implement the FATF 40 and to undergo mutual
evaluations, no treaty obligation was involved and no timetable was
set for implementation.363 The FATF also expanded its membership
to include twenty-four members of the OECD plus Hong Kong,
Singapore, and representatives of the European Commission and the
Gulf Co-operation Council.364 This expansion, both of its own
membership and of regional bodies, helped to offset the negative
effects of the FATF’s original restricted membership.
While the FATF created a set of technical anti-money laundering
standards, it sought to implement them with techniques that went
beyond simple persuasion. The FATF also worked on developing
appropriate “countermeasures” to those jurisdictions that failed to
adequately implement anti-money laundering policies.365
In 1996, the FATF revised the Recommendations to extend antimoney laundering preventive measures to non-bank financial
institutions.366 In addition, it also agreed to apply “preliminary
sanctions against certain [FATF] members” that did not comply with
the Recommendations (note that the term “countermeasures” was
not used).367 By 1998, the CFATF and the Asia Pacific Group on
Money Laundering together included all of the offshore centers in the

362. See FATF, FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ANNUAL REPORT 1996–1997,
paras. 5–6, http://www.jya.com/fatf96-97.htm.
363. See Caribbean Financial Action Task Force [CFATF], CFATF Overview
http://www.cfatf-gafic.org/component/content/article/17-main/8-cfatf-overview.html (last
visited Nov. 9, 2009). The “uncommitted” commitment to implement the FATF 40 was
discussed at a number of CFATF meetings and later at the Asia-Pacific Group on MoneyLaundering (“APG”) and the Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of AntiMoney-Laundering Measures (“PC-R-EV”), now known as “Moneyval.” The author
attended meetings of the APG as a representative of the IMF from 1998 to 2004, where he
heard such comments. Also during that period, he discussed the issue with delegates from
member countries of the CFATF and the PC-R-EV where he heard such comments.
364. FATF, About the FATF, supra note 352.
365. The author served as an IMF representative at FATF meetings starting in 1998
and continuing through 2004 and observed the operations of the FATF in detail, including
engaging in discussion with the FATF secretariat and delegates from sub-state entities.
366. FATF, THE FORTY RECOMMENDATIONS, pt. c (1996), http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/15/51/40262612.pdf.
367. FATF, FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ANNUAL REPORT 1996–1997, supra
note 362 para. 32 (emphasis added).
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Caribbean and Asia listed both in the OECD’s 2000 tax haven list and
in the FATF’s Non-cooperating Countries and Territories 2000 list.368
During the early 1990s, FATF members expressed concern about
jurisdictions they believed were key weak links in enforcing antimoney laundering rules.369 According to the FATF, at that time many
onshore jurisdictions, including almost all poorer or developing
countries, had little or no anti-money laundering rules or
enforcement. However, it was the role played by some key offshore
jurisdictions that was frequently mentioned as the most troublesome.
Many of these jurisdictions allegedly provided benefits to launderers
that the vast number of poorer and developing countries did not: they
were usually “tax havens,” they had a first-world financial
infrastructure, and a first-world legal system to protect property
rights.370 The 1996 FATF 40 included Recommendation 21, which
stated that financial institutions should give heightened due diligence
to business relations and transactions with persons from jurisdictions
that “do not or insufficiently apply [the] Recommendations.”371 Such
heightened due diligence could result in a financial institution
refusing to undertake transactions with the person from a noncomplying jurisdiction, but the Recommendation was vague on this
issue.372 The Recommendation was an invitation, however, for local
regulators to use hard power on their domestic institutions to ensure
compliance on the part of non-resident institutions, in a manner quite
similar to that recommended for both tax and prudential standards
enforcement.373

368. Membership of the CFATF includes every OFC in the Caribbean region. See
CFATF, CFATF Overview, supra note 363. The membership of the Asia Pacific Group
includes every OFC in the Asia region. See Asia/Pacific Group, Overview of Members,
http://www.apgml.org/apg-members/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2009); Appendix, infra.
369. The author served as an IMF representative at FATF meetings starting in 1998
and continuing through 2004 and observed the operations of the FATF in detail, including
engaging in discussion with the FATF secretariat and delegates from sub-state entities.
370. Interview with Rick McDonnel, Head of Secretariat, Fin. Action Task Force,
Paris, Fr. (May 12, 2007). The first-world financial structure included branches or
subsidiaries of onshore banks or domestic onshore banks that were an accepted part of the
international financial system and trust and company service providers to assist in access
to the financial system.
371. FATF, THE FORTY RECOMMENDATIONS (1996), supra note 366, at 5,
Recommendation 21.
372. For further discussion of this issue, see Hartman, supra note 164, at 273–78.
373. As there was no formal enforcement mechanism within the FATF, the only way to
enforce the FATF 40 was for local regulatory authorities to accept the standard and
enforce it domestically. See the discussion of enforcement of TRN-developed standards
supra in Part I.A.
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There are a number of reasons why offshore centers might not
have wished to make full implementation of the FATF’s
recommendations a priority. The primary purpose of anti-money
laundering rules is to reduce criminal activity by reducing the ability
to enjoy the profits of crime.374 However, the vast majority of
criminals and criminal activities were onshore, not off; therefore,
implementing such policies was likely to help onshore jurisdictions far
more.375 Because implementation of such policies was relatively
costly, especially to financial institutions,376 there may have been
relatively little “non-altruistic” reasons to expend such cash. Also,
because the implementation of anti-money laundering rules required
clients of financial institutions to jump through more hoops regarding
such matters as identification,377 implementation might have hurt
business.
By 1999, key FATF members, led again primarily by the United
States and France, determined that diplomatic efforts, plus the threat
of implementation of Recommendation 21, had not been enough to
encourage these allegedly troublesome jurisdictions to change.378
Taking as their model the OECD’s harmful tax competition project,379
FATF delegates began to formulate an analogous anti-money
laundering program, putting together the Non-Cooperating Countries
and Territories process.380 In doing so, the FATF made a number of
crucial decisions.
First, analogous to the Harmful Tax Practices Project and the
detrimental issues involved in that system, the FATF delegates chose
not to include in its initial review all jurisdictions that failed to follow
the FATF 40, but rather those they believed were causing the most
374. See Gordon, supra note 345, at 409.
375. See the discussion in Gordon, supra note 345, at 413–14. This point was made
repeatedly to the author during meetings with officials from OFCs during the period of
2000 to 2004.
376. See Richard K. Gordon, Trysts or Terrorists? Financial Institutions and the Search
for Bad Guys, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 699, 721–25, 728–29 (2008).
377. See, e.g., FATF, FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS 2–3, Recommendation 5 (2003),
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/7/40/34849567.PDF. Recommendation 5 requires
financial institutions to identify all clients, including beneficial owners or controllers. Id.
This includes beneficiaries of trust accounts as well as directors and controlling
shareholders of companies. Id. This is far more onerous than simply requiring the name
and address of the client of record.
378. Interview with un-named high ranking official for a FATF-member country, in
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (July 2000).
379. The modest FATF Secretariat was physically housed at the OECD’s Paris
headquarters, which may have lead to the FATF adopting some of OECD ideas during
mutual staff coffee or lunch breaks in the OECD mess.
380. Interview in Kuala Lumpur, supra note 378.
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practical problems.381 For this purpose, they put together an ad hoc
group to determine which jurisdictions should be included in the
initial review.382 The reasons for so doing were obvious, as most
countries in the world had yet to adopt and implement the FATF 40;
to cover all countries would require too many resources. However, by
selecting only a subset of such countries, they left themselves open to
criticism. FATF members wound up selecting a relatively large
number of jurisdictions for review, including a number of large
onshore jurisdictions like the Philippines and Russia.383 Eventually,
FATF examined a total of forty-seven countries or territories in two
rounds of reviews.384
Unlike the Harmful Tax Practices Project or even the prudential
supervisory program, the FATF already had a standard formally
endorsed by virtually all of the jurisdictions they wished to examine:
the FATF 40. Although when signing on to the FATF-style regional
bodies the jurisdictions had not pledged to implement the FATF 40
by a specific date, at least they had accepted it as the applicable
standard against which their anti-money laundering policies should be
judged through a mutual evaluation process.385 Nevertheless, the
FATF decided neither to apply the full FATF 40 as the standard by
which cooperation would be judged nor to rely on the FATF-style
regional body mutual evaluations to determine compliance.386 Rather,
the FATF chose to create a special set of twenty-five criteria based on
a subset of the FATF 40, and to assess compliance with the twentyfive criteria themselves.387 The FATF also contemplated a “certain
subjectivity” in assessments.388 This failure to apply the same standard

381. FATF, REPORT ON NON-COOPERATIVE COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES, supra
note 340, at 6 (“FATF members have been invited to mention those jurisdictions where, in
the recent past, there have been difficulties, with an explanation of the nature of the
difficulties that were encountered.”).
382. See id. at 6–7.
383. See FATF, FATF REVIEW TO IDENTIFY NON-COOPERATING COUNTRIES OR
TERRITORIES: INCREASING THE WORLDWIDE EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING MEASURES 9 (2000), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/56/43/33921824.pdf.
384. Interview with Rick McDonnel, supra note 370.
385. Id.
386. Interview in Kuala Lumpur, supra note 378.
387. See FATF, REPORT ON NON-COOPERATIVE COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES,
supra note 340, at 1–7.
388. “No specific criteria can be considered a litmus test of a particular jurisdiction’s
level of co-operation in the international fight against money laundering. Rather, each
jurisdiction must be judged by the overall, total effect of its laws and programmes in
preventing abuse of the financial sector or impeding efforts of foreign judicial and
administrative authorities.” Id. at 6.
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indicated more detrimental attributes, in that a successful standards
system should apply the same standard to all.
Many of the twenty-five criteria focused on the core of the
preventive measures in the FATF 40, including inadequate regulation
and supervision of financial institutions, inadequate fit and proper
test rules for the licensing and creation of financial institutions,
inadequate customer identification requirements for financial
institutions, excessive secrecy provisions regarding financial
institutions, and a lack of an efficient suspicious-transaction reporting
system.389 Other criteria focused on law enforcement (lack of a
financial intelligence unit) and on international cooperation.390 But
others, such as “[i]nadequate commercial law requirements for
registration of business and legal entities” and “lack of identification
of the beneficial owner(s) of legal and business entities,” were new.391
There simply was no single standard for all.
For jurisdictions that were found to be non-cooperative with
respect to these criteria, proposed responses could include:
[s]pecific actions . . . by other multi-lateral fora (e.g., the G-7,
the OECD, the Basle Committee, IOSCO and the International
Financial Institutions) to seek the issuance of public statements
or other appropriate action. In particular, the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund, could examine the
consequences of a particular jurisdiction’s failure to take
appropriate corrective action, in connection with their
activities.392
Other proposed responses involved applying Recommendation
21 to financial institutions with respect to heightened due diligence.393
And finally, again reminiscent of the OECD’s Harmful Tax Practices
Project, the Report proposed the application by FATF members (as
opposed to financial institutions located within FATF-member
jurisdictions), collectively or individually, of “counter-measures,”
including “[c]onditioning, restricting, targeting or even prohibiting
financial transactions with non-cooperative jurisdictions.”394

389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.

Id. at 2–4.
Id. at 4–6.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
Id. at 8.
See id.
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In February of 2000, the FATF published its first review.395 The
vast majority of the OFCs listed in the initial forty-seven did not
make it to the “uncooperative” list.396 While it was not clear from the
report why this was the case, a number of persons who were part of
the review process reported that the United Kingdom worked to keep
its offshore territories off the list, while Canada also worked to keep
off the list a number of territories with which it had close relations
and which it represented on the Executive Board of the IMF.397 The
Cayman Islands, one of the most important OFCs in terms of total
business transacted, did make the list. The report noted that the
Caymans had no requirement for customer identification and
recordkeeping, the most essential of the anti-money laundering
preventive measures, as well as little active bank supervision.398 Other
jurisdictions like the Bahamas, Dominica, and the Marshall Islands
were listed primarily for not providing information on beneficial
ownership of legal persons or arrangements,399 something that most
onshore jurisdictions also did not do. A number of other relatively
minor OFCs (in terms of total business transacted) were on the list
and were also uncooperative tax havens; three of these, the Cook
Islands, Nauru, and Niue, also had no customer identification
requirement.400 A number of others with serious shortcomings,
including Russia and Lebanon, were not offshore centers at all.
As noted earlier in Part II.B.2, the NCCT process was
proceeding more or less parallel with the OECD’s Harmful Tax
Practices Project. Jurisdictions named as NCCTs complained as well,
and for many of the same reasons: the defensive “countermeasures”
were actually coercive sanctions, or the illegitimate application of
power by the rich and powerful against the small and weak.401 Again,
there was some agreement with this view in the popular press as well

395. FATF, FATF REVIEW TO IDENTIFY NON-COOPERATING COUNTRIES OR
TERRITORIES: INCREASING THE WORLDWIDE EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING MEASURES, supra note 383, at 1.
396. See infra Appendix.
397. The author personally observed these discussions during February of 2000.
398. FATF, FATF REVIEW TO IDENTIFY NON-COOPERATING COUNTRIES OR
TERRITORIES: INCREASING THE WORLDWIDE EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING MEASURES, supra note 383, at 4.
399. Id. at 2, 5, 7.
400. The Cook Islands did not require customer identification for offshore banks
(defined as banks that do not accept resident customers), id. at 4, while Nauru lacked
regulations of any kind, id. at 8, and Niue had deficiencies in customer identification, id.
401. See supra notes 169, 170, 172 and accompanying text.
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as in academia.402 While the FATF 40 was at least arguably a standard
accepted by virtually all of the OFCs on the NCCT list via their
membership in an FATF-style regional body, the twenty-five criteria
by which they were assessed were not.403 This allowed the offshore
centers to claim that the larger onshore centers were trying to impose
standards that were neither internationally accepted nor applied to
some of their own members.404 As with the tax competition program,
another key complaint was that the process of assessing the
jurisdiction’s compliance lacked all the hallmarks of due process
posited to be found in the most successful standards system; in
particular, the assessments were certainly neither uniform nor
impartially applied.405 Objectivity was noticeably absent.
In 1996, a staff member in the Monetary and Exchange Affairs
Department published a paper on the macroeconomic implications of
money laundering.406 In the paper, he argued that laundering created
inaccuracies in macroeconomic data, investment decisions based on
ease of laundering rather than on rate of return, erosion of confidence
in financial markets, tax evasion, and finally an increase in underlying
criminal activities (i.e., predicate offenses) that would result in the
promotion of private economic benefits over social welfare.407
In response, the IMF Legal Department disputed each of these
views, suggesting that if a problem existed it was that anti-laundering
policies resulted in inaccurate macroeconomic data, skewed
investment decisions, erosion of confidence in markets, and tax

402. See, e.g., Hartman, supra note 164, at 263–64 (arguing that countermeasures are in
fact sanctions as a remedy for a breach of international obligations, but that because there
are no such obligations with respect to tax, the sanctions are illegitimate); James, supra
note 170, at 5 (“[T]he OECD, like pirates who plied the waters of the Caribbean during
the sixteenth through nineteenth centuries, has, through its ill-advised anti-harmful tax
competition initiative, effectively robbed fourteen CARICOM nations of their sovereign
right to determine their tax and economic policies.”).
403. This was because the standard had been created solely by the FATF and its
members, meeting without consultation with outsiders. See supra notes 387–91 and
accompanying text.
404. See SHARMAN, supra note 135, at 71, 86–93.
405. See id. at 75, 86–88; see also John Burgess, 15 Nations Cited as Havens for Possible
Money Crimes, WASH. POST, June 23, 2000, at E3 (quoting the Cayman Islands’
government in criticizing their placement on the FATF list as “made without due
process”).
406. PETER QUIRK, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, MACROECONOMIC
IMPLICATIONS OF MONEY LAUNDERING (1996).
407. Id. at 2, 18–19, 27–28.
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evasion.408 As for the argument that crime is bad, the article noted
that while this is obviously true, relying upon this argument would
lead logically to a position that all anti-crime efforts were within the
IMF’s mandate. This position would be self-evidently unworkable.409
Informal discussions among the Legal Department and Executive
Board offices, management, and senior staff at other IMF
Departments confirmed a strong general inclination for the IMF to
avoid money laundering issues because they were primarily related to
criminal enforcement and, therefore, beyond the Fund’s mandate and
expertise.410
Nevertheless, in part to placate the American and French
governments, the IMF agreed to send staff members as observers to
FATF and FATF-style regional bodies. As the FSAP/ROSC program
was being developed, the United States established a slightly different
tack. In early 2000, U.S. Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers sent
a letter to the International Monetary and Financial Committee411 at
the Fund and the Development Committee at the World Bank,412
urging the two to “step up” their efforts to combat money
laundering.413 Noting the recent “increased engagement . . . on
financial sector issues and assessments,” Secretary Summers urged
the IMF and World Bank to include money laundering measures in
financial sector reform programs.414 In particular, the United States
lobbied to include the FATF 40 as a standard to be assessed under
408. Gordon, supra note 345, at 410–14. Although published as an opinion by a senior
lawyer in the Legal Department, it was done so with the encouragement of the IMF’s then
General Counsel.
409. Id. at 414–17.
410. The author served as a senior staff member at the IMF during this time and
participated in these discussions.
411. The International Monetary and Financial Committee (“IMFC”) is composed of
twenty-four IMF governors, ministers, or others of comparable rank. See IMF, A Guide to
Committees, Groups, and Clubs, supra note 266. The Committee advises the IMF’s Board
of Governors. Id. Each member country that appoints, and each group of member
countries that elects, an Executive Director appoints a member of the IMFC. Id.
412. The Development Committee’s formal title is the Joint Ministerial Committee of
the Boards of Governors of the Bank and the Fund on the Transfer of Real Resources to
Developing Countries. It is composed of twenty-four World Bank governors, finance, or
development ministers or others of comparable rank. It advises IMF and the World Bank
Board of Governors on development issues. Each World Bank member country that
appoints, and each group of member countries that elects, a World Bank Executive
Director appoints a member of the IMFC. See Dev. Comm., About the Development
Committee, http://go.worldbank.org/XC5NCJDH40 (last visited Sept. 12, 2009).
413. Lawrence H. Summers, U.S. Treasury Sec’y, Statement to the Development
Committee of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Apr. 17, 2000),
http://imf.org/external/spring/2000/dc/usa.htm.
414. Id.
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the FSAP/ROSC and OFC programs.415 There apparently were a
number of reasons the United States wished for the IMF and World
Bank to add anti-money laundering to the FSAP program. One was
that it would bring added attention to money laundering issues.
However, another was that the IMF, with its near universal
membership and independent staff, would add legitimacy to an
assessment practice that was lacking in the NCCT process.416
The reaction from most other Executive Directors, management,
and staff was again largely negative. Two staff reports were drafted
and discussed at the Executive Board meeting that largely rejected
the idea, but suggested instead that the existing assessment of the
anti-money laundering principles in the various supervisory principles
(Basel Core Principles, IOSCO, and IAIS) be enhanced and that the
IMF and World Bank work more closely with the FATF in ensuring
compliance with these principles.417 The staff reports also suggested
that the World Bank and IMF might recognize the FATF 40 as the
anti-money laundering world standard, but that it would be up to the
FATF and FATF-style regional bodies to assess compliance.418 The
Board went along, noting in particular that the IMF should not
become involved in “law enforcement.”419
A key concern expressed by all the non-OECD Executive
Directors at this time (and privately by a few OECD Directors) was
that the FATF NCCT process was, in their opinion, anything but
voluntary and cooperative in nature, and, therefore, anathema to
both the Fund and the Bank’s culture and tradition in general and to
the Financial Sector Assessment and Offshore Financial Sector
programs specifically.420 They did not want the two international
financial institutions to be seen to support in any way the NCCT
415. See, e.g., IMF, FINANCIAL SYSTEM ABUSE, supra note 154, at 17 (“We believe
country programs and loan operations should incorporate, as appropriate, preconditions
and performance criteria designed to help countries make real and measurable progress in
combating money laundering. ROSCs offer a flexible process for incorporating
assessments of countries’ observance of the FATF Forty Recommendations as another
separate module.”).
416. The author discussed these issues with a number of senior U.S. authorities.
417. IMF & WORLD BANK, ENHANCING CONTRIBUTIONS TO COMBATING MONEY
LAUNDERING: POLICY PAPER 14, box 1 (2001), available at http://www.imf.org/external/
np/ml/2001/eng/042601.pdf.
418. Id. at 15–16.
419. Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 01/41, IMF, IMF Executive Board Discusses
Money Laundering (Apr. 29, 2001), http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2001/
PN0141.htm.
420. See id. (“[S]everal Directors noted that recognizing the FATF 40
Recommendations did not constitute an endorsement of the non-voluntary and noncooperative manner in which the FATF applies the Recommendations.”).
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process and contemplated ways in which the IMF and World Bank
might work to soften or eliminate the entire NCCT program.421
In spite of criticism, the NCCT process continued without the
support of the two international financial institutions. In June of 2000,
the Bahamas, the Cayman Islands, and Liechtenstein had been
removed from the list, while a number of onshore jurisdictions,
including Egypt, Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, Myanmar, and
Nigeria, were added.422 While the addition of these onshore
jurisdictions somewhat muted the complaints that the NCCT process
involved a ganging up of the powerful over the weakest, it also added
voices of countries with significantly larger populations and political
influence to the criticism of the process.
The change in U.S. administrations, so important in re-framing
the United States’ advocacy for the Harmful Tax Practices Project,
may have affected U.S. support for anti-money laundering activities.
At the IMF, it was rumored that the new officials involved in
formulating U.S. policy toward tax havens believed that much of the
U.S. policy on anti-money laundering was actually a subterfuge for
closing down tax havens. The reason, it was rumored, was that the
most important of the twenty-five non-cooperating country criteria
were linked to piercing bank secrecy and sharing information, which
were also central to uncovering U.S. persons who use tax havens to
avoid or evade income tax.
At this point, the efforts of the major onshore jurisdictions to
involve the IMF (and to a lesser extent the World Bank) in their
harmful tax practices and NCCT projects had largely failed beyond an
enhanced emphasis on Basel Core Principle Fifteen, which required

421. In the Executive Board’s discussion of the role of the IMF in anti-money
laundering efforts,
Directors also stressed that the FATF process needs to be made consistent with
the ROSC process—that is, the FATF standard needs to be applied uniformly,
cooperatively, and on a voluntary basis—and that once this is done, the FATF
could be invited to participate in the preparation of a ROSC module on money
laundering. They called on the staffs of the Fund and the World Bank to
contribute to the ongoing revision of the FATF 40 Recommendations and to
discuss with the FATF the principles underlying the ROSC procedures and come
back to the Board with a report and proposals.
Id.
422. FATF, REVIEW TO IDENTIFY NON-COOPERATIVE COUNTRIES OR
TERRITORIES: INCREASING THE WORLDWIDE EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING MEASURES 3–4 (June 22, 2001), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/56/41/
33922055.pdf.
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banks to have effective anti-money laundering programs.423 While the
IMF’s project to assess OFC’s compliance with the Basel Core
Principles (and occasionally the securities, IOSCO, and insurance,
IAIS, principles) was proceeding, most offshore centers were actually
receiving very good assessments.424
Any remaining effort to derail plans for significant IMF and
World Bank involvement in promoting compliance with anti-money
laundering principles was rendered almost entirely irrelevant by the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States. Although
the attacks were carried out inexpensively, the U.S. Treasury
Department began immediately to push other members of the FATF
to include terrorism financing as a central part of its mandate. On
October 29 and 30, 2001, the FATF, meeting in an extraordinary
plenary session in Washington, adopted eight new recommendations
on terrorist financing.425 Soon after, the IMF Managing Director
created a special task force to consider how to intensify IMF
involvement in anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism financing
projects.426 On November 5, 2001, the Task Force issued a report
recommending that the IMF and World Bank endorse the FATF 40
plus the eight new Special Recommendations (“FATF 40 + 8”) and
begin to include the assessment of compliance with the FATF 40 + 8
into the FSAP and OFC program.427 In addition, the report
recommended that anti-money laundering and terrorism financing
ROSCs be prepared once the already adopted rules for ROSC
assessments could be achieved.428 The Task Force managed to find
the previously missing mandate for activity in this area in the IMF’s
role in overseeing the international financial system.429 Intellectually,
this was a stretch, but politically, the results were unavoidable: the
IMF’s management and Executive Board simply could not say no in
the charged atmosphere that was the immediate aftermath of the
terrorist attacks. In fact, the Task Force report states quite explicitly

423. For full text of this Principle, see BASEL COMM., PRINCIPLES FOR THE
SUPERVISION OF BANKS’ FOREIGN ESTABLISHMENTS, supra note 213.
424. Interview with Rick McDonnel, supra note 370.
425. The author served as a senior staff member at the IMF during this time and
participated in these discussions.
426. The author of this Article was a member of the Task Force.
427. IMF, INTENSIFIED FUND INVOLVEMENT IN ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING WORK
AND COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM 14–15 (2001) [hereinafter IMF,
INTENSIFIED FUND INVOLVEMENT], https://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/aml/2001/eng/
110501.pdf.
428. Id. at 16.
429. Id. at 5–6.
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that the IMF’s involvement should be based not on its mandate but
on the fact that
[t]he Fund is a collaborative institution with near universal
membership, which lends the Fund legitimacy and acceptance,
and makes it a natural forum for sharing information and
developing common approaches to issues. These strengths also
make the Fund a vehicle for actively promoting desirable
policies and standards in member countries.430
The report also noted that the IMF already had experience in
assessing compliance with other standards.431 In other words, the Task
Force suggested that the IMF had as attributes many of the positive
factors that lead to good standards systems.
While the Task Force members were drafting the report, some
Executive Directors made clear that they wanted not only for all
offshore center assessments to include money laundering assessments,
but that the offshore program be accelerated.432 There was some
resistance to this on the part of many members of the Task Force,
who felt that the events of September 11, 2001, had nothing to do
with offshore centers and that resources could better be used
elsewhere. Nevertheless, in the end, the Task Force report proposed
increasing the target number of OFC assessments from ten to twenty
per year so that two-thirds of the forty-two OFCs on the Financial
Stability Forum’s list would be assessed by the end of 2002.433 The
Executive Board agreed.434
The report noted a number of other issues, including that in
order for assessments of compliance to be as objective and uniform as
possible, the new anti-money laundering and terrorism financing
standard—FATF 40 + 8—needed an assessment methodology;
without such a methodology, which already existed for Basel Core
Principles assessments, there could be no objectivity.435 The report
also suggested that the IMF and World Bank should not be involved
in assessing compliance with criminal law matters and raised the
430. Id. at 10.
431. Id. at 10–11.
432. The author served as a senior staff member at the IMF during this time and
participated in these discussions.
433. IMF, INTENSIFIED FUND INVOLVEMENT, supra note 427, at 15.
434. Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 01/120, IMF, IMF Board Discusses the
Fund’s Intensified Involvement in Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing
of Terrorism (Nov. 16, 2001) [hereinafter IMF Board Discussion], https://www.imf.org/
external/np/sec/pn/2001/pn01120.htm.
435. IMF, INTENSIFIED FUND INVOLVEMENT, supra note 427, at 12. The meaning of
these two paragraphs was understood as such by the authors of the paper.

GORDON.PTD5

2010]

2/9/2010 1:23 PM

ON THE USE AND ABUSE OF STANDARDS

579

question of how the activities of the IMF and World Bank would
intersect with that of the FATF and FATF-style regional bodies.436
Finally, the report discussed the NCCT process, which clearly
breached the rules of the game for producing acceptable ROSCs: the
NCCT process was not voluntary, not objectively applied across
countries (e.g., there was no methodology for assessment), and was
assessed using pass-fail ratings.437 In short, it flunked many of the
attributes of a good standard system identified in Part I above.
Although they did not explicitly mention the NCCT process, the
Executive Board agreed that these issues had to be resolved before
anti-money laundering ROSCs could be prepared and, in particular,
that the process be “compatible with the uniform, voluntary, and
cooperative nature of the ROSC exercise.”438
At this point, an intense series of discussions began among key
FATF members and senior staff with respect to the continuation of
the NCCT process. In effect, management at the IMF and World
Bank concluded that the Executive Board would not endorse an antimoney laundering and terrorism financing ROSC while the FATF
continued the NCCT process, while key FATF members insisted that
the NCCT process was working and should be allowed to continue.
Another issue was the assessment methodology document, which was
needed if assessments were to be uniform and objective. The FATF
agreed to complete the document and referred the job to the U.S.
delegation, but their initial version was little more than a restatement
of the FATF 40 + 8. As a result, IMF and World Bank staff agreed to
complete the methodology with IMF staff taking the lead. The result
was a highly detailed set of criteria that one staff member noted
would “make it very hard for the FATF to be easy on themselves and
hard on others.”439 IMF staff began to use the draft methodology to
make anti-money laundering assessments in the OFC program, but
not to publish ROSCs.
By April, the Fund’s International Monetary and Financial
Committee,440 chaired by the United Kingdom, called on the Fund to
complete the anti-money laundering/combating financing of terrorism
(“AML/CFT”) methodology “and the development of assessment
436. Id. at 12, 28, 34.
437. Id. at 27.
438. IMF Board Discussion, supra note 434.
439. The author of this Article was a principal author of the methodology. This view
was widely held among staff.
440. For additional information on the IMFC, see IMF, A Guide to Committees,
Groups, and Clubs, supra note 266.
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procedures compatible with the uniform, voluntary, and cooperative
nature of the ROSC process.”441
In June of 2002, the FATF released its next non-cooperating
countries report; fifteen jurisdictions were still listed, just under half
of which were offshore centers, and none of which was particularly
important in terms of percentage of total offshore business in the
world442: the Cook Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Marshall Islands,
Nauru, Niue, St. Vincent, and the Grenadines.443 However, a number
of the remaining onshore jurisdictions (including Egypt, Indonesia,
Nigeria, the Philippines, Russia, and Ukraine) had relatively large
economies compared to those of the smaller offshore centers and,
therefore, could be influential with the IMF Board.
The next staff paper proposed a pilot program of anti-money
laundering assessments based on the new methodology to be
undertaken by the IMF and World Bank and the FATF and FATFstyle regional bodies.444 However, given the International Monetary
and Financial Committee’s statement, the authors insisted on
standing up to the United States and France and insisted that all
assessments embrace a process that was:
uniform, including using the same methodology for all
assessments (the FATF’s NCCT process uses a different
methodology from those of mutual evaluations), voluntary (the
FATF NCCT process is mandatory and can result in the
imposition of sanctions) and cooperative, including not using a
pass-fail approach (the FATF NCCT process labels
jurisdictions either “cooperative” or “non-cooperative”) and
giving the jurisdiction the opportunity to publish a right of reply
alongside the ROSC (the FATF NCCT process does not allow
such a right of reply).445

441. Press Release No. 02/22, IMF, Communiqué of the Int’l Monetary and Fin.
Comm. of the Board of Governors of the IMF (Apr. 20, 2002), http://www.imf.org/
external/np/sec/pr/2002/pr0222.htm.
442. Interview with un-named senior staff member from a FATF-member country, in
Washington, D.C. (June 2002).
443. FATF, REVIEW TO IDENTIFY NON-COOPERATING COUNTRIES AND
TERRITORIES 4 (June 2002), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/4/32/
33922320.pdf.
444. IMF & WORLD BANK, ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING
FINANCING OF TERRORISM (AML/CFT) MATERIALS CONCERNING STAFF PROGRESS
TOWARD THE DEVELOPMENT OF A COMPREHENSIVE AML/CFT METHODOLOGY AND
ASSESSMENT PROCESS: JOINT PROGRESS REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE IMF AND
WORLD BANK 10 (2002), http://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/aml/2002/eng/061102.pdf.
445. Id. at 10 n.5.
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The FATF flatly refused to give up the current NCCT round.446
Thus followed another round of discussions with Executive Directors.
A majority of those opposed to the NCCT process still favored
accepting the FATF’s offer; they felt that it was the best they could
get, and that having impartial IMF assessment of NCCT countries
would act as a significant counterbalance to the “partial” and “unfair”
NCCT assessments. Most of these Executive Directors did not
represent jurisdictions on the NCCT list. Others representing
constituencies that had been assessed through the NCCT process
expressed concerns that such benefits would be outweighed by the
legitimacy that an IMF/World Bank-endorsed FATF Report on the
Observance of Standards and Codes would confer on the FATF and,
therefore, on the NCCT process.
In the end, the Board was split, adopting by a majority a twelvemonth pilot of anti-money laundering assessments and accompanying
ROSCs. Under this pilot, the IMF and the World Bank were to
complete some ROSCs while the FATF and FATF-style regional
bodies were to continue to assess their own members.447 However, the
Board insisted that FATF first agree to undertaking its mutual
evaluations of its own members in a manner consistent with the
ROSC process (including endorsing the new methodology and its use
in undertaking FATF or FATF-style regional bodies and IMF and
World Bank assessments) and that it agree “not [to] undertake a
further round of the [NCCT] initiative, at least during the period of
the 12-month pilot project.”448
However, a number of Directors expressed their disapproval,
saying that those conditions did not go far enough. They said that
“reports on observance associated with FATF-led assessments
[should] not be designated ROSCs unless the FATF undertook a
blanket commitment not to undertake any further country
assessments without the consent of the country, and acknowledge that
it would accept the results of any Fund/Bank-led assessments.”449
As the pilot program went forward, by the end of 2002, the eight
offshore centers assessed, which included the formerly listed
Liechtenstein, did quite well, with only Vanuatu showing a few
remaining significant problems with respect to the quality of
446. The author was a party to these negotiations.
447. See Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 02/87, IMF, IMF Advances Efforts to
Combat Money Laundering and Terrorist Finance (Aug. 8, 2002), http://www.imf.org/
external/np/sec/pn/2002/pn0287.htm.
448. Id.
449. Id.
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supervision in the offshore banking sector and non-bank financial
institutions.450 The assessments merely showcased how effective
jurisdictions were in implementing their anti-money laundering
programs, in most cases noting great improvement in recent years.451
However, the remaining OFCs on the FATF NCCT list did not
request an immediate assessment. The following year, the Cook
Islands requested and received an assessment from the IMF,452 with
the staff report stating that the authorities “have strengthened the
AML/CFT legal and institutional framework mainly in response to
the FATF’s listing of the Cook Islands as a non-cooperative” but that
“the efforts remain uneven,” noting that the FATF had not removed

450. See IMF, ANGUILLA—OVERSEAS TERRITORY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM:
ASSESSMENT OF THE SUPERVISION AND REGULATION OF THE FINANCIAL SECTOR
VOLUME I—REVIEW OF FINANCIAL SECTOR REGULATION AND SUPERVISION 24–32
(2003) [hereinafter IMF, ANGUILLA], http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2003/
cr03370.pdf; IMF, GUERNSEY—CROWN DEPENDENCY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM:
ASSESSMENT OF THE SUPERVISION AND REGULATION OF THE FINANCIAL SECTOR
VOLUME I—REVIEW OF FINANCIAL SECTOR REGULATION AND SUPERVISION 27–33
(2003) [hereinafter IMF, GUERNSEY], http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2003/
cr03364.pdf; IMF, ISLE OF MAN—CROWN DEPENDENCY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM:
ASSESSMENT OF THE SUPERVISION AND REGULATION OF THE FINANCIAL SECTOR
VOLUME I—REVIEW OF FINANCIAL SECTOR REGULATION AND SUPERVISION 21–27
(2003) [hereinafter IMF, ISLE OF MAN], http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2003/
cr03366.pdf; IMF, JERSEY—CROWN DEPENDENCY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM:
ASSESSMENT OF THE SUPERVISION AND REGULATION OF THE FINANCIAL SECTOR
VOLUME I—REVIEW OF FINANCIAL SECTOR REGULATION AND SUPERVISION 29–33
(2003) [hereinafter IMF, JERSEY], http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2003/
cr03368.pdf; IMF, LIECHTENSTEIN: ASSESSMENT OF THE SUPERVISION AND
REGULATION OF THE FINANCIAL SECTOR VOLUME I—REVIEW OF FINANCIAL SECTOR
REGULATION AND SUPERVISION 33–39 (2003) [hereinafter IMF, LIECHTENSTEIN],
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2003/cr03289.pdf; IMF, MONACO: ASSESSMENT OF
THE SUPERVISION AND REGULATION OF THE FINANCIAL SECTOR VOLUME I—REVIEW
OF FINANCIAL SECTOR REGULATION AND SUPERVISION 28–39 (2003) [hereinafter IMF,
MONACO],
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2003/cr03262.pdf;
IMF,
MONTSERRAT—OVERSEAS TERRITORY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM: ASSESSMENT OF
THE SUPERVISION AND REGULATION OF THE FINANCIAL SECTOR—REVIEW OF
FINANCIAL SECTOR REGULATION AND SUPERVISION 20–27 (2003) [hereinafter IMF,
MONTSERRAT],
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2003/cr03371.pdf;
IMF,
VANUATU: ASSESSMENT OF THE SUPERVISION AND REGULATION OF THE FINANCIAL
SECTOR VOLUME I—REVIEW OF FINANCIAL SECTOR REGULATION AND SUPERVISION
61–67
(2003)
[hereinafter
IMF,
VANUATU],
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2003/cr03253.pdf.
451. See IMF, ANGUILLA, supra note 450, at 6; IMF, GUERNSEY, supra note 450, at 6;
IMF, ISLE OF MAN, supra note 450, at 7; IMF, JERSEY, supra note 450, at 7; IMF,
LIECHTENSTEIN, supra note 450, at 17, 35; IMF, MONACO, supra note 450, at 6; IMF,
MONTSERRAT, supra note 450, at 6, 20.
452. They were also assessed as part of a mutual evaluation by the Asian FATF-style
regional body.
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the jurisdiction from the list.453 While the IMF provided free technical
assistance to the Cook Islands,454 they remained on the NCCT list
until 2005.455 If one theory was that involving the IMF in assessing
anti-money laundering compliance would help get OFCs off the
NCCT list, it did not appear to be playing out.
There was an unanticipated effect on the onshore jurisdictions
resulting from the involvement of the IMF in the anti-money
laundering project. In agreeing to allow the FATF and FATF-style
regional bodies to produce ROSCs, the IMF and World Bank insisted
that they ensure uniformity through review of the former’s
assessments.456 This did not go entirely well for the FATF and FATFstyle regional bodies, where a major review
found a high degree of variability in the quality and consistency
of reports prepared by [the FATF and FATF-style regional
bodies] as well as within the same assessor group. While a large
majority of reports were of high- or medium quality with
respect to key components of the assessments, the treatment of
ratings gave rise to greater problems. A number of initiatives
have been taken or are underway to improve the quality and
consistency of assessments by all assessor bodies, including: the
standardization of documentation, the strengthening of
peer/internal reviews, and the intensification of assessor
training.457
According to a law enforcement official from an FATF member,
one result of this review was that if “the introduction of the
methodology document killed some of the ‘I’ll scratch your back if
you scratch mine’ attitude; this quality review will kill off more.”458
The IMF staff’s review of the OFC program in 2003 generally
gave OFCs high marks in anti-money laundering as well as banking
supervision, noting that they “compare[d] favorably” with onshore
453. IMF, COOK ISLANDS: ASSESSMENT OF THE SUPERVISION AND REGULATION OF
THE FINANCIAL SECTOR VOLUME I—REVIEW OF FINANCIAL SECTOR REGULATION
AND SUPERVISION 8, 32 (2004), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2004/cr04413.pdf.
454. See id. at 12 (referencing gains produced by “work undertaken by an IMF
[technical assistance] mission in 2002 and other donors”).
455. FATF, ANNUAL AND OVERALL REVIEW OF NON-COOPERATIVE COUNTRIES
AND TERRITORIES 1 (2005), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/41/26/34988035.pdf.
456. See IMF & WORLD BANK, ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE
FINANCING OF TERRORISM: REVIEW OF THE QUALITY AND CONSISTENCY OF
ASSESSMENT REPORTS AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF COORDINATION 3 (2006),
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2006/041806r.pdf.
457. See id. (emphasis omitted).
458. Comment by a senior IMF staff member to the author immediately following the
publication of the report.
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jurisdictions of similar wealth.459 The review again found no serious
systemic risk. The review the following year actually found that
compliance levels for OFCs for money laundering were, as with
banking supervision, more favorable than for other jurisdictions.460 As
discussed in Part II.C above, in 2008, the offshore financial
assessment program was merged with the FSAP program, treating
offshore centers like their onshore counterparts.461
As a result of the IMF’s insistence that offshore centers be
assessed in a fair, consistent, and uniform manner, it was shown that
those centers largely conformed to the universal anti-money
laundering and terrorism financing standards. Offshore centers had
scored another significant victory.
With the NCCT process, the anti-money laundering standards
system started out with many detrimental attributes. Even so, the fact
that the FATF had some positive TRN characteristics (such as
participation of some local regulatory bodies and the absence of pure
state control of membership), plus the fact that the FATF-style
bodies included many more members, did help in creating a far more
generally accepted standard than did the OECD with respect to its
Harmful Tax Practices Project. However, once the system was
changed from the NCCT to uniform assessment of the same standards
by the IMF (and other quasi-TRNs under IMF oversight), the system
assumed far more beneficial than detrimental attributes. Once again,
participation of the IMF, an international organization with TRN
attributes, made the difference. It not only produced generally
accepted standards applied and implemented impartially, but also it
helped protect the interests of weak states over the strong.
III. SUCCESSES AND FAILURES: THE SYSTEM AND TRN
CHARACTERISTICS
A. Deconstructing the System
While onshore centers achieved much of what they claimed they
wanted with respect to each of the three areas of complaint, the
processes and results were different. The first system, the Harmful
Tax Practices Project, was widely criticized. The second, the Global
459. See IMF, 2003 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 332, at 10–14 (describing the results
of both banking and money laundering assessments).
460. IMF, 2004 ASSESSMENT PROGRAM UPDATE, supra note 331, at 7, 22–25 app. II.
461. Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 08/82, IMF, Executive Board Integrates the
Offshore Financial Center Assessment Program with the FSAP (July 9, 2008),
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2008/pn0882.htm.
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Forum, is far less unpopular. Offshore centers, by agreeing to provide
taxpayer information to onshore centers, should wind up being less
easy locations for onshore residents to commit tax evasion. That
being said, the onshore jurisdictions are by no means fully satisfied;
offshore centers will still make income tax evasion somewhat easier
for determined tax-evading onshore residents. However, the resulting
income tax standards, limited to transparency and sharing of
information, are largely agreed upon and the system implementing
these standards is far less controversial. With respect to prudential
regulation, the story was quite different. Offshore centers not only
adopted and implemented the generally accepted financial regulatory
standards of onshore jurisdictions, they did (overall) a better job at
implementing them than did onshore jurisdictions. There is little
complaint from anyone over the standards themselves or the system
of implementation. Much the same can be said of anti-money
laundering and terrorism financing standards, at least after the
completion of the non-cooperating countries and territories process.
1. Income Taxation
With respect to the original Harmful Tax Practices Project, there
was no real transnational regulatory network and no generally
accepted standard.462 Onshore centers sought to use the OECD to
develop a generally accepted standard and to assess compliance with
that standard.463 Onshore centers no doubt would have preferred that
offshore centers accept the standard through peer pressure or
persuasion. As it turned out, the offshore centers (as well as other
jurisdictions) were not convinced that the standard actually was a best
practice; they neither accepted that income taxation was the best way
to raise revenue nor believed that they should give up all of the
benefits of offering tax avoidance or evasion possibilities to onshore
residents.464 They also did not accept that the OECD’s assessment
process was legitimate. The OECD members’ fall-back position was
to use the hard power of coordinated action by their local tax
authorities against their own residents who did business with offshore
centers. This resulted in an even more significant outcry against the
alleged illegitimacy of the entire OECD process.
The first departure from the paradigm TRN process was the
absence of a generally accepted standard. There were not only good
462. See supra notes 136–38 and accompanying text.
463. See supra notes 94, 124 and accompanying text.
464. See supra notes 80–86, 172 and accompanying text.
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economic arguments against the income tax in general; there were, at
least from the perspective of offshore jurisdictions, very good
arguments as to why they should not adopt an income tax, including
that other taxes, such as import duties, were more appropriate for
their particular economies.465 As the IMF noted, there was no
international obligation for one member to adopt policies that were
injurious to themselves to benefit other members.466 With no genuine
agreement on a standard, it was difficult to impose one. One can
argue that the onshore centers tried to use the OECD to help
legitimize the “standard” by formally adopting it the way a TRN
might, but the effort largely failed. Unlike TRNs, such as the Basel
Committee, the OECD was not a group of technical experts but
rather a club of states.467 To make matters even worse, the OECD
shared the undesirable TRN quality of being a select club, consisting
only of wealthy onshore jurisdictions.468 Onshore jurisdictions turned
to the IMF to remedy some of these deficiencies, but the IMF refused
to participate—again because staff did not accept the underlying
argument that the proposed standards were really best practices
appropriate for all jurisdictions.469 Next, the compliance assessment
process was also conducted by the OECD, further depressing the
perception of legitimacy. At the end of this process, the only tool
available to the onshore jurisdictions to reach compliance was the
hard power of onshore regulatory authorities.470 Though somewhat
successful, the income tax standards system was turning out to be by
far the least satisfactory of the three.
The shift by the OECD from the problematic paradigm of the
Harmful Tax Practices Project to the Global Forum on Transparency
cured many of these defects. It created a far more inclusive suborganization—the Global Forum—and adopted another standard,
one that was less stringent but more acceptable to offshore
jurisdictions (as well as others).471 The OECD (as the Forum)
adopted a system of assessment that, by being less arbitrary and
including a review process for the countries affected, adopted many
of the positive features of the most successful TRNs.472 While
participation of the IMF (if transparency and exchange of
465.
466.
467.
468.
469.
470.
471.
472.

See supra notes 80–86 and accompanying text.
See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 100–01, 110–11, 156–57 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 159–62 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 181–82, 197–98 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 183–89 and accompanying text.
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information in tax matters were ever deemed to be a part of its
mandate) might have added even more protection, at least the Global
Forum’s standard and assessment procedures were moving in the
right direction both to add to the legitimacy of the process and to
protect the legitimate interests of OFCs.
2. Prudential Regulation
With respect to prudential regulation, starting in the mid-1970s,
there was a real transnational regulatory network—the Basel
Committee—and a generally accepted (though evolving) standard.
Unlike the absence of an income tax, poor prudential regulation in
one jurisdiction actually could cause problems for all jurisdictions,
including offshore centers. There was a potential legitimacy
deficiency with respect to the standard adopted in that the Basel
Committee consisted of only a small number of onshore regulators.
However, the later acceptance of the standard by the Offshore Group
of Banking Supervisors (which included many offshore centers)
largely remedied that deficiency.473
Following the Asian Financial Crisis, when onshore centers
sought to cast blame for banking and other financial failures on
offshore centers, onshore countries enlisted the IMF to add
legitimacy to the process.474 The IMF added a few positive TRN-like
aspects, but more importantly (given the participation of the Basel
Committee), corrected some typical TRN deficiencies. Most states
were members of the IMF, resulting in broader representation
(sometimes indirectly and imperfectly, such as with British Caribbean
jurisdictions).475 IMF staff acted with relative independence from
member states and had significant independent technical
knowledge.476 The IMF provided a review of the standards and a way
of assessing compliance with those standards separate from the Basel
Committee or any member states. In particular, the assessment
process was designed to be as objective as possible, providing
significant procedural protections for complying jurisdictions.477 The
process determined that OFCs were largely in compliance with the
standard, making it much more difficult for onshore jurisdictions to
implement (via their regulators) “countermeasures” against residents

473.
474.
475.
476.
477.

See supra notes 214–15 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 254, 258, 267–71 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 116–19 and accompanying text.
See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 267–69, 274–84 and accompanying text.
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doing business with offshore centers.478 To the extent that onshore
jurisdictions were trying to use the Basel Core Principles as a backdoor to forcing greater compliance with the failed income tax
“standards,” this also failed.
3. Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing
With respect to anti-money laundering and terrorism financing,
the system evolved as a kind of combination of the previous two. The
G-7 began the FATF as a kind of TRN. While the FATF was
technically a state membership task force, states largely were
represented by domestic regulatory authorities as well as by domestic
law enforcement.479 The anti-money laundering standards (and later
anti-terrorism financing standards) developed by domestic authorities
and endorsed by the FATF were generally accepted as best practices
by offshore centers via the OGBS and the CFATF and later other
relevant FATF-style regional bodies.480 Unlike domestic bank
failures, however, domestic money laundering was far less of a threat
to offshore centers in that criminals were committing their crimes
onshore. Perhaps as a result, many offshore centers were less
interested in suffering the direct and indirect costs (including losing
banking clients who were relying on bank secrecy to evade domestic
income taxation) of enforcing the standards.481 As with the OECD’s
Harmful Tax Practices Project, the FATF responded with its NonCooperating Countries and Territories project. However, offshore
centers again objected to the assessment process as illegitimate,482 in
part because the assessments did not use the FATF 40 as the standard
and because the methodology for assessment was particularly
subjective.483
Again, the IMF was enlisted, perhaps in part to add legitimacy to
the process.484 The IMF added a key procedural benefit by creating a
detailed assessment methodology, resulting in a far more objective
assessment process.485 Also, by agreeing to participate, the FATF had
to agree to abandon the NCCT process.486

478.
479.
480.
481.
482.
483.
484.
485.
486.

See supra notes 321–39 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 38, 352–58 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 360–62 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 374–77 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 378–80 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 385–88, 401–05 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 415–17, 430 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 438–39 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 445–49 and accompanying text.
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As with its assessment of OFCs’ compliance with Basel Core
Principles, the IMF determined that OFCs were largely in compliance
with the anti-money laundering and terrorism financing standard,
making it much more difficult for onshore jurisdictions to implement
countermeasures.487
This Article began with a quotation suggesting that powerful
governments may once again strike out against OFCs, this time
blaming them for the current financial crisis. But perhaps past
experience has actually tamed the response. The G-20 (itself a more
inclusive group than the G-8 at the time of the Asian financial crisis)
statement in April of 2009 specifically resolved to “take action against
non-cooperative jurisdictions, including tax havens.”488 However,
assessments of OFCs’ prudential and anti-money laundering practices
were firmly in the hands of TRNs and the IMF, which have shown in
the past their ability to act fairly in assessing well-accepted standards.
The G-20 did state that “[w]e stand ready to deploy sanctions to
protect our public finances and financial systems.”489 But to that
effect, they mention only that “[t]he era of banking secrecy is over.
We note that the OECD has today published a list of countries
assessed by the Global Forum against the international standard for
exchange of tax information.”490 But the Global Forum, with its wellaccepted standards on transparency and improved assessment
process, would be less fearsome to OFCs than the original form of the
Harmful Tax Practice Project.
B.

Some Proposed Modifications to TRN and Standards Theory

The experience of offshore centers with proposed global
standards in income taxation, prudential regulation, and anti-money
laundering generally confirms the important role played by transnational regulatory networks. States not only acted alone in the
international system but through their various domestic governmental
institutions, including tax and financial regulatory agencies (and,
where relevant, legislatures and law enforcement). The Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision played a particularly important
role. The Basel Committee, through application of the collective
expertise of its members and through the building of consensus and

487. See supra notes 451–55 and accompanying text.
488. GROUP OF 20, THE GLOBAL PLAN FOR RECOVERY & REFORM, para. 15 (Apr. 2,
2009), http://www.g20.org/Documents/final-communique.pdf.
489. Id.
490. Id.
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other “soft power” methods, worked successfully to convince all
regulators that their Basel Core Principles were in fact best practices.
Also, as predicted by theory, the Basel Committee still had some
legitimacy issues, including its limited membership and the fact that
there was no other TRN independent of the Basel group with
sufficient expertise to review the standards or to undertake objective
assessments of compliance.
The OFCs’ experience also validates the proposed theory that
certain non-TRNs with TRN characteristics can combine with TRNs
to create a far more legitimate and effective system for creating and
spreading the effect of global standards. The IMF was able to play
this role by supplying some of the helpful features missing from the
Basel Committee. The IMF had a near universal membership. The
fact that IMF members were states and not local expert regulators
was mitigated by the relative independence of a highly expert staff.
The IMF supplied both an independent review of the standards and a
relatively neutral and subjective method for assessment of
compliance. Thus, an organization with beneficial TRN and non-TRN
characteristics may help mitigate the predicated deficiencies of a
TRN; together they may advance the adoption of best practices
creating the most effective and beneficial standards system.
The combination of the Basel Committee and IMF also helped
protect offshore centers from the predations of onshore centers.
Because of the transparent legitimacy of the system, onshore
regulators were constrained from acting against resident financial
institutions that did business with financial institutions in offshore
centers. Thus, the combination of an organization with beneficial
TRN and non-TRN characteristics may protect relatively weak states
from the self-interested actions of the strong, creating a better
standards system.
The OECD and FATF had a more difficult time, demonstrating
the problems of operating without the legitimacy of a TRN and/or an
organization with TRN (and certain non-TRN) characteristics. With
respect to the Harmful Tax Practices Project, the OECD did not have
enough positive TRN characteristics to achieve legitimacy. By moving
to the Global Forum on Transparency, it did. The FATF did not have
quite enough positive TRN characteristics to achieve enough
legitimacy. It was, however, able to involve the IMF, whose beneficial
TRN and non-TRN characteristics helped once again to create a
legitimate system of review and assessment, advancing best practices
and protecting weak states from the actions of the strong. Thus, a
system that combines the most beneficial TRN and non-TRN
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characteristics among participating organizations results in the most
effective and beneficial standards system.
The OFC experience suggests two additional observations.
Outside observers accept that the substantive standards of TRNs are
accepted as best practices because observers (largely) agree that they
are best. Had the IMF agreed to adopt the OECD’s standards, it
would have been through political influence of member states or
some other means that would render meaningless its beneficial TRN
(and beneficial non-TRN) characteristics.
CONCLUSION
The title of this Article is “On the Use and Abuse of Standards
for Law.” With respect to the OFC experience with prudential
regulation and anti-money laundering rules, the use of standards for
“law” (using the word “law” here to mean a rule that is, practically
speaking, not optional), standards are well “used.” The combination
of the Basel Committee/FATF and the IMF, with the former using
relatively independent expertise to create the standards and the latter
using more representative, if less expert, skill to review and assess
compliance, resulted in a (relatively) positive result, both in terms of
substance and procedural fairness. The hard power of local regulators
was guided, and restrained, by the process. The process is relatively
free from the often problematic origins of traditional international
law, guided as it is by states’ views of principle or ideology (both of
which may not be guided by technical expertise applied to solve
technical problems) and state self-interest (which can overwhelm
both technical considerations and the interests of weak states).
This Article views the larger onshore centers’ attempt to use the
OECD to create and enforce income tax rules as an attempt to abuse
standards as law. In fact, the OECD did not succeed in creating and
implementing a generally accepted standard that satisfied all parties
and that protected the legitimate interests of the weak against the
strong. While OECD members were able to force much of the
OECD’s agenda on OFCs through the coordinated threat of imposing
the hard power of domestic tax authorities, the apparent lack of the
system’s full legitimacy worked to reduce its effectiveness. Brute
force has always been available to powerful states to force change on
weaker states; the attempt to create an income tax standard did not
change that fact, though it may very well have mitigated its
effectiveness. The OECD’s partial retreat into the Global Forum and
its less heinous standard and fairer method of assessment is perhaps
proof of this.
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Another way of viewing the use (and failure of the abuse) of
standards for law is the triumph of objectivity. The application of
technical expertise to solve technical problems is designed to be
objective (based on facts) and not subjective (based on viewpoint).
The standards are reviewed by an objective process. They are then
generally accepted through objective review by domestic sub-state
actors. The assessment of compliance is accomplished by an objective
process. Ratings of compliance can then be used by local sub-state
actors to guide their application of hard power.
What then is the answer to the question posed by Nietzsche:
Does the objectivity implied in the use of standards for law originate
in a “heightened need and demand for justice,” or does objectivity
just “create the appearance” of such need? A comparison of the
serious criticism levied on the false application of objectivity in the
income tax area with the general acceptance of the real application of
objectivity in the other areas argues for a tentative “yes.” The validity
of this tentative “yes” may be tested during the current period of
international recession. No doubt OFCs are hoping that it is not
merely a “detrimental and too flattering bias.”
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APPENDIX: FSF, OECD, AND FATF LISTS491

COUNTRY

FSF OFC

OECD

OECD

OECD

OECD

FATF

FATF

FATF

FATF

FATF

Prudential

Tax

Tax

Tax

Tax

NCCTs

NCCTs

NCCTs

NCCTs

NCCTs

3rd Tier

Havens

Havens

Havens

Havens

2000

2001

2002

2005

June

List

2000

2001

2004

2006

2006

2000

AFRICA

Egypt

Liberia

X

Maldives

X

Seychelles

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

ASIA and PACIFIC

Cook Islands

X

Indonesia

Marshall
X

X

X

X

X

X

Islands

Myanmar
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

(Burma)

Nauru

X

X

Niue

X

X

Samoa

X

X

Tonga

X

X

Vanuatu

X

X

X

X

X

EUROPE

Andorra

Cyprus

X

X

X

Gibraltar

X

Guernsey

X

Hungary

X

Isle of Man

X

Jersey

X

Liechtenstein

X

X

X

X

X

X

491. Brigitte Unger & Joras Ferweda, Regulating Money Laundering and Tax Havens:
The Role of Blacklisting 5–6, 8–9 (Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute, Utrecht
School of Economics, Discussion Paper Series No. 08-12, 2008), available at
http://www.uu.nl/uupublish/content/08-12.pdf; IMF, Offshore Financial Centers IMF
Background Paper (June 23, 2000), http://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/oshore/2000/eng/
back.htm.
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Monaco

X

Russia

X

X

X

X

Ukraine

X

X

X

MIDDLE EAST

Bahrain

X

Israel

Lebanon

X

X

X

X

X

AMERICAS

Antigua &

X

X

Anguilla

X

X

Aruba

X

X

Bahamas

X

X

Barbuda

Barbados

Belize

X

X

X

X

X

X

Bermuda

British
Virgin
Islands

Cayman
X

X

Islands

Costa Rica

X

Dominica

X

Grenada

X

Montserrat

X

X

X

X

X

Netherlands
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Antilles

St. Kitts &
Nevis

St. Lucia

X

X

X

X

St. Vincent
& the
Grenadines

Turks &
Caicos
Islands

X

